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This thesis focuses on the strategies through which poor migrants in a Dhaka slum seek to se-
cure their livelihoods. The main argument of the thesis is that in order to understand these strate-
gies it is important to identify and analyse the multiple relationships in which the slum dwellers 
are involved. It is through relationships and networks that the poor create and recreate the type of 
social capital which allows them access to resources and helps to make their social, political and 
economic environments more predictable and secure.  In the face of exclusion from urban service 
provision and a location largely outside the formal economy, the strategies of the poor mainly op-
erate in the context of a system of informal rights.  
 
In tracing different relationships and networks, the thesis identifies the important role played 
by a particular group of actors, the ‘strong men’ of the slum, or ‘mastaans’.  Although mastaans are 
normally associated with violence and crime, the thesis shows how they also offer access to ser-
vices, contacts and market opportunities that are essential to the survival prospects of slum dwell-
ers. The mastaans play a critical role in the creation and maintenance of the system of informal 
rights. Ironically therefore, it is through mastaans that the urban poor develop and strengthen their 
social capital, while at the same time the mastaans co-opt that social capital for their own purposes.  
 
The thesis offers both theoretical and empirical insights into both the wider process of urbanisa-
tion in Bangladesh, as well as the survival strategies of particular slum dwellers. Chapter two in-
troduces the slum area where the fieldwork was carried out while chapters five, six and seven ex-
plore various aspects of the migration and survival strategies of the slum dwellers. The first chap-
ter presents a critical review of the literature on the process of urbanisation, with particular refer-
ence to the Bangladesh context. Finally, chapters three and four describe the key methodological 
and theoretical issues that have guided the research.  
 
   The conclusion reflects on the main findings of the thesis and highlights some policy implica-
tions. These suggest that awareness of the significance of relationships and networks to slum live-
lihoods must occupy central place in any development intervention. Rather than seeking to effect 
the immediate exit of the poor from mastaan dominated structures, the emphasis should be on 
gradually building up alternative forms of social capital, critically under-girded by the establish-
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This thesis focuses on the responses of the urban poor to social transformation in the 
context of a slum in Dhaka, Bangladesh. In studying rural social transformation in Bang-
ladesh, the structure of relationships has been prioritised by a number of authors (Wood 
1994, McGregor 1991, Lewis et al 1996  and Devine 1999). A serious ethnography of the 
urban context, however, has as yet not been produced. This research contributes to two 
broad areas where present understanding is still very limited. First, it will address the 
research/knowledge gap which exists with regard to urban ethnography. Second, it will 
focus on the role of a particular set of actors in the lives of the urban poor, the ‘strong 
men’, or  mastaans. 
This research was carried out in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. This is today a 
mega city with more than 8 million inhabitants. When I first moved to Dhaka in Septem-
ber 1977 from Jessore, a district in the South-West of Bangladesh, I remember noting how 
much of the city was permanently or temporarily submerged under water. Things have 
changed radically since then - Dhaka is now a mega city with half of its total population 
living in poverty and half of its land area occupied by slum dwellers. Where there was 
once water, there now stand slums. The world of the urban poor in Bangladesh has not 
attracted academics, researchers and official planners but development activists. NGOs 
have been working for the urban poor since the late 1980s with either pilot projects or 
adaptations of rural development strategies. In 1995, realising the need for further under-
standing of the urban context, Proshika, one of the largest NGOs in Bangladesh under-
took an Urban Livelihoods Study (ULS) in collaboration with the London School of Hy-
giene and Tropical Medicine and the University of Bath, UK. One of the aims of the study 
was to impact on policy formulation processes so that development programmes de-
signed for the urban poor can be anchored in a better informed and sound knowledge 
base. Thus, the ULS had a multi-disciplinary focus and combined both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to investigation. I was responsible for the qualitative part of the 
ULS and this research is a further development of that investigation.  
My research  for this thesis has developed in a fairly unconventional way. It began 
with my experience in carrying out the ULS qualitative work. As I explored their stories 




whole survival strategy. The phrase is ‘line lagao’ which translates as ‘make a connection’ 
or ‘contacts’. This thesis attempts to analyse the meaning and implications of this phrase.  
When bustee dwellers use the phrase ‘line lagao’, they refer to the importance of social 
relationships for their survival. Bustee dwellers enjoy few, if any, formal rights and nei-
ther the state nor the formal market offers them access to employment opportunities, 
welfare, urban services and so on.  By saying ‘line lagao’, the bustee dwellers indicate that 
where urban poverty and vulnerability prevail, the only survival option is to ‘make con-
nections’ with people who can either provide the services both the state and market fail 
to deliver, or can facilitate access to the same services. 
In tracing the connections or relationships which facilitate survival in the bustees, one 
particular set of actors figured prominently: the mastaans. The mastaans represent a con-
tradiction. On the one hand they are the ‘strong men’ of the slums.  They control the bus-
tees through a ‘culture of violence’, exacting protection money and demanding total sub-
ordination.  Outside of the bustees they therefore have an overwhelmingly negative im-
age. Inside, however, they show themselves to be vital actors in the urban political econ-
omy.  They are the intermediaries who negotiate and deliver important services for the 
urban poor, in particular shelter and employment.  Far from being isolated strong indi-
viduals, together they constitute a structure which ensures service delivery in exchange 
for monopoly control over the bustee. To understand the livelihoods of the urban poor, it 
thus became clear that it was necessary to understand the mastaan structure.  For it is this 
produces informal rights  controls the codes of conduct which govern bustee economy 
and culture.  
This thesis focuses on the sources of the mastaan’s monopoly control over the bustee. 
Primary amongst these are the lack of formal rights and the absence of appropriate bustee 
social organisations. The lack of formal rights means that the bustee dwellers need inter-
mediaries to provide them with access to the services they require.  This provides the op-
portunity which the mastaans can exploit. At the same time recent migration from rural 
areas means an absence of the lineage based institutions that form an important link in 
village level social organisation and control.  Again, the mastaans provide the missing 




day to day running of the bustee and the people who reside therein. Looked at this way, it 
can be seen that the mastaans make the bustee economy and society functional.  
The functions that the mastaan structure provides in the bustee context is a central con-
cern of this research.  However, the thesis does not aim to provide an ethnography of the 
mastaans as such.  Rather, their significance is considered in the context of the bustee 
dwellers’ need to ‘make connections’ in order to pursue their livelihoods. The central fo-
cus is thus on how the bustee migrants survive, and the concern with the mastaans arises 
in as much the structure of social relationships and individual behaviour in the bustee are 
embedded within the mastaan structure.  Secondly, although this research cites rural ex-
amples to make the challenges of bustee society clearer, this research considers the con-
struction of bustee community or society only rather than  comparing it  with rural tradi-
tional society.  
As mentioned earlier, the strategy of ‘line lagao’ refers to a deliberate attempt to devel-
op contacts or networks in order to achieve specific aim. In order to understand the gam-
ut of relationships involved under the informal rights produced by the mastaan structure, 
I make use of and build on the notion of social capital. This approach allows me to con-
sider the mastaan structure in a wider perspective. Thus, the mastaan structure is consid-
ered not only as a criminal organisation but as an organisation which offers benefits to a 
number of actors which are required for their survival in an uncertain and insecure situa-
tion. The combination of these factors allows actors to create environments of  relative 
predictability and trust.  
In facilitating such environments of predictability and trust in the bustee community, 
the mastaan structure can be considered as producing a form of social capital that repre-
sents a ‘public goods’.  On the other hand, the type of social capital produced by such 
Mafia-type organisations is generally considered  to be a ‘public bads’. This thesis argues 
that there is a problem when the designation ‘public bads’ follows simply from general-
ised norms and the imposition of an external value judgement. In this thesis the mastaans 
cannot be said to be wholly good or bad.  On the one hand the mastaan structure facili-
tates action producing informal rights where legal rights produced by state and market 
are absent, but on the other mastaans undertake much criminal activity. Therefore, from 




‘bad’ but at the same time empirically it produces the most important resource for the 
survival of the bustee dwellers, and so must be considered as ‘good’.  This thesis, in exam-
ining  the role of the mastaan structure in relation to the bustee dwellers’ survival, high-
lights this tension and generates the question: how can ‘public bads’ be bad when the 
survival of others depends on them? In order to address this issue, the process of the cre-
ation of social capital and its use for survival in bustee context with regards to informal 
rights, is a major theme throughout  this thesis.  
The analysis of the bustee mastaan structure is complemented by an overview of the 
mastaans in the wider political economy of Bangladesh. Although this research focuses on 
the micro level of one bustee, the findings are relevant for other bustee contexts. I men-
tioned earlier that my research developed in an unconventional way. The research idea 
was first generated during fieldwork and the theoretical elaboration followed later.  To a 
certain extent the experience of moving from fieldwork to analysis and concentration is 
reflected in the thesis structure. Chapters dealing with ethnography and theory are not 
separated as sharply as in conventional thesis structures. The thesis consists of seven 
main chapters, a conclusion and this introduction. 
            
           In the first chapter I attempt to provide an overview of the urbanization process and its 
consequences for poor people. I discuss this globally and then relate it to the context of 
Bangladesh.  I focus on two major points. First, urbanisation has introduced a global social 
transformation since a large share of the world’s population is now urban dwelling. The 
second point is that the urban social environment of Bangladesh reflects a situation in 
which the urban poor have become part of the modern urban economy. This urban 
economic system produces both opportunities and insecurities, uncertainties and risks for 
the poor since the economy operates or is regulated through a system of informal rights.  
         In the second chapter I illustrate some of the points discussed in the first chapter by 
introducing the slum or bustee where I carried out  my fieldwork. I highlight three main  
issues: a)  the problematic  nature of social organisation, b)  the nature of the urban cash 
economy and c)  the prevalence of a  ‘culture of violence’ in the bustee.  First, two im-
portant levels of social organisation are absent in the bustee: gusti (kinship) and lineage 
based neighbourhoods. As bustee households leave their rural homes, they tend to be-




associated  aspects of their social life. Second, the bustee economy is extremely cash based 
and this influences bustee migrants’ economic behaviour. Third, there is a new culture of 
violence prevalent in the bustee. Not surprisingly, mataans are involved in all three parts. 
The mastaan structure covers a range of coalitions and associations. They act: a) as agents 
who fulfill social functions; b) as intermediaries in the cash economy; and c) as actors 
who either use or threaten to use violence. 
  In the third chapter I attempt to show how the research was carried out. The research 
approximates the way bustee people live in that it focuses on sociology of everyday life. 
Such an approach cannot be fully organised in advance and does not limit itself to pre-
developed research methodologies. This thesis is exploratory in nature. I begin with con-
crete life experiences and from there I move towards theory in order to inform and 
strengthen my analysis. 
   In the fourth chapter I analyse the concept of social capital as a resource encom-
passed within social relationships. This form of capital influences action and the envi-
ronment in which it takes place. The concept of social capital has a growing number of 
applications and is normally used to denote effects that have positive outcomes. Howev-
er, it is a highly contested concept and in this chapter I use my research observations to 
develop the concept in a pertinent way.  
In chapter five, I make two main points. First, I argue that the decision to migrate is 
not only the product of push-pull factors. Pull factors may create exit options for mi-
grants, but the decision to migrate depends upon entry options in the town. The demand 
for labour alone is not sufficient to explain migration. The decision to migrate is highly 
correlated with the quality and quantity of the social capital resources of the migrants. 
Second, migration actually takes place within networks developed on the basis of kin. 
The migration process itself creates an opportunity to confirm, extend and re-make kin-
based networks. This is done primarily through developing relationships of fictive kin-
ship.  The ability to extend social networks is fundamental for those residing permanent-
ly in the bustee. 
  
In the chapter six, I present how bustee migrants extend and re-make their social lives 
while settling down in the bustee. I argue that the space created by the absence of both 
family and lineage neighbourhoods (see chapter two) is filled by different coalitions, so-




guishes rural from bustee contexts is that while in the former, kin based relationships are 
fundamental, in the latter non kin based relationship are prominent. The second argu-
ment I make is that the importance of the mastaan structure lies in its ability to produce 
multiplex relationships. The mastaan structure covers various coalitions and associations 
which create a strong structural foundation in the urban context. The ability to manipu-
late these relationships constitutes the basis of the mastaans’ authority and power. 
In the seventh chapter I attempt to show how bustee migrants use their social capital 
resources to create survival strategies. I argue that the survival of bustee households 
greatly depends upon their ability to produce social capital in the bustee context and to 
use this resource to gain access to other livelihood goods or outcomes. 
In the conclusion, I re-state the main empirical findings of the thesis and  discuss the  
theoretical and policy implications. From a theoretical perspective, I argue that social 
capital resources should be conceptualised as value neutral when they are required for 
survival. As far as policy implications are concerned, this research suggests that any de-
velopment intervention in the slums needs to understand the relationships and networks 
that exist and are in use in the bustee livelihoods. Without creating the option for alterna-
tive social capital and environments with formal rights, any action requiring immediate 
exit of the bustee dwellers from the mastaan structure would not be either practicable or 





Chapter One  
URBAN SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND URBAN 
LANDSCAPE IN BANGLADESH 
1. Introduction 
As urbanisation is a key characteristic of the present world, it invites academic debate, 
discussion, criticism and speculation since it reflects the contradictory combination of 
wealth and poverty. Urbanisation brings about social transformation by shifting a high 
proportion of the rural population into cities. A combination of a real increase in urban 
population and increased coverage of new areas by urban growth ensure that the global 
landscape is becoming an urbanised one, changing the global environmental landscape 
from green to grey (Stanley 1988). Although urbanisation is a worldwide phenomenon, 
Asia has the highest share of the global urban population and five countries i.e. China, 
India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh share two-thirds of the Asian urban popula-
tion. Among these five, Bangladesh has so far experienced the lowest level of urbaniza-
tion, even if it still has a high growth rate of urban population (Afsar 1995a).  Dhaka, the 
capital city of Bangladesh, where I carried out my fieldwork, has become a mega city. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to understand the social transformation that is tak-
ing place through urbanisation and the effect this has especially in the case of Bangla-
desh. This chapter will therefore incorporate both global and local dimensions of the ur-
banisation phenomenon.  
 
2. Global Urban Social Transformation 
Although urban social transformation is a global phenomenon, rapid urbanisation 
mostly takes place in developing countries where it is strongly related with the phenom-
enon of development. Modernization policies, designed to alleviate rural poverty, have 
been introduced throughout developing countries, and have been widely associated with 
the shift of labour from agriculture to industry, and of population from rural to urban 
locations. Urbanisation in developing countries is thus considered from the modernisa-




phenomenon of urbanisation, I intend looking at three interrelated points: i) develop-
ment perspectives; ii) common features of urban social transformation; and iii) how its 
consequences are perceived. 
  
2.1. Development Perspectives 
While urban poverty has received some attention in Latin America, it is only recently 
that its importance has been recognised by researchers and development planners in 
South Asia. Two main factors are responsible for this: a) the importance afforded to rural 
development, b) the negative tone of the early urban ethnographies, which associated the 
urban poor to a large degree with crime and social disorder.  
The first factor relates to the emphasis given to rural development especially by mod-
ernisation paradigms. It was assumed after the colonial period that the problem of  pov-
erty in the South would be solved if the rural sector could be modernised. Within the 
modernisation paradigm there were contradictory approaches: on the one hand to en-
hance urbanisation and on the other to reallocate resources from the urban to the rural 
sector. Firstly, modernisation paradigms enhanced urbanisation by establishing the 
towns as centres of growth. At the same time, the introduction of the so-called ‘green 
revolution’ technology led to polarization in rural society, and so brought the rural poor 
into the city. 
Secondly, this development paradigm was strongly complemented by arguments 
about resource allocation, to which Lipton’s popular ‘urban bias’ theory has contributed.  
Lipton (1977) strongly argued that the main problem with the less developed countries is 
that the allocation of material resources, organisation and power is urban-based while 
the majority of the population lives in the rural areas. Furthermore, he argued that gov-
ernment taxation and expenditure policies mainly favour the urban population, the bet-
ter off section of the population, causing national income inequalities. The ‘urban bias’ 
thesis thus argues for less resource allocation to the urban sector. This perspective was 
also supported by other theorists. For example, Hoselitz (1957) described the city as ‘par-
asitic’ because in his mind the development of cities requires the transfer of rural re-




associated with the wealthy, and in South Asia at least, the issue of urban poverty was 
rarely considered by development discourse. 
The second reason is related to the view that the poor living in the urban areas are 
seen as problem creators. It was thought that material deprivation made the poor frus-
trated to the point that they would reject the dominant values of urban society (Lewis 
1967). Their inability to participate in the wider urban economic system would make the 
poor cynical and foster mistrust against the government and other social institutions. 
Furthermore, they would feel helpless and suffer from a sense of insecurity and inferiori-
ty. This would result in a ‘culture of poverty’, perpetuated from one generation to the 
next (Lewis 1958, 1967). 
 
2.2 Common Features  of Urban Social Transformation 
As mentioned earlier, urbanisation is generally seen in positive terms from the mod-
ernisation perspective but in reality such social transformation can have negative effects, 
producing a number of consequences which lead to urban poverty. Urban social trans-
formation in developing countries is characterised by three distinguishable features.  
Firstly, the growth of the urban population has led to the creation of mega cities. In 
1950 there were only two mega cities in the world (London and New York) while by 1990 
there were fourteen mega cities in developing countries of which nine were in Asia. 
These mega cities or ‘urban conglomerations’ normally have a population of eight mil-
lion or more (Afsar 1995a), and absorb most of the country’s urban population. For ex-
ample, half of the total urban population of Thailand lives in Bangkok. 
Secondly, it has been found that most cities are densely populated. For example, Cal-
cutta in India is the most densely populated Asian city, while the number of persons per 
habitable room is highest in Karachi, at 3.6. The density of population in Dhaka is com-
paratively lower than other Asian cities; it was 9,930 per km. sq. in 1980-88, but the densi-
ty in slum areas is as high as 162,000 per square kilometer (Table 1.1). 
Thirdly, such a pattern of urban growth produces sub-human settlements where liv-




threat to people’s lives as inadequate urban provision results in the mushrooming of ‘in-
formal’ settlements like slums and squatter colonies (table 1.1). 
 
 
Table 1.1: Slum and squatter formations and urban overcrowding in selected Asian 
countries and cities 





Major city with highest popu-
lation density 
 
   City Population per 
Km2 1980-88 
Republic of Korea 47 1.5 Seoul 15.932 
Japan - 0.8 Tokyo 13,973 
Indonesia 54 - - - 
Malaysia 15 1.2 Kuala Lampur 4,712 
Philippines 28 2.3 Manila 45,839 
Thailand 16 - Bangkok 3,486 
Bangladesh 47 2.9 Dhaka 9,930 
India 36 2.8 Calcutta 88,135 
Pakistan - 3.6 Karachi 3,990 
Sri Lanka 21 2.1 - - 
Source: Afsar 1995a quoted from UN, 1993b 2- 42 and 2- 47. 
It is generally argued that slums and squatter settlements are the result of overcrowd-
ing in the city (Islam 1996, Afsar 1995a). The cities continually attract the rural popula-
tion, but fail to provide sufficient shelter or services. Migration from rural to the urban 
areas contributes to making cities bigger and more overcrowded, thus creating an obsta-





2.3 How are the Consequences  Perceived? 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter urban poverty is a relatively new area 
of interest in development studies in South Asia. Elsewhere, while much of the early re-
search presented various aspects of the urban phenomenon in negative terms later stud-
ies reacted by underlining the positive aspects of urban poor and their overall contribu-
tion to the national economy. In the following sections I review these discussions in a lit-
tle more detail. 
 
General Perceptions 
First, there is a tendency to label the urban poor as a ‘neither category’. The  ‘neither 
category’ can express both geographical and sociological perspectives. From a geograph-
ical point of view,  ‘neither categories’ arise through a re-classification of urban areas.  
Although the growth in urban population is associated with a real increase in the cities’ 
population, it also occurs because a wide range of rural areas are reclassified or redefined 
as urban areas. This re-classification may occur even with the introduction of a few mod-
ern facilities, like electricity or roads. “In China (which has an enormous impact on glob-
al urbanisation statistics due to its population size), vast tracts of countryside are includ-
ed in the catchment area of cities in order to provide reservoirs and hydro-electric power 
supplies for urban dwellers” (Wratten 1995:21). In view of this, Wratten (1995:21) raises 
the question, “Should peri-urban areas be classified as urban, rural or neither catego-
ries?”. From a sociological point of view, it is observed that the migrated population fol-
lows a pattern of circular migration, shuttling between town and countryside. Although 
they live in a slum, dwellers are not fully integrated into either the city or rural areas 
(Lloyd 1979). In this sense they are people who seems to belong to a ‘neither category’. 
A second perspective offers a more positive scenario. It has been shown that migrant 
labourers gain a substantial income through their participation in the urban informal la-
bour sector. Furthermore, as the urban inhabitants are concentrated in a smaller area, the 
supply of necessities like piped water and electricity is  easier and cheaper to provide 
(Peterson et al. 1991). This helps the poor set up small enterprises. A micro study in Mexi-
co suggests that even female labourers can find opportunities to set up small enterprises 




sector can achieve higher incomes than wage labourers. It has also been suggested that 
the informal sector positively contributes to the urban economy in particular and to the 
national economy in general. Moreover, both opportunities for participation and the 
higher incomes of the rural migrant labourers contribute to the rural economy. Migrants 
often send back home part of their incomes and this benefits the rural economy (Mohan 
1984). 
 
Sub-Culture  Perspective 
     As mentioned earlier, urban poverty is often presented negatively because crime and 
social disorder are seen as characteristics of the ‘culture of poverty’. This concept was de-
veloped by Lewis' biographical description of the experiences of migrants who lived in 
the cities of Puerto Rico and Mexico.  The high population density and concentrated set-
tlements contribute to a culture of mistrust and lack of community solidarity. Moreover, 
such settlements have the reputation of being a haven for  criminals and are often re-
ferred to  as ‘urban ghettos’ (Bartles-Smith et al 1976). The communities of the urban poor 
are seen to be helpless, having low expectations, to be dependent and to have an inferior-
ity complex. This leads to the notion that vulnerability and insecurity are perpetuated by 
the poor people themselves, as they are internally competitive, have little sense of com-
munity, a cynical view of life and a mistrust of and lack of participation in formal institu-
tions (Lewis1967).  Lewis gave an account of the structure of relationships, horizontal in 
nature, among the poor but this structure does not create wider solidarity for social ac-
tion. The problematic nature of community is thus a key element in vulnerability and in-
security.  Most critically, Lewis (1967:50) argues that the marginality of the urban poor 
becomes a self-perpetuating process:  
"By the time slum children are six or seven they have usually 
absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their sub-culture and are not 
psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or 
increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime".  
 
     This theme has been taken up more recently in the ‘underclass’ debate.  This identifies 




nancy and drug addiction - that would persist even if the economic opportunities exist-
ed” (Fukuyama 1995:38). 
Similarly, Banfield (1967) found that in a Southern Italian peasant community after the 
second world war, the social ties and moral obligations were limited and individuals did 
not trust each other, thus limiting wider solidarity within the community. Based on this 
observation he developed the concept known as ‘amoral familism’ which means that 
these communities develop a cynical view of life with low expectations and submit 
themselves to a relationship of clientelism dominated by criminal gangs. This is seen in 
Southern Italy where the economy is facilitated by the Mafia who emerged as a result of 
distrust produced in wider society (Gambetta 1988). Various urban studies show that 
slum communities are often dominated by the gangs who produce a ‘culture of violence’ 
(Moser and Holland 1995).  Alternatively, however, it can be argued paradoxically that 
trust is produced and maintained through these same intermediaries, and this facilitates 
socio-economic action (Khan 1998). However, the trust in intermediaries does not pro-




          The extension of citizenship to the poor is important as it “focuses on the ways in 
which and extent to which people exercise that right collectively to make changes in the 
way resources are allocated “(Roberts 1995:185). The socio-political marginality of the 
poor produces livelihood vulnerability by limiting various rights to get access to market 
and to participate in the political process. Thus, the allocation of citizenship rights 
becomes a practical issue. 
    When focusing on social integration, sociologists consider the urban poor as 'marginal’,   
“a person who belongs to two cultures or societies, being fully integrated into neither" 
(Lloyd 1979:60). The lack of integration is also reflected in the ideas of conventional 
economists who consider the slum dwellers as "parasitic upon society and should there-
fore be eliminated that is excluded from the town or transformed into wage earn-
ers"(ibid:60). The idea of elimination of the poor from urban society echoes the denial of 




ban setting. The denial of citizenship rights is reflected in state policy where the access of 
the urban poor to resources is restricted. For example, there is no policy or provision to 
allocate land to the urban poor in Bangladesh. As their access to the city land is denied, 
(Islam 1986), slums and squatters become the only abode for the poor migrants (Afsar 
1996). Since the state appears to feel no obligation to these people, the urban poor can 
neither establish nor protect their citizenship rights. The lack of rights of tenure can be 
cited as an example of the preceding. Slum houses constructed on government fallow or 
disputed land are managed, operated and controlled by the mastaans - intermediaries or 
brokers - living either in the bustee or in nearby non-bustee houses. Apart from the high 
rent which is as high as that of the most expensive commercial area, the operators pre-
serve the right to terminate or evict the poor, if and when they wish to do so. The exercise 
of the right to evict the poor migrants adds further vulnerability to urban poor liveli-
hoods and  this is exacerbated by the state when it takes initiatives to dismantle the 
slums. 
The state’s contribution to marginality is acknowledged by political scientists when 
they consider "marginal those who do not participate fully in the modern democratic 
process" (Lloyd 1979:61). The denial of citizenship right excludes the poor from enjoying 
city services like education, health and social security. Apart from the lack of city ser-
vices, the unauthorized development of slums on government fallow and disputed lands 
does not allow people to construct the minimum infrastructure required for living such 
as sanitary toilet, internal roads, drainage. The lack of the minimum required physical 
infrastructure has adverse effects on human health, and in turn on human resources. The 
ill health of income earners threatens the survival of the bustee migrants in the urban 
economy. Moreover, the scope of developing human resources is further restrained due 
to lack of access to education and skill-oriented services; access to education is limited 
both by the non-availability of schools and by the child labour required for families’ live-
lihoods. The preceding discussion suggests that urban poor livelihoods are maintained 
through a complex web, stemming from the default of state responsibility and the ab-






Asset Vulnerability Framework 
     The asset vulnerability framework has been developed to bring the ‘asset ownership’ 
concept from rural to the urban context.  Sen (1982) conceptualised ‘entitlement’ by relat-
ing it to the two dimensions of  ‘endowment’ and ‘exchange’. Since Sen’s work, which 
sees this asset ownership concept in terms of ‘entitlement’, debate on it continues and 
lists of assets are continually added when assets are considered in relation to food securi-
ty and vulnerability.  
 
Based on Sen’s work two asset ownership approaches have been merged: identifica-
tion of  ‘investments, stores and right to claim’ has been combined with identification of 
‘risk to food entitlements’. Vulnerability and security are seen as a function of asset-
holding by Swift (1989) when he identifies: ‘investments’ as being human in education 
and health, physical in housing and land;  ‘stores’ as being food, expensive goods like 
jewelry; and the ‘right to claim’ as being networks with kin, friends or patron. Maxwell 
and Smith (1992) also classify five sources of entitlements: productive capital, non-
productive capital, human capital, income and claims.  
The above mentioned asset ownership analysis approaches have been developed on 
the basis of evidence from the rural sector. Moser (1998) has classified assets as a function 
of vulnerability and security in the urban sector. She identified its three generalised char-
acteristics: ‘commoditisation’, ‘environmental hazard’, and ‘social fragmentation’ and 
sees the level of these to vary from rural to urban life. Moser (1998) therefore developed 
an ‘asset vulnerability framework’ which identifies those assets which are essential to 
reduce vulnerability or secure livelihoods of the urban poor. The ‘asset vulnerability 
framework’ has therefore been developed to classify assets as Moser (1998:4) summaris-
es: 
*     “ Labour - commonly identified as the most important asset of poor people. 
*      Human capital - health status, which determines people’s capacity to work, and 
skills and education, which determine the return to their labor. 
*       Productive assets - for poor urban households the most important is often hous-
ing. 





*      Social capital - reciprocity within communities and between households based 
on trust  deriving from social ties.” 
     
 Moser (1996, 1998) shows that achieving a successful livelihood depends upon the abil-
ity of people to manage resources which are transformed in two distinct ways: through 
the intensification of the existing strategy and through developing  new or diversified 
strategies. 
To sum up, it can be said that the  rapid urbanisation which  contributes to the  rise of 
mega cities and urban growth is a significant expression of  social transformation. Such 
social transformation, however, does not bring a high share of urban resources or facili-
ties to the majority of those who become the urban poor. The nature of urban physical 
and social environments have thus become a matter of debate. Viewed negatively, urban-
ization is seen to create densely populated settlements which are responsible for a series 
of environmental and ecological problems. By contrast, other studies show more positive 
aspects of urbanisation. The urban poor are not marginalised, rather they  participate in 
the social, political and economic activities, and so contribute to the overall economy. 
They are urban actors who construct different opportunities within the urban economy 
(Perlman 1976).  In this the role of informal economy has been well recognised. In the fol-





3. Urban Landscape in Bangladesh 
Like other developing countries, Bangladesh has witnessed an increase in its urban 
population and a concentration of that population in the mega city of Dhaka. As a conse-
quence, Dhaka is full of slums which contain half of the city’s entire population. This 
produces a complex situation with a combination of physical problems in the cities and 
social tensions between different urban communities. I will offer an overview  of general 
urban landscape focusing on : a) the increasing urban poor population, b) poor people’ 
settlements, c) informal sector and d) an important urban actor: the mastaan. In this con-
nection I will also introduce two urban terms which are frequently applied in the urban 
context in Bangladesh and are particularly relevant for this study. The terms are bustee 
and mastaan. The bustee  is the local term used for slums and squatters settlements and 
mastaan is an well known  urban actor. 
 
3.1. Urban Social Transformation: the Concentration of Urban Population in the 
Large Cities and Contributions of Slum Settlements 
In order to understand the nature and consequences of urban social transformation, I 
will focus on three interrelated issues: a) the nature of urbanisation; b) the factors respon-
sible for the growth of urbanisation and c) the significant consequences of urbanisation. 
    Although Bangladesh has a low level of urbanisation compared with its neighbouring 
countries, Bangladesh has experienced a rapid rate of urban growth over the last three 
decades. In very broad terms, between 1961-1981 the rate of growth was around 8%, 
while from 1981 to 1991 it was 6% average, about 8% during 1961-81, and 6% during 
1981-91. Even with the projected declining trend, the urban growth rate is unlikely to be 
less than 4% until 2010 (Task Force, vol. 3, 1992). Given  the country’s large population 
lower, the absolute size of the urban population is enormous. An estimated 23 million 
people are currently living in urban areas. By 2005, this figure is projected to rise to over 
46 million (Islam 1994), and by 2015 projections indicate that 68 million, or 37% of the 
population, will live in urban areas (Task Force, vol. 3, 1992). Crucially this rapid rate of 




planned urban or spatial development (Task Force vol. 3, 1992; UNDP; Alam 1987; Islam 
and Muqtada 1986; Shakur 1987, 1988). 
Secondly, a combination of three factors have been identified as being responsible for 
this rapid growth of urbanisation in Bangladesh (Islam 1997, Afsar 1995a). These are as 
follows: 
thenatural increase of the urban population i.e. the number of births exceeds that of 
deaths. 
the change in the definition of ‘urban areas’ i.e. the reclassification as ‘urban’  
rural to urban migration i.e.  new migrants from outside of the urban areas. 
Among the three factors mentioned above, the latter two are the main contributing 
factors to the increased urban population in the  Bangladesh for  the last four decades 
and will remain the major conributors  in near future (Afsar 1995a). 
In relation to rural-urban migration in Bangladesh, the UN estimates that this factor 
explains between three-fifths to two-thirds of urban growth (Afsar 1995a) and for some 
large cities this contribution is much higher. Large cities like Dhaka and Chittagong ab-
sorb the migrant population arriving from the rural areas. The rate of absorption of mi-
grants is as high as 70 percent. A survey conducted in 1995 found that 72 percent of ur-
ban poor household heads migrated to the cities (Islam 1997). The ULS survey conducted 
within the slum population suggests a much higher figure than 72%percentage share of 
other surveys. A rapid increase in the slum population mainly through migration  posi-
tively correlates to the increase of the urban poor in Dhaka. 
Natural population increase is another contributor to the general increase, although  in 
this case figures are  much more controversial. Citing the question of validity of the 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) data and referring to UN official data estimates, 
Afsar (1995a)  states  that 40% of the urban population can be accounted for  by natural 
increase between the 1960s and 1990s.  The UN  projection also shows that the contribu-
tion from the natural increase continues to grow. 
A third consequence is that  it is also evident that the changes in urban boundaries al-




significant when the upazila (Thanas - the lowest administrative unit were converted to 
upazila by the then Chief Martial Law Admistration in 1983) came to be considered part 
of the urban area. It appears that this boundary change contributed one-third to the ur-
ban growth between 1974 and 1981. 
A fourth consequence of urbanisation is that  it tends to lead to a situation in which  
the  urban population  is concentrated in the large cities and slum settlements generally 
emerge. Urban growth in Bangladesh is concentrated  in  two major cities: Dhaka, the 
capital city and Chittagong, the port city of Bangladesh. These two cities absorbed almost 
one third of the  total urban population in 1981 (Shahabuddin 1998)  and half of the coun-
try’s total urban population of the country in 1991 (Afsar 1995a). Dhaka  contains almost 
one third of the total urban population and half of those  live below the poverty line. It is 
estimated that half of the urban population (or 11.45 million people) live below the pov-
erty line and it is estimated that this number will increase to 22.72 million by  the year 
2010 (Task Force, Vol. 3, 1992). This  growth has had  serious consequences for the  phys-
ical and socio-economic conditions of the  cities (Task Force 1992; UNDP, 1993; CUS 1989; 
Madjumder et al. 1989; Miah et al. 1988). In particular,  it has led to the accelerated growth 
of urban and peri-urban slum settlements (Arefeen and Mahbub 1993).   
 
3.2. Bustee  (Slums and Squatter settlements): poor migrants residential place and 
uncertain settlements 
In the previous section I stated that the growth rate of the urban population has had  
an impact on the physical and socio-economic conditions of the cities. The most noticea-
ble impact in Dhaka is the emergence and extension of the slums and squatter settle-
ments throughout the city.  It is estimated that half of the total population are forced to 
live in slums and squatter settlements and these are urban poor who have migrated from 
the rural areas (Islam 1997). It may be useful to present the different terminologies used 
to describe the  settlements of poor migrants living in the urban areas and the main fea-
tures of the settlements.  
The urban literature on poor settlements in Bangladesh use the terms slums and 




Studies (CUS 1988) adopts the terminology from the United Nations Centre For Human 
Settlements)  and use the following definitions. as: 
Slums are areas and communities of high density (over 300 persons per acre) with 
high room crowding (3 or more adults per room), and poor housing (impermanent 
(kutcha), semi-permanent (semi-pucca) or dilapidated buildings). These have inadequate 
water supply, poor sewerage and drainage facilities, few paved streets and lanes and ir-
regular clearance of garbage. Such areas are inhabited by very poor and poor people who 
are mostly engaged in various types of informal sector activities. 
Squatter settlements are the areas where people illegally occupy land belonging to 
government or non-government organisations by erecting makeshift structures of vari-
ous nature for residential purposes.  
A range of names are used throughout the subcontinent to refer to urban poor settle-
ments: chowls in Bombay, katras in Delhi, cheris in Madras and bustees in Calcutta 
(Chakraborty and Rana 1993) and in Dhaka. In this study I will use bustee as a generic 
term for both slums and squatter settlements for a number of reasons. First, it is the term 
most used by the people in Bangladesh. Second, by using the general  term bustee  I will 
avoid the confusion that may arise from  using different names to different types of set-
tlements. For example, table 1.2 shows that settlements are developed on the lands of 
government, semi-governments, private organisation, as well as on private land. There 
are also settlements developed on mixed and disputed lands. With the term bustee, I in-
tend covering all these settlements types. Third, the management procedure of all settle-
ments is broadly similar. For example, both the settlements developed on government 
and private land are primarily managed and controlled through violence which makes 





Table 1.2: Land Ownership Pattern 
Land ownership No. of cluster Percentage 
Government/Semi-government 328 29.2 
Private (organisation) 23 2.0 
Private (individual) 733 65.1 
Mixed (public and private) 11 1.0 
Unidentified disputed 30 2.7 
Total 1125 100.0 
Source: Islam (1996:133) 
Although in this thesis I will use the term bustee, other researchers use different terms. 
When citing or referring of their work I will respect their own their terminological pref-
erences. The main features of the settlements will be presented by referring to a) their 




Table 1.3: Some Basic Aggregate Information about Slum and Squatter Settlements 
(Clusters) in Dhaka Municipal Corporation Area, 1988 
Type of Information Statistics 
Total number of settlements identified 1125 
Total area in acres 1340 
Estimated households (in 1125 clusters) 146400 
Estimated population (in 1125 clusters) 878000 
Total estimated population including mini clusters 1010,000 
Estimated number of structures 80000 
Average number of clusters per ward 15 
Average number of households per ward 1950 
Average number of population per ward 11700 
Average size of cluster (in acre) 1.20 
Average amount of slum area  per ward 18 acre/54 bighas 
Density of population (per square mile/km) 420000/162000 
Density of population (per acre) 655 
Percentage of clusters up to one bigha (0.33 acre) 61 
Percentage of clusters up to one acre ( 3 bighas) in size 81 
Average number of households per cluster 130 
Average number of population per cluster 780 
Percentage of clusters established after 1971 74 
Established median size of a cluster (area/household/population) 13 khathas/30/180 
Model pattern of monthly house rent Taka 200-250 
Percentage of clusters inundated (partly or fully) by 1987 flood 65 





The first striking feature of slums and squatter settlements is the physical condition. It 
is evident that the poor migrants live in inhuman conditions.  The settlements offer very 
poor housing, roads, sanitation and drainage, and basic facilities like water and energy. 
For example, with very few exceptions most of the houses are one-roomed including the 
cooking space. Generally the houses are small in size, constructed from fragile materials 
and are densely constructed. Such houses fail to  protect people  from winds, cold and 
rain (CUS 1983, 1988, Salway et al 1998)  and fail to  provide space for privacy.  
The conditions of slums are better than the house of squatter settlements in terms of 
construction material used. Most of the slum houses have kutcha (mud) walls and tin 
roofs, while squatter houses are constructed from  bara (woven bamboo sticks) for  wall 
and roof. Some houses are bell-shaped and are constructed with one sheet of  bara or pol-
ythene. They are so small that no adult can stand inside the house. These houses are 
known as ‘jhupri’. The ULS study found that the overall mean floor area per person is just 
2.3 square meters (Salway et al 1998). The population in both slums and squatter settle-
ments is extremely high. Table 1.3 shows that slums are densely populated with as high 
as 655 persons per acre or 162,000 persons per km. 
The very poor quality of sanitation together with the almost  or complete absence of a 
drainage system make the settlements’ physical condition even worse. Most of the la-
trines have  neither water-sealed nor kutcha drains. During the monsoon most of the 
houses are submerged  under water due to the over flows from poor drainage. The ULS 
report found that more than 52 % of  adult males and nearly 70% of adult females were ill 
during one round of  its data collection. The overall health situation is also affected by 
water use. There are some settlements where dwellers have access to piped or tubewell 
water either through illegal connections or from neighbouring houses. To use illegal con-
nections dwellers have to pay high ‘fees’ or wait a long time to collect water. Many  set-
tlements do not have   water supply and the dwellers use river or canal water. For exam-
ple, the dwellers in Beri Badh Bustee (BBB) use water from the river (Salway et al 1998) 
which is highly polluted by waste expelled from  nearby leather factories. Many settle-
ment dwellers enjoy electricity and gas through illegal connections but the connection is 
technically risky and is a main cause of fires in the slum areas. 
The second feature alluded to above is the concentration of population in city settle-




lowest administrative unit in municipality) is 1,950  and the  average population is 11,700 
.  While there are slums spread over all the wards of the city, slum settlements are con-
centrated in certain areas. For example, there is one ward in Dhaka city, namely ward No 
54, which mostly includes the Mothijeel colony area adjacent  to the Mothijeel comercial 
area, where there are no slums. The main reason for this is that  there is less land availa-
ble for constructing slums and there are very few employment opportunities other than 
domestic work in this residential areas. In contrast, there are concentrations of slums 
around the main market and business places. For example, in Islambagh, which includes 
important business centres and a river port, there is  a high concentration of slums and a 
high density of population (Islam 1996). The main rural areas from where migrants move 
to Dhaka city are: the central part of Bangladesh and especially the greater Dhaka dis-
trict; southern districts like Barishal, Faridpur and Patuakhali; south-east districts like 
Comilla and Noakhali; and Jamalpur a northern district (Islam 1996). All these districts 
are well connected to Dhaka by rivers and railways. For example, in slums in the wards 
connected to the river port concentrate regional migrants from Southern districts like Ba-
rishal and Patuakhali which are directly connected to Dhaka via rivers. Similarly, slums 
close to the railway stations are concentrated by migrants from districts like Jamalpur 
which have a rail connection with Dhaka. 
The different ‘routes of migration’ also contribute to the concentration of skills and oc-
cupations in certain areas. For example, many migrants from the South live in Islambag 
and work as kulis (labourers) at the river port. The ULS study found that in the slums 
which have been  established  for a long time there is a high concentration of skills (Sal-
way et al 1998). The reason behind such concentration is that migrants living in the newly 
settled slums are new and young and their main  objective is to enter  in the urban labour 
market. Most of the migrants (over 60%) will  accept almost  any job after arriving in  the 
city (Islam 1996). In contrast, long-time migrants move as their skills develop (Opel 1998). 
This skill generation process is basically attached to social networks. The combination of 
networks and the nature of job availability results in the concentration of  particular skills 
in particular areas. 
The concentration of skills is also influenced by information regarding job opportuni-
ties. For example, wage labourers who are employed on a daily basis need to belong to a 




or to different labour gangs. Similarly, job availability also influences skill concentration. 
For example, in commercial areas like Motijeel there are limited rickshaw garages due 
mainly to the lack of space while are very common in the Mohammadpur area (Opel 
1998). 
Slums are also characterised by age and sex. The available literature on migration to 
Dhaka slums confirms that people migrate at a young age (Islam 1996, CUS 1983, 1990, 
Afsar 1995a). In fact 80% of the migrants migrate between the ages of 16 and 25 years (Is-
lam 1996). Huq-Hussain (1996) also states that recent female migrants tend to be  com-
paratively younger. This present study confirms this finding for the case of single female 
migrants. Newly settled areas are therefore dominated by newer migrants who tend also 
to be younger.  
The fact that age and profession influence migration patterns results in another char-
acteristic, an imbalance in the sexes. The female-male sex ratio among migrant popula-
tion is 100:156 (Islam 1996). This means that slums tend to be numerically male dominat-
ed. However the increase in the number of jobs available in the export oriented garments 
industry has led to an increase in female migration and the slums situated close to the  
factories have predominantly more females. 
A third feature of the slum areas is the level of control exercised through violence.  
Key actors in the web of violence which characterises both slums and squatter settle-
ments are the mastaans. Living quarters are often developed and managed by mastaans 
who resort to violent tactics in order to extort protection money  from the dwellers. Vio-
lence is also used by house owners to receive rents on time and evict tenants. The use of 
violence is particularly common for evictions. Table 1.4 shows that the government de-














Table 1.4 : Agency Making the Eviction from the House /Area 
Types of crisis Dhaka (%) all urban (%) 
Govt. department 62.1 56.8 
Landlord 4.2 11.7 
Mastan (Mastaan) 19.7 21.6 
Uncertain 8.5 7.2 
semi-government 2.8 1.8 
Private orgainisation 1.4 0.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
n (number of households) 87.0 111.0 
Source: Reproduced from Islam et al (1997) 
 
 
3.3 The Urban Informal Sector: Opportunity for Employment and Source of Insecuri-
ty 
It is acknowledged that urban informal sector (UIS) is important  for its employment ab-
sorption capacity and its contribution to the economy (Peattie 1974, Harris 1982, Islam 
1996). However, the trends and characteristics of the UIS are poorly understood. This is 
mainly because of  lack of  time series data. Despite this, various studies highlight  the dual-
ism of the UIS. On the one hand, it contributes positively as a source of income, on the oth-
er hand, it is a source of insecurity and uncertainty (Harris 1986, ILO 1973, UNDP 1993,). 
An attempt will be made here to understand how the informal sector both offers oppor-
tunity and produces constraints for the urban poor in the context of  Bangladesh. 
In order to understand the UIS in the context of  Bangladesh, it is first necessary  to un-
derstand the most significant features of the sector. The task is not helped by the fact that 
there is a lack of reliable data.  Given this limitation I will follow two approaches. I will 
look at features of the urban sector in general from the official time series data and use oth-
er  studies to complement this data. First of all, I will use data produced by the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS). Unfortunately, this data cannot be disaggregated and it   does not in-
clude the persons engaged in household work. This creates two problems. First of all, dis-
aggregated data eludes my analysis. Secondly, women participation in the UIS is not ade-
quately reflected.  However, despite their limitations, the official government data clearly 
show that urban employment has been steadily rising over time compared to the rural sec-





Table  1.5 : Urban-rural employment share in Bangladesh 
(million) 
Year & source Bangladesh Urban Rural 
1961 Census 16.9 (100) 1.0 (6) 15.9 (94) 
1974 Census 21.9 (100) 2.1 (10) 19.8 (90) 
1981 Census 25.9 (100) 3.3 (13) 22.6 (87) 
1983-84 LFS 28.5 (100) 3.9 (14) 24.4 (86) 
1984-85 LFS 29.5 (100) 4.1 (14) 25.4 (86) 
1985-86 LFS 30.9 (100) 4.7 (15) 26.2 (85) 
1989 LFS 50.7 (100) 5.7 (11) 45.0 (89) 
1990-91  LFS 51.2 (100) 8.7 (17) 42.5 (83) 
Note: Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage 
Source: Islam et.al. (1997:65) 
 
Secondly, I will consider observations made by various micro and cross sectional studies 
on the informal sector in Bangladesh. It is evident from these studies that those  labour 
employed in the urban informal sector enjoy a wider range of opportunities compared to 
the rural sector. This is mainly due to the limited absorption capacity of the agricultural 
sector which slowed down even further during 1980s. Meanwhile there has been a nota-
ble development of the urban informal sector creating labour demand (UNDP 1993). In 
fact, as much as half of urban employment is provided by the informal sector, while a 
number of studies claim this share is much higher. For example, the World Bank (1992) 
claims that the urban formal sector provides only 10% of urban employment and the rest is 
provided by the informal sector. The urban informal sector has played an important role in 
generating employment  and income for  a large section of people living in the urban  areas. 
Islam (1996:70) notes: 
“It is now well recognised that the urban informal sector which comprises a 
number of small and micro enterprises and embodies a wide range of activities 
like hawking, street vending, letter writing, knife sharpening, garbage and 




Many studies confirm another important feature of the  urban informal sector: the par-
ticipation of women. (Amin et al 1997, Kibria 1995,  Mannan and Akter 1991). Between 1974 




14.5% in  the urban labour market, while the male labour force was 6.1%. The new open-
ings in export-oriented garments industries  have contributed to the  high rate of female 
labour force participation (Islam 1996). 
The high labour absorption capacity of the informal sector is both the source of oppor-
tunity,  but also  a  problem for the urban poor. The problem is conceptualised in two ways: 
‘barriers to entry’ and ‘free operation’. Insecurity for the poor is generated by the ‘barriers’ 
which protect people accessing employment opportunity. The barriers restricting entry are 
commonly seen in access to information and  the interlocked and social embedded charac-
teristics of the  market (Wood 1998, Opel 1998, Amin 1991). Although such characteristics 
of the market are considered  typical in a developing country, Granovetter (1977) argues 
that the social embeddedness of markets is equally visible and active for the markets of de-
veloped countries like USA. Granovetter ‘s work suggests that ‘barriers to entry’ is a gen-
eral market problem and that labour market entry heavily depends on networks, particu-
larly in terms of generating and accessing information. In the Bangladesh context, evidence 
suggests that ‘barriers to entry’ is an important mechanism and it may generate insecurity 
for the urban poor if they are excluded from information channels.   
 
There is some ambiguity in the notion of ‘barriers to entry’ for as mentioned earlier, 
there is labour demand in the UIS and new  migrants can secure employment soon after 
their arrival to the city.  In most cases within 15 days (CUS 1989,  Islam 1996, Huq-Hussain 
1996). This indicates that urban poor in Bangladesh in one way or another do in fact enter 
the labour market.  In reality however the informal sector is dominated by casual workers 
and dependent self-employed, who make up 39.9% and 25.2% respectively of the total la-
bour force (table 1.5). Labour market demand therefore does not ensure workers gain entry 
nor does daily employment ensure security. Wage labourers and self-employed workers 
like rickshaw pullers are employed on a day to day basis and there is no guarantee they will 
be employed the next day. For example, dependent self-employed workers like a rickshaw 
pullers, who depend on rickshaws of others for their employment, are not granted regular 
access to their means of survival.  
A second way of explaining the generation of insecurity is by refering to the   ‘free oper-
ation’ of informal markets. This ‘free operation’ has two dimensions. The first dimension 
refers to the structural flexibility and dynamics of the sector (ILO 1973, Amin 1986), while 




and employment security and labour segmentation (Amin 1986, Harris 1986). While study-
ing the Indian informal sector, Harris (1986) noted that the different nature and contextual 
arrangements among the categories of labour and the varied forms of contractual arrange-
ments produced insecurity of employment and income. Labourers who belong to the in-
formal sector do not enjoy formal protection or employment rights. 
       Furthermore, labourers are also denied the right to different services required to oper-
ate in the market,  like credit, skills and education. The lack of such rights in the informal 
sector generates insecurity.  
The insecurity  which exists  in the informal sector is highlighted when we analyse dif-
ferent labour categories of the urban labour market. Below I reorganise the employment 
data by the ULS study to capture differences associated with labour segmentation. 
 
Table 1.6: Labour Segmentation in Urban Labour Market 
Occupation category Percentage of peo-
ple involved 
Percentage reported 
missing at least one    
day of working 
Regular salaried worker (skilled) 11.0 7.1 
 
Wage worker 
Casual wage worker (skilled) 









Dependent self-employed worker 











Note: Estimated from  Salway et al (1998) 
Table 1.6 shows that there are three main categories of labourers in the informal sec-
tor. Around 50% of these labourers are in the self-employed categories. The self em-
ployed categories  may be broadly divided  into two groups: those  who are dependent  
on others’ means (e.g. rickshaw pullers) on a regular basis,  and those who are  independ-
ent (i.e. those who are work in their own establishment). The second highest percentage  
labourers are waged workers. These comprise around 40% of the total labourers engaged 
in the informal sector and it is the most significant category because labourers are em-




ous slum and informal sector studies show that daily wage labourers are employed in 
activities ranging from urban agriculture-related work to construction (Amin 1981,1986, 
1991, Majumder 1996, Salway et al 1998). They receive employment on a daily and on-
the-spot contractual basis. Females are employed as daily wage labourers (Salway et al 
1998). Finally, the regular salaried category is by far the lowest percentage, comprising 
only one tenth of total labour force. 
The insecurity generated from the informal sector is different for different labourer 
categories and can be categorised in three different sets: associated insecurity, mainly 
produced from insufficient income flows; uncertainty of the actual labour market and 
instability arising from self-employment. 
Associated insecurity refers to insecurity that is not generated directly from the em-
ployment but from the low income generated from employment. For example, regular 
salaried workers may not have employment insecurity but the ULS data confirms that 
people often receive very low incomes. The cost of regular employment therefore is sig-
nificantly lower incomes. For example, although garment workers have regular employ-
ment, they are forced to accept low salary. In many cases it is as low as Tk. 300/ per 
month (i.e. 6 US dollars per month). With such  low incomes many  labourers resort to 
taking credit  with interest or  seeking lower security jobs with higher salaries. Some 
garment workers who migrated from  the rural areas either return to villages or become 
involved with other jobs, even prostitution.  
The  uncertainty of the actual labour market produces insecurity both  for wage la-
bourers and dependent self-employed labourers. There is no guarantee that either of 
these categories of labourers will  secure regular employment. As mentioned earlier, se-
curing employment is  daily work. 
 Evidence shows that many labourers fail to secure employment (CUS 1989, Opel 1998, 
Kabir 1998). This insecurity forces labourers to accept any job and any condition. For ex-
ample,  many wage labourers have to pay the sardars (labour leaders) an amount of their 
earning and accept any sort of work the sardar offers. 
There is a particular form of instability mainly associated with self-employment. Self-
employed labourers work in their own establishments which are themselves unstable in 




tlements where inhabitants do not have formal rights to access required services. For ex-
ample, in most cases, electric and gas facilities that can only be obtained illegally and on 
payment of very high rates to the mastaans.  These lacks pose serious threats to the bustee 
dwellers.  Not only are they faced with the prospect of having to close their businesses, 
they are also faced with the threat of eviction. 
 
 
3.4 Mastaan: an urban actor with a contradictory image 
Mastaans are well known actors in the urban landscape of Bangladesh. The mastaan is 
an ambiguous, even contradictory character. In the development discourse two terms are 
found  - ‘mastaani’ and ‘mastanocracy’. ‘Mastaani’ refers to criminal types of activities 
while ‘mastanocracy’  refers to an urban political economic culture where  informal rights 
are prevalent. By informal rights, I refer to socially instituted claims which although lack-
ing any  legal status,  are more than mere ad hoc  arrangements. These informal rights are 
highly predictable and are often enforced through social norms. In short, therefore,  mas-
tani has clear negative contributions while  ‘mastanocracy ‘ has at least some sort of legit-
imacy or acceptance. Thus, urban dwellers are both adversely affected by and benefit 
from the activities of mastaans. 
Mastaans are therefore virtually always considered in negative terms. They are almost 
synonymous with gangster criminals who are mainly responsible for urban social disor-
der. ‘Mastaani’ refers to  a package of activities carried out by mastaans. Those activities 
mastaans ensure their income. For example, extorting money in the name of raising toll in 
commercial areas and construction sites is an everyday feature in urban life (Siddiqui 
1990). This image is prevalent from the legal frameworks guided by state machinery and 
generated by law enforcing agencies and formal state institutions. However, the terms 
mastaan often  confused with  two other terms: cadre and gundha. In many cases it is diffi-
cult to separate these three but mastaan has its own meaning and is somehow different 
from the rest. The term cadre is used to refer to the underground party members who 
own arms, while  gundha refers to professional killers who can be hired for criminal activ-
ities. Although mastaans are muscle-men they are also associated with important func-




 ‘Mastanocracy’ refers to an urban political economic culture which may produce in-
formal rights that help urban dwellers manage risk, uncertainty and insecurity. Informal 
rights are essential in the case of risk management especially when there is a lack of suf-
ficient formal rights offered by the state. The absence of adequate formal and legal rights 
creates a space for intermediaries like mastaans  to operate between people  and their im-
perfect institutions. From this perspectives, building trust for the poor with these inter-
mediaries  is essential. 
Gabetta (1993) demonstrates how the Mafia in Italy develop their interests by control-
ling access to both orderly and disorderly markets. The Mafia develop a business of 
providing protection services to keep the others’ business running. In such a situation, 
people need to maintain strategic contacts with the Mafia.  The contacts constitute social 
networks. In his analysis of how networks function Boissevain (1968) distinguishes two 
orders of tangible and intangible resources. ‘First order’ resources include material assets 
such as land, house, employment and special knowledge like practical skills. ‘Second or-
der’ resources puts emphasis on ‘strategic contacts ’ with others who own or control first 
order of resources and who help others access those resources.  People who own ‘first 
order’ resources are known as patrons while those who rather have to seek brokered ac-
cess to ‘first order’ resources are known as clients. The third group who maintain ‘strate-
gic contacts’ and act as intermediaries to establish contact between patrons and clients 
are known as brokers or intermediaries. 
Mastaan in the urban economy are strategic contact actors. In order to understand their 
‘strategic role’ in the urban economy, I will look at two aspects: a) the structure through 
which mastaans operate and b)  the level and importance of  their services in the urban 
economy. 
In order to fully understand the mastaan structure, we need first to appreciate the fac-
tors associated with ‘mastanocracy’  that   allow mastaans  to exist in the urban political 
economic culture of Bangladesh. The answer is related to the historical role of ‘civil socie-
ty’ in Bangladesh since the colonial and semi-colonial period. However, there are in total 
three factors which make the mastaan accepted actors in the urban landscape: i) cultural 





The first factor of cultural perception as hero is connected to a customary belief about 
mastaans which is  reflected through Bangladeshi arts and cultural products like films, 
novels, drama, short stories and fairy tales. For example, there is a famous sub-
continental song about mastaans recorded in Pakistan in the 1950s which starts with the 
word ‘domadam mast Kalander’. The term mastaan comes  from Turko-Persian word ‘mast’  
which is “possessed or one who is not in control of oneself and in a derivative sense one 
who is controlled by supernatural power” (Ahmed 1999). The sense of ‘one who is con-
trolled by supernatural power’ expresses the heroic image in that it denotes that one can 
sacrifice oneself for others or for some betterment. For the betterment of an unjust and 
exploitative society, young people protest and sacrifice themselves and this makes them 
honorable icons among the common people living the same unjust society. All of this is 
reflected in the recent television drama series based on the popular Bangla novel ‘Kothao 
Keu Nei’ written by Humayan Ahmed (1997). The central character of the story is a mas-
taan called  ‘Baker bhai’. ‘Baker bhai’  extends his helping hand to the oppressed people in 
the community and punishes oppressors . This however  is considered a crime from  a 
strictly  legal point of view. Before the end of the last series, there was a huge demonstra-
tion and procession organised mostly by young people in different parts of Bangladesh 
to convince the director not to hang ‘Baker bhai’, as was the original ‘Baker bhai’ in the  
novel. The question arises why ‘Baker bhai’ became so popular given that he is a mastaan 
convicted of being a killer. The answer may lie, at least in part, in the role the mastaan 
performs in creating informal rights in the urban landscape. 
The second factor alludes to the historical role played by mastaans in civil society. 
During the colonial rule under British and semi-colonial time under Pakistan, the civil 
society that struggled and fought against the British and Pakistan rulers was exposed to 
violence and polarization. This situation continued until the liberation war in 1971. Thus, 
violence was a well established and accepted part of the reality lived by civil society. The 
post independence phase is dominated by mastaans and “only mastaans could profit from 
the reproduction of violent and polarized civil society” (The Daily Star, 1999). In analys-
ing the emergence of the mastaan in Bangladesh Mohammad (1987) expresses  the same 
opinion but in a slightly different manner. He argues that the emergence of  mastaans in 
Bangladesh arises from the political failure to use the resourceful youth of the country 




The third factor is that the existing political system itself makes the mastaan an ac-
ceptable actor. Existing power relations are deeply connected to the present form of 
democratic practice geared to secure  state  power. “Politics is said to run on ‘money’ and 
‘muscle’, both of them being the required tools of an infant democracy where politicians 
find it easier to express themselves with street violence than parliamentary debate” An-
other statement given by a mastaan and recorded by Bearak states that  “ I am the senior 
vice president for Ward No 41 ... I organize the voters for the party. When they need a 
crowd, I can produce a crowd” (Bearak 2000: A4).). Mastaans therefore work for ‘big 
bosses’ who are often political or public figures and mastaans become mobsters in that 
they establish their right to do their business by providing and selling monopoly services 
with the blessing of their ‘big boss’. In addition, the alliance between political actors and 
mastaans create a wider influence in society, particularly the urban one. 
A combination of factors is therefore responsible for the acceptance of mastaans. Their 
alliance with other political and governmental actors ensures  a  structural shape guaran-
teeing  the monopoly position  of the mastaans. The economic political culture generates a 
gap and creates an opportunity for establishing informal rights even through violence. 
The gap is filled by  different ‘intermediaries’, including from mastaans, political actors,  
corrupt officials and hired goons (the Daily Star, 1999). Therefore, mastaans are not only  
armed men who extort money from people, they also represent an ‘unarmed’ intermedi-
ary group providing institutions and administration who extort money through extra-
legal operations. This implies a structure which makes the society and the economy func-
tional in the urban political economy. I refer to this as the ‘Mastaan Structure’. This struc-
ture will differ according to context, situation and level. For example, in the bustee con-
text a micro-level structure can be observed. 
In order to focus on the importance of the  mastaans’ strategic role as intermediaries I 
would like to refer to a recent household survey. This survey gives evidence of the per-
vasive existence of mastaan in the urban economy. Referring to the survey, Ahmed (1999) 
reports that  intermediaries influence people’s  access to basic health, education, and oth-
er services. In public hospitals 21%  of people have to pay for registration and 35% for 
admission. The admission to a school requires the mediation of a pressure group and  
22% of people have to take this while 32%  have to make extra payment in the form of 




peddling for getting FFE (Food For Education) allocation and 39% do it  for getting 
school registration. In elections mastaans may vote for absentee persons, or prevent voters 
from coming to vote or interfere with election process. In addition, as many as 37% of 
households complained that payment had to be made to lodge a complaint with the po-
lice and another 29% said that it was possible to influence police reports on payment to  
and /or intimidation of mastaans/ influence peddlers. 54% of the people with pending 
cases in court made payments directly or through intermediaries for setting dates for 
hearings or for influencing outcomes. 85% of the people reported that they made extra 
legal payments and sought help of intermediaries to get their land deeds written or regis-
tered. A sizable 43% said payment made directly to  or through intermediaries were 
needed to secure loans from banks. 23% got their WASA bill reduced  and 30% got their 
electricity bill reduced through the help of intermediaries. These simple but meaningful 
statistics indicate that intermediaries are required in every sphere of life in the urban are-
as. Therefore, it is not the case that mastaans only extort money at gun point, rather mas-
taans are in a system where ‘trust’ is problematic and they develop ‘trust’ between third 
parties for monetary benefit.  Therefore mastaans are both the source of uncertainty and 
as well as offering a relationship for managing insecurity and risk. 
  
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to provide an overview of the urbanisation 
process and its consequences for the poor. I first of all discussed the global aspects of ur-
banisation and then introduced to the context of Bangladesh. Two major observations 
have been made. Firstly, the phenomenon  of  urbanisation has brought  a global  social 
transformation in that  a large proportion  of the world’s  population has  become urban 
dwellers. The second observation is that urban social environment in Bangladesh is high-
ly associated with urban poor who have become a part of the urban economy. The urban 
economy is dominated and operated by urban actors known as mastaan. The urban eco-
nomic system produces opportunities and insecurities, uncertainties and risks for the 
poor as the economy is operated or regulated through informal rights. In the following 
chapter I will focus on a particular bustee in Dhaka in order to examine more closely the 







AN INTRODUCTORY ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE STUDY BUSTEE 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to Beri Badh Bustee 2 (BBB2) 
where I carried out my fieldwork. The idea for the thesis emerged from the Urban Liveli-
hoods Study - (ULS) which sought to understand the livelihood strategies of the urban 
poor in Bangladesh. The bustee which is analysed in this thesis was one of the ULS study 
areas. The ULS had a multi-disciplinary focus combining both qualitative and quantita-
tive approaches to investigation and my specific role was to coordinate the team under-
taking the qualitative analysis. My fieldwork was therefore embedded within the ULS 
endeavour and the bustee was selected following the ULS methodology. I used the ‘key-
hole’ approach in my fieldwork and started my research with 20 households from three 
different economic categories, which provided  ‘windows’ onto the bustees. Of these 
households, five were ‘improving’, ten were ‘coping’ and five were ‘declining’.  I discuss 
the basis of this household classification further in chapter three when detailed method-
ology will  be discussed.  In this chapter, I offer a basic ethnography of the bustee. 
2. The Setting: Beri Badh Bustee 2 (BBB2) 
Although the general area of my fieldwork is called Beri Badh Bustee , it has six differ-
ent parts or sections and each part is distingushed by a Bangla number such as ek, dui 
(one, two). The part of Beri Badh Bustee which was selected for my fieldwork is known as  
Dui Nombor Beribadh Bustee (Beri Badh Bustee Number  2 - BBB2). This bustee was devel-
oped under Mohammadpur thana (administrative unit) on Dhaka city protection em-
bankment. The Dhaka protection embankment was constructed in 1989 after the devas-
tating flood of 1988.  Mohammadpur is located in the middle of two thanas. The Northern 
part is connected to the inter district bus stand called Gabtoli, under Mirpur thana, and 
















All six sections of Beri Badh Bustee belong to two wards of the city commission (Dhaka 
city commission comprises 64 wards). While Beri Badh Bustee one belongs to ward no. 43, 
all the others belong to ward no. 46. Therefore, there is a strong administrative and polit-
ical bond among those from section two to section six since they belong to the same 
ward. 
BBB2 is located between bustee one and bustee three which are situated in the north 
and south respectively. In the west there is a vast field (five kilometers wide) which ex-
tends up to Basila the last part of Mohammadpur thana. During the monsoon this field is 
submerged under water and turns into marshland. In order to protect the embankment 
from the waves of the water, BWDB (Bangladesh Water Development Board) made the 
western slope concrete. Therefore, most BBB2 houses to be found on the eastern side of 
the embankment. There, the housing plots are developed by private real estate compa-
nies filling in or levelling out open areas. These housing plots will be extended up to the 
newly built residential areas known as Mohammadi Housing Society and Mohammadia 
Housing Limited. 
3. Physical Condition and Dwelling 
As mentioned earlier BBB2 is located at the fringe of the city and on the embankment. 
It is not only situated at the fringe in terms of location, but it is also isolated in terms of 
communication with the city. Although there are three roads - one to  the South, one to 
the East and the other to the North and although both in the summer and winter two 
roads are open, migrants need to walk a long way to reach to town. The third road is 
linked with a more distant periphery, but is impassable during the monsoon season. Mi-
grants can use boats during this time but this is rather costly compared to their regular 
income and they often walk a long way to use the road in the South, which runs through 
parts of Beri Badh number three and four. 
As mentioned earlier the physical condition of BBB2 is better than the average bustees 
in Dhaka. Advantages and disadvantages result from the settlement pattern and location 
of the bustee. For example, as the settlements are developed on the slopes of the em-




on the fringe of the city and a lacks communication, residents often have difficulties trav-
elling to the city for work or shopping. 
There are three physical advantages enjoyed by migrants living in BBB2. Firstly, peo-
ple have settled down on the slope of the embankment like hill dwellers. Unlike other 
bustees, the slope protects it from water logging. Although those living at the base of the 
embankment face the problem of floods during the monsoon as the water level rises, they 
can shift their houses up the embankment during this time. Secondly, BBB2 is relatively 
under populated and therefore the migrants have extra space on top of the embankment. 
Migrants can use the embankment for many purposes. For example, they can sleep under 
the sky during summer in order to avoid the heat. Thirdly, migrants have the opportuni-
ty of taking possession of a piece of land and constructing their own houses which saves 
them from paying regular house rent. 
Despite these advantages,  migrants living at BBB2 are also negatively  affected by the 
area’s physical condition and location. Firstly, BBB2 housing structure and conditions are 
worse than other bustees of the ULS. Most of the houses are jhupri, with bara (woven 
bamboo sticks) for walls and thatched roofs. A few houses are made out of polythene 
sheets and bamboo. The weak construction makes them vulnerable to wind and rain, so 
they require repair throughout the year. 
In addition, the houses are small and over crowded. It is almost impossible for an 
adult person to stand erect inside a house. These houses have no ventilation as  there is 
no window and have only a small bamboo-made door. This lack of space however  helps  
protect houses from natural calamities, such as winds. Furthermore, many migrants will-
ingly construct their houses in a densely packed manner. There is, therefore, no space 
around the houses and people enter them through tiny passageways. Both the crowded 
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 creates a damp atmosphere, which becomes worse during the monsoon. In a single-
room house, all the household activities, including cooking, are carried out in the same 
space, worsening the overall situation. Only a few houses which are situated at the top of 
the embankment have separate cooking areas. 
The location of BB2 results in further disadvantages for its residents. These are the lack 
of various facilities like electricity, water and sanitation which are available illegally in 
many other bustees. The Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA) provides safe drinking 
water and sanitation facilities for the inhabitants of Dhaka city. However, migrants of 
Beri Badh are not supplied with any water by WASA. For this area there are only three 
tube-wells for the 180 households. Of the three, one is privately owned and was installed 
for selling drinking water1. Bustee migrants were earlier served by four tube wells in-
stalled by World Vision, an  international NGO. Two of these, however are no longer in 
working order due to lack of proper supervision and management. Consequently, wom-
en either have to go long distances or stand in long queues for water collection. This adds 
to the existing workload of women labourers. Like other bustees developed on common 
land, people in BBB2 consider that shortage of drinking water is their main problem2. 
In order to meet their need for water, migrants depend on water sources which are not 
potable. For example, they use water from the marsh for washing and bathing. Moreover, 
this water gets polluted due to garbage disposal, hanging toilets over the water surface 
and chemical pollution from the leather processing industry situated in neighbouring 
Hazaribagh, (Lalbagh thana). This is a particular problem late in the cold season when the 
water flow is interrupted. Although both sides of the embankment are under water dur-
ing monsoon the water is cleaner then than in the dry season. 
Like WASA, other public utility services do not serve the migrants living in this bustee. 
For example, Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and Titas Gas which supply 
electricity and cooking gas to city dwellers, do not operate.  The people living in unit one 
and unit four have illegal access to electricity because like many other bustees, they are 
situated close to power supply lines. 
                                            
1  Huq, S. (1994:35-37) describes the mechanism of water selling to the bustee dwellers. She calculates that one can 
earn Tk. 300.00 to 400.00 per day from this business.  
2  Forty four percent of  respondents of Agorgaon bustee identified collection of water as one of their major problems 




In the absence of public utility services, bustee dwellers have somehow to manage fuel. 
Normally dried cow-dung, waste wood etc. are used for cooking. But due to the shortage 
of supply and the high demand of fuel, people have to pay a very high price for it. Mi-
grants, therefore, cook only once a day, mostly before lunch, and they eat this same 
cooked meal three times. Their main food is rice and this saves their cooking time.  In this 
sense, the migrants maximize the use of the resources available to them. 
A further locational disadvantage is that the migrants are excluded from the services 
provided by the NGOs for the urban poor in Dhaka city. Except for the ASD (Assistance 
for Slum Dwellers) there are no NGO activities in the bustee. World Vision withdrew 
their activities in 1994. ASD however is working with very limited coverage and only 
targets women with a credit support programme. It also runs one non-formal school for 
adolescent girls and children's literacy. There is a madrassa  (religious school) for the chil-
dren run by Jamat-E-Islami, a Muslim fundamentalist political party. 
4. The Bustee Migrants  
BBB2 is part of an embankment known as Dhaka City Protection Embankment which 
was constructed in 1989 after the devastating flood  of 1988.  Most people moved to this 
slope of the embankment from the bustee on the adjacent real estate plots owned by a 
private company. Others came from other parts of the city and from rural areas. All the 
people living in BBB2 had originally migrated to Dhaka from different parts of rural 
Bangladesh. There were a total 180 households living in BBB2 when I started my field-
work in January 1996 while at its end in December there were 218.  Only seven house-
holds left during this time. Of these seven households, two went back to their rural origin 
and 5 households moved to other bustees. This simple statistic indicates that the annual 
rate of increase of  households in BBB2 is as high as 21%.  
In the following section I present the basic migration differentials of the study bustee. 
First, the migrants’ place of origin. The migrants living in BBB2 are predominantly rural 
even if most came from neighbouring bustees.  There were only eight households in BBB2 
in 1989. At the time of the first major settlement, most of the people settled towards ei-
ther end of the embankment so as to be nearer to their places of work. In the south peo-
ple could easily enter the city while in the north settlers could work at the Northern Cen-






Table 2.1 : Districts as place of origin 
Name of the Districts as Place 
of  Origin 
% of old Mi-
grants3 
% of New Migrants4 
(%) 
Bhola 60 50 
Barisal 20 34.38 
Dhaka 03 6.26 
Faridpur 05 3.12 
Rangpur 10 3.12 
Khulna 02 3.12 
 
As Table 2.1 shows, apart from the first settlers, people living in BBB2 migrated from 
five districts, mainly in the central and south-western parts of Bangladesh. The exception 
is Rangpur district, which is in the north. Among the old migrants, more than 90% of the 
people migrated from the south-west districts, Bhola in particular. This data differs from 
the findings of another survey, carried out for the Bangladesh Institute of Development 
Studies (BIDS) by Mujumder in 1990.  There are two reasons for this discrepancy. 
First, the  BIDS study location was Agargaon, which is centrally located and estab-
lished 30 years ago. Second, Bhola was not considered by BIDS a separate district since it 
was then a part of Barisal.  Yet, in both studies Barisal (including Bhola) appears to be the 
most common district in terms of the place of origin of the migrants (Majumder et al 
1995). The table indicates that although the share of migration from different places of 
origin has been changing over time, a high percentage of new migrants still come from 
Barisal. This situation can be partially explained by considering how migration occurs. 
Networks play a key role in migration decision-making and hence the close communica-
tion between those in Dhaka with Barisal accounts for its frequency as a district of origin.   
A second migration differential is the age of migrants. Here there are differences be-
tween temporary migrants who engage in seasonal or circular migration while maintain-
ing livelihoods in the rural areas, and permanent migrants who are settled bustee resi-
dents (differences between these different migration strategies are discussed further in 
                                            




chapter five). The majority of people in both groups (temporary and permanent) migrate 
to the bustee in early adulthood, between 16  and 29 years. Other studies of migration to 
Dhaka bustees confirm this trend (Islam 1996, CUS 1983, Afsar 1995a). Moreover, two-
thirds of the temporary migrants are between 15 and 20 years of age and the majority of 
new migrants in this age group are single. The assumption is that they migrate for better 
employment opportunities in the urban labour market. 
 
Table 2.2: Temporary migrants 
 No. of migrants (%) No. of Family mem-
bers(%) 
Single ( Male) 11 (34.37) 11 (18.32) 
Single (Female) 01 (3.12) 01 (1.7) 
Male with Family 11(34.3) 33 (55) 
Female with Family 04(12.5) 10 (16.7) 
Single – 
married after arrival 
05(15.62) 05 (8.3) 
Total 32 (100) 60 ( 100) 
 
A third migration differential is sex and marital status. This study shows that more 
than half of the total migrants are unmarried and more than fiften percent of them marry 
in the bustee after arrival (table 2.2). When considering sex and marital status there is an 
imbalance between the female and male migrants.  There are three reasons for this im-
balance. Firstly, many young males migrate before marriage. Secondly, married men may 
decide not to bring their wives to the bustee. Thirdly, female migrants who migrate do so 
with their family and are known as  “associational” migrants, in other words, autono-
mous female migration rarely occurs in this bustee. All these influence the imbalance in 
the sex ratio in the bustee and the structure and dynamics of bustee households. 
5. Bustee  Social Organisation 
As mentioned earlier, the inhabitants of  BBB2 are of rural origin. Not surprisingly, the 
forms of social organisation they have adopted resemble those of rural areas. For exam-
                                                                                                                                   




ple, the shamaj (village association), which is the highest form of social organisation in 
the rural areas also exists in the bustee  albeit in a modified manner. This modification is 
noticeable on two counts: a)  the structure and b)  the use of different terms. In order to 
clarify the roots and significance of the modifications, I will present a comparative de-
scription of the social organisations found in the  gram (village) and the bustee. 
Village social organisation is organised along hierarchical lines and at the top of this 
hierarchy stands the shamaj.  The shamaj is made up of paras (neighbourhoods), gustis 
(lineages) and baris (homesteads) which provide the core bases of identity. The idea of 
gramer shamaj often extends beyond the geographical boundaries of the village and infers 
a strong sense of identity and affiliation (Rahman 1998). It is therefore distinct from the 
administrative unit, the mauza, which  was established by the British rulers to organise 
rural tax and toll collection (Hartmann and Boyce 1983).  
Every level of social organisation has its designated male leaders who are primarily 
responsible for enforcing particular moral codes of behaviour (Arens and Burerden 1977). 
These leaders are known as matubbar (village leader), para-matubbar (neighbourhood 
leader), muribbi (homestead leader), khana prodahan (household head)  and khana shadasha 
(household member) (Rahman 1998). The comparative situation of village and bustee in 
terms of structure and leaders of each position of the hierarchical structure is presented 






































Major differences can be observed between the structure and social organisation of ru-
ral villages and urban bustees. Firstly, in the hierarchical structure of the bustee social or-
ganisation, there no gusti - bari (lineage homestead). This is an important institution in 
the village social structure. Many factors explain why there is no gusti - bari in bustees but 
the most important is that first generation migrants tend to come either without families 
or as a nuclear household.  
Secondly, in the bustee context, the notion of  ‘neighbourhood’ mainly refers to rela-
tionships developed on the basis of regionalism and factionalism. Instead of para (neigh-
bourhood in the rural context), bustee neighbourhoods are known as busteer angsho (part 
of the bustee) and they often carry the name of  the region where the dwellers  come from. 
For example, in BBB2, there are three angsho which are known as Rangpurer angsho (the 
part of the bustee inhabitants by migrants from Rangpur district), Faridpuerer angsho (the 
part of the bustee inhabitants by migrants from Faridpur district), and Bholer angsho (the 
part of the bustee inhabitants by migrants from Bhola district). The name of the bustee 
angsho and even the name of the bustee   itself can also reflect the name of the founder or  
leader of that area. 
Thirdly, the composition of the bustee shamaj is different from the rural samaj. The  bus-
tee samaj leader is known as netha (leader), a term often found in South Asian political 
vocabulary. The bustee netha is mostly self-designated while the angsho netha (leader of 
the bustee ansho) is usually nominated by the bustee netha and the mastaan. In BBB2 there 
is one bustee netha, three bustee angsho netha and one leading mastaan.  The bustee shamaj is 
comprised of a bustee netha (leader), angsho netha (leader)  and mastaan,  while the rural 
shamaj is made up of the leaders from khana, gusti and para. In the bustee shamaj, the mas-
taan is the main actor responsible for enforcing codes of behaviour through the shalish, 
(found in the villages as a form of people’s court). The complex combination of relation-
ships among the actors belonging to the bustee shamaj is presented in Figure 2.2.   To give 
a fuller sense of the overall functioning of  the bustee shamaj, in the next section I focus on 

























5.1. Bustee mastaan structure 
As mentioned earlier, the mastaan is a critical actor in the bustee shamaj.  Mastaans 
however are themselves located in a broader structure, which is shown in figure 2.3. 
Those at the top of the structure are usually known as ostad. This term is adopted from 
the traditional educational system to refer to an honourable learned teacher. However in 
the bustee context it is also clear that ostads provide shelter to their followers, teach them 
how to control and exercise influence in the locality and also teach them  how to deal 
with  enemies. In BBB2, the leader is called netha by the ordinary residents and ostad by 
the mastaans.  
The second position in the hierarchy is the  ‘top-mastaan’. The ‘top-mastaan’ interacts 
with both the local political leaders and ostads to create a strong chain of command with-
in the hierarchical structure. The   main actor in this chain is the mastaan. To control and 
capture a specific territory, mastaans often use their muscle power and in fact are often 
known simply as ‘musclemen’. 
In BBB2 mastaans have different names according to their level of influence, the nature 
of their activities, the quality of their leadership,  age,  social reputation and networks. 
Some teenage boys operate as trainee mastaans. These are known as utthi-mastaans or pati-
mastaans and rangbaj. Pati-mastaans  are the  most promising trainees while  rangbaj  are 
the less promising ones. Rangbajes are normally considered community trouble makers. 
For example, they often tease young girls or create scenes. Since they are members of the 
mastaan structures their behaviour remains unchallenged. Drug addicts, who are not 
usually  allowed  to be  serious members of the mastaan gang, are however protected and 
are known as ‘heroenchi’.   This strongly structured network of relationships is central to 



















Two types of mastaans can be identified in BBB2, full-time and part-time. In BBB2, 
there is no ostad. The name of the top-mastaan is Raja. Both types of mastaans 
acknowledge the authority of Raja. Five mastaans always accompany Raja. They are en-
gaged in no work other than mastaani. These mastaans are between twenty and twenty 
five years of age. They have an average monthly income of more than ten thousand taka 
from toll money collected from different sources. There is a strong discipline among 
these five mastaans, they trust each other and share any income earned.   
 
Table  2.3: Numbers and different levels of mastaans living in BBB2 
Category of Mastaan No. 
Top Mastaan 01 
Full-time Mastaan 5 
Part-time Mastaan up to 15 
Pati-Mastaan and Rangbaj up to 25 
Heroenchi up to 10 
 
To conclude this section, although BBB2 is isolated from the centre of urban activity in 
terms of its location and social interaction, it has quite strong social links with other mas-
taans residing at the centre. Although mastaans have a negative image in the urban con-
text, their role in terms of intermediaries and power brokers is generally accepted by the 
urban poor and particularly by the bustee migrants. The  mastaans’ structure will be fur-
ther discussed  in chapter six.    
 
5.2. The bustee household 
The household is the basic social unit in the bustee shamaj, just as it is in the village 
shamaj. Village people understand the household as ghar or co-residential unit (Rahman 
1998) and bustee people do the same. The term commonly used for household is chula 




residence and shared consumption in their definition of a bustee household. In this sec-
tion I present a brief description of the types of bustee household structure and attempt to 
give some sense of their internal dynamics. 
Like any Bangladeshi village, there exist three types of households in the bustee. These 
are commonly known as ‘nuclear’, ‘joint’ and  ‘extended’ households. The dominant 
form in BBB2 is nuclear (62.5%) consisting of a co-habiting couple and their children. 
Joint households, which also include married sons and their wives, are relatively few but 
significant (12.5%). 25% of households are extended.  In sharp contrast with the village 
context, these households are ‘extended’ through the inclusion of fictive kin, who are in 
most cases paying guests.  In rural villages there is little provision for paying guests, and 
fictive kin relationships are typically contracted outside of the household. Despite this 
practice of extending household membership, however,  the average size of households 
in BBB2 is still only 4.2 persons, as compared with the national average household size of 
5.6 persons (GOB 1994). 
As stated above, a ‘snapshot’ of household structures shows that the nuclear form is 
predominant.  Considered over time, this trend towards nucleation is magnified.  Most of 
the joint and extended households are interim and temporary arrangements. Thus, many 
of the households which were joint in January of 1996, had become nuclear before the 
end of my fieldwork in December of 1996. Those households with scope to arrange the 
house for newly married sons may continue for some time as ‘joint households’, but they 
eventually split and become nuclear units.   
The extended households were similarly in transition, and this took two forms. The 
paying guest arrangement mentioned above is the more common. These paying guests 
are single migrants who are seeking to develop the necessary social networks to survive 
in the urban economy. Simultaneously such arrangements help host households to earn 
extra income. The second way in which households become extended households is 
through providing temporary shelter to families breaking up. Separated, divorced and 
widowed people join their natal household as a temporary measure until they manage to 
set up their own separate household anew, usually close by the natal household. It is 




hold structure. This trend has important implications for the relations between house-
hold members. 
In Bangladesh, in general, the internal structure of households is hierarchical, under 
the authority of the senior male who is generally known as khana prodhan (household 
head) (Cain 1978).  Individual members maintain a close interpersonal relationship with-
in the household and the household unit determines the nature of relations with other 
households, neighbourhoods and the wider village context. Although there are differ-
ences, this broad pattern holds for BBB2. The wife moves into her husband’s house after 
marriage. In a nuclear household, the husband is the khana prodhan (household head). 
Females may become khana prodhan only by default, either on temporary  basis or  when 
there is no male household head.  
It was estimated by the PRA participants that 20% of the total households in BBB2 
were either female-headed or female-managed. During the temporary absence of the 
male head, the female may become the proxy household head, assuming responsibility 
for managing the household activities. I prefer to call this arrangement ‘female managed 
households’. While the concentration of female-managed households are in the ‘improv-
ing’ and ‘coping’ categories, the female-headed households are in the ‘declining’ catego-
ry. 
I also observed that some households are male-headed but female-managed. In BBB2, 
for example, most of the shops are run by women who receive financial assistance from 
ASD, an NGO working  in the area. Although it appears that these women are responsi-
ble for the financial management of the household, in reality all the decisions even in re-
lation to the business, are taken by the male members of the households. It is therefore a 
mistake to interpret the fact that women are running the shops as an indicator of their 
empowerment.  In reality there is no difference in terms of economic freedom between 
the women working in household shops and the rest of the women doing household ac-
tivities in the bustee. 
Similarly, female household management should not be interpreted as evidence of 
empowerment. Typically, they only have the customary right to take decisions on how to 
implement activities which have been designed or planned by the male members or male 




the female member assumes responsibility for running the household, she cannot take 
major decisions (for example, extending or investing money) without consulting or get-
ting permission from the  husband or other adult male members. 
The complete absence of the male household head typically follows family break ups, 
like divorce, separation or death. Here females head the households. But in the bustee 
context, this household form is also temporary in nature. Since the sense of insecurity 
stemming from threats of sexual abuse, rumour and humiliation is extremely high, wom-
en, particularly young ones, cannot live alone for a long period and are forced to find 
new partners. In fact permanent female headed households are rare in BBB2. Normally, 
such households turn into male headed ones after a certain period of time. 
Example 2.1 
Karimon, a 46 year old woman, has been living in BBB2 for six months after moving from her 
rural house following the death of her husband. She has been living with her three daughters and 
three sons. One of her daughters is a divorcee and the other two young girls are working in  a 
garment factory. The oldest son is a rickshaw puller and is 16 years old. The other two boys are 
twelve and ten years old. Her second daughter received a proposal for marriage from a young man 
living in the bustee. Since  she  declined, she was beaten and accused of being a prostitute. Finally, 
she was forced to  accept the proposal and marry the man. The youngest daughter also had to mar-
ry in similar circumstances.  The oldest son left his natal household after marrying a bustee girl. 
Within six months, this household had become small and Karimon tried living with her two sons 
but this also failed. Finally she was forced to marry a bustee leader who then established his rights 
over any  income that  Karimon earns as a maid servant.    
If male dominance is the first determinant of bustee household relationships, the second 
is marital instability. The bustee households are very fragile in nature and this is reflected 
in the widespread practice of serial monogamy. Serial monogamy refers to a series of 
changes of conjugal partners. In BBB2, half of the household heads and their spouses 
have been married more than once. During the PRA exercise held in April 1996 it was 
noted that 60% of married men had been married more than once. One extreme case is 
that of Khaleqe who had been  married 19 times by the age of 45. During my fieldwork, I 
tried to investigate this further and found serial monogamy is far more frequent than po-




cause around half of the households in this category belong to the 20-30 age group.  
Serial monogamy is common among men who marry early and arises mostly where 
the patrilineal ideology enforced by the village khana prodhan is absent. The major differ-
ence between the village and bustee khana prodhans lies in this area. This is connected to 
the absence of the gusti (patrilineal descent groups) within the bustee. Consequently, the 
bustee khana prodhan operates in a context where there are no relations among khana 
prodan which creates a social vacuum. Thus the bustee migrants themselves explained the 
high level of female headed households by referring to the inability of the concerned 
families to impose sanctions. This social vacuum means that there is little support for 
households in difficulty and little sanction against households breaking up.  This struc-
tural fragility is compounded by the marriage behaviour of both men and women, albeit 
in different ways. 
The tendency towards serial monogamy is further compounded by the insecurity ex-
perienced by bustee females. Loose morality is a common characteristic of men’s marriage 
behaviour. Females can be divorced at any time and for any reason since there do not ex-
ist any formal or informal rights to prevent divorce. Women are then forced to accept a 






















      
02 times 03 06 03 03 00 04 
03 times 00 02 01 01 00 00 
04 times 00 00 00 00 00 00 
05 times 00 00 00 00 00 00 
06 times 01 00 00 00 00 00 
07 times 00 00 00 00 00 00 
08 times 01 00 00 00 00 00 
Polygamy       
02 wives 02 00 01 00 00 00 
03 wives 00 00 00 00 00 00 
04 wives 01 00 00 00 00 00 
 
Serial monogamy begins with a child marriage (table 2.5). Child marriages in the bus-
tees are common. In most cases these marriages take place between an under-aged girl 
and an adult man.  Among the ten under-aged girls’ marriages I observed during my  
fieldwork, all except one of the  brides, were found to be between eleven and fourteen 
years  old5 whereas the bridegrooms were in their early twenties. Insecurity forces wom-
en to marry, but does not keep them married, and so polygamy or serial monogamy re-
sults. 




Age group Bride Bridegroom 
11 – 14 09 00 
15 -  17 01 00 
18 – 20 00 05 
21 –23 00 05 
 
To sum up this section, in the bustee men do not face the same social pressures as they 
would in the village. They are not normally considered immoral for marrying several times 
or keeping more than one wife. Females are forced to marry to minimise social, physical 
and economic insecurity. While women often suffer violence within the home, if the 
household dissolves they become even more vulnerable as they can be beaten or humiliat-
ed by anyone, not just their husbands. Before going to deal with bustee violence I will dis-
cuss bustee cash economy. 
 
6. Bustee  Cash Economy 
. As a part of the urban economy, cash income is important, necessary and desirable 
for the bustee migrants. To acquire cash, migrants use their labour in multi-dimensional 
ways. As mentioned earlier bustee migrants are basically rural labourers and unskilled 
which makes it difficult for them to enter the formal urban labour market where secure, 
protected and regular cash income flows can be found. Therefore, the main option open to 
bustee labourers is the informal labour market which however does not offer the same fi-
nancial security and regularity.  In short, bustee labourers are often found in the unstable 
jobs of the urban informal market. 
A PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) exercise conducted by me in BBB2 found that  
the migrants were mainly involved with selling their labour or selling goods. Under the 
ULS categories, no distinction was made between labour intensive workers and sellers of 
goods, as they were both categorized together as self-employed labourers.  The bustee 
migrants, however, insisted that business was a separate category of cash source even if 
what was meant by business was simply selling goods. To reflect this, I subdivided the 
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ULS category to classify self-employed labourers as ‘sellers of labour ‘, while capital in-
tensive self-employed labourers like entrepreneurs were put under  ‘sellers of goods’. It 
should also be mentioned here that the labour intensive self-employed, like rickshaw 
pullers, were included in both ‘self-employed’ and ‘wage labourer’  categories due to 
their dual characteristics of autonomy and the need to secure  a job on a daily basis.  
Besides selling labour and goods, migrants also get involved in illicit occupations like 
thieving and prostitution, as well as cost saving activities (matrix 2.1). However, it is dif-
ficult to draw a sharp line between different sources of cash income through work be-
cause individual labourers frequently switch their employment. To do so they need to 
keep up multiple contacts to gain information regarding job availability. If and when 
they fail to secure employment, many bustee migrants in BBB2 get involved in illicit oc-
cupations. Moreover, cost savings activities are carried out mainly by the children. Ma-
trix 2.1 presents the different cash income categories I identified, and these are described 
a little further in the following sections.  
 
Matrix 2.1: Classification of sources of income through different work 
Categories Ranking 
Sellers of labour 5 
Sellers of goods 3 
Carryovers illicit occupations 1 
Cost savings activities 2 
 
6.1. Sellers of Labour 
 Selling labour is the main source of income for the bustee migrants of BBB2. The high 
concentration of different types of labourers both in different bustees and within particu-
lar bustees  (see chapter one) influences the bustee economy and affects peoples’ options 
and levels of cash income. For example, Noorhosener bustee, which was one of the bustees 
in the ULS qualitative study, shows two sharply contrasting trends. Migrants from 
southern districts engage in labour intensive work like rickshaw pulling, while those from 




In BBB2 I distinguished four different categories of labour. Self- employed and wage 
labour are the most common, while a lower proportion are employed in establishments 
like restaurants and brick fields. In both cases, the majority of workers are young and 
male. Male and female labour forces are engaged in all different categories of employ-
ment, but the share of participation in terms of age and sex is different due to the nature 
of the job in which they are engaged (Matrix 2.2). 
 





  Old Young Men Women 
Wage Labourer 5 X XX XX X 
Self- Employed 5 X XX XX X 
Domestic 4 XX X X XX 
Employees in 
establishment 
2 X XX X XX 
 
Each of the four labour categories varies widely in terms of payment and contractual 
arrangement, generates different ambivalences, insecurities and uncertainties and pro-
vides different options for creating opportunities. Since labour selling is the main income 
source, I will discuss how each of the different labour categories produces risks, uncer-
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Note: (1) By uncertainty produced by structure I mean those uncertainties of work or income 
over which the workers have no control. 
(2) By flexibility I mean the freedom of workers to decide to give up their jobs.  
 
The most significant form of employment in the BBB2 cash economy is daily wage la-
bour. This reflects the capacity of the urban labour market to absorb unskilled and agri-
cultural workers. Indeed, information about the demand for labour is the main motiva-




 Young male migrants access the labour market easily as it does not require any skill 
and is labour-intensive. In most cases they work on a short term and casual basis. One 
feature of the wage labour sector is its ability to continually absorb new workers. This is 
helped by the fact that most of the settled bustee migrants (both the young and the aged) 
try to shift over time to better prospects. For example, young and second generation mi-
grant rickshaw pullers look for jobs where there is the prospect of becoming scooter or 
taxi drivers. Such a continuous shifting of occupation again ensures that the demand for 
migrant labourers remains high. 
There is also a considerable female labour force seeking this type of employment. This 
is for two main reasons. Firstly, apart from employment in the garment factories or as 
domestic maids, there are very few job opportunities open to women. In addition, mid-
dle-aged women have very limited options to join the skill-based job sectors. Extreme 
hardship thus forces them to enter the market as wage labourers, so that households can 
make use of the whole household 'stock labour'.  
Daily wage labourers are very sensitive to changes in the market. This is because they 
are not guaranteed work and may have to go several days without work. At the same 
time, they cannot always maintain their wage levels as those depend on the fluctuations 
in the demand for labour. Thus, daily wage labourers experience insecurity and even 
though some may be loosely associated with the sardar (informal labour leader), most are 
unorganized and unable to protect their interests by themselves. On the other hand, an 
additional characteristic of daily wage employment is that all types of daily wage labour-
ers enjoy some sort of autonomy. Even though they are dependent on others for the 
means of production and they do not participate in the decision-making structure, they 
are not completely controlled.  
A second prominent form of informal sector employment found in BBB2 is income 
generation through self-employment. Generating one’s own income in this way allows 
autonomy over the production process. In most cases, this involves unpaid family labour.  
Self-employment thus allows for the  appropriation of profit. 
Most young male migrants are initially absorbed into this self-employment section of 
the labour market. Rickshaw pullers and taxi drivers are common forms of this, and they 




shaws, push carts or baby taxis for a certain period of time and at the end of the scheduled 
time, return the vehicles to the owners deducting the rent from their income.   
The self-employed labour force enjoys different types of status in terms of autonomy 
and income earned. Employment is regular and payment is normally made on a daily 
basis. Labour-intensive workers (e.g.rickshaw pullers) who have  self-employed status, 
also devise their own strategies for protecting their income earning  process. For instance, 
the labour force working in the transport sector belongs to trade unions. Recently a Rick-
shaw Trade Union was formed to protest against the City Corporation’s intention of phas-
ing out rickshaws from city streets. The leader of the union organised a press conference 
and published leaflets for public support. Finally, the Mayor of Dhaka City Corporation 
agreed to consider the case sympathetically.  
Another important category of the informal labour force in BBB2 is the female labour 
force engaged in different domestic services. These labourers are divided mainly into two 
age groups: (i) older experienced workers, and (ii) the new migrants who are usually 
younger. As mentioned earlier, the use of female labourers, particularly older ones, is di-
rectly correlated with household economic stress, and often with female headship. Bustee 
households make use of their female labour force as 'stock labourers'. Often these women 
are unskilled and have very limited employment options.  They are therefore  forced to  
participate in the labour market either as domestic or as wage labourers. Many again 
work part-time. Although there is a high demand for garment labourers, some of the 
younger migrant women who have little or no experience in the urban context, are also 
forced to seek employment in the domestic service. This occurs when the women lack 
alternative contacts and so they accept domestic work on a temporary basis. Many of 
them are brought directly from the rural areas by the employers themselves. Finally, 
there are also many males involved in domestic services, especially young boys. A num-
ber of agencies have sprung up recently in the city to supply male domestic workers, 
such as security works or guards for residences and offices.  
    Labourers employed in  domestic services may have either long-term or casual labour 
status. Like all other wage labourers, this section of the labour force is unorganised and 
this means they have no bargaining power which protect their economic interests. These 




A fourth type of informal employment in BBB2 is found  in different  establishments 
which  recruit labour. It is estimated that 96% of  these urban establishments belong to 
the informal sector and each provides employment for 1-9 persons (UNDP 1993).  The 
location of BBB2 means that relatively few of these opportunities are available there. 
However, many migrants find employment in street restaurants, brick factories, garment 
factories and motor garages. Migrants may work in an establishment on a long-term ba-
sis, but this does not mean that their jobs are secure. For instance, in the transport sector, 
companies do not make any formal written contract with their workers regarding the 
terms of their employment. Employees in fact are not entitled to anything but their 
monthly wage. There are even many labourers working on a long-term basis who do not 
enjoy a monthly salary, but are treated as casual labourers and are paid daily.  This 
means that they are not paid for their days off. This practice is also prevalent among 
garment workers. 
There are also many labourers who work on a temporary or seasonal basis for these 
different establishments.  Brick breakers and brick-field workers fall under this category. 
Those who need cash for buying goods for their daily survival may prefer this, as it offers 
them a daily wage. Many young girls also leave garments factories and begin labour-
intensive work like brick breaking. This indicates that the young female labour force is 
breaking away from cultural constraints in the face of socio-economic necessity. 
To sum up, it is clear from the information mentioned above that the four categories of 
labour are highly influenced by two main features: a) the characteristics of the workers 
and b) the status of the employment sector. Labour force characteristics are determined 
by workers’ age, sex, length of migration to the city, culture and norms, plus, of course, 
the economic condition of their households. Normally, labour terms and conditions do 
not favour the labour force, nor do they guarantee employment. In order to secure em-
ployment and offset its instability, migrants need to maintain a number of contacts with 
other actors. The sense of insecurity constantly accompanies labourers in the different 
categories of the labour market. Despite this, they also enjoy a certain degree of flexibil-
ity, freedom and autonomy which means they can  give up one  job to   take up another. 
This often represents a means of increasing income. For example, it has been observed 
that garment workers often change factories because when they get a new job, they get a 




6.2. Sellers of Goods 
As mentioned earlier in any bustee cash economy, individuals can sell labour or goods 
to obtain money. There are two groups of migrants who sells goods: those vending and 
those engaged in fixed petty trading. The first group trades or sells goods in bustee and 
non-bustee localities by hawking and vending. The second group operates an enterprise 
using their family labour. I will discuss here the characteristics of the sellers of goods, as 
well as the risks and opportunities linked with their occupations. 
The first group involved in the trading or selling of goods can be divided into two cat-
egories of vendors in terms of the location of their activities. One group sells their goods  
mainly in residential areas by hawking from door-to-door. These normally sell house-
hold goods. The second group consists of street hawkers who sell their goods on the busy 
foot paths,  parks, business areas or in any strategic place like in front of  schools.  
Both types of  vendors share a number of common characteristics. First, the circulation 
of goods is on a day-to-day basis.  The vendors buy these goods almost every day and try 
to sell them on the same day. Second, vendors tend to buy a small quantity of goods in 
order to minimise risk. The main risk is that goods can be easily damaged since they are 
normally perishable goods. Third, this kind of dealing requires only a small amount of 
capital. Fourth, this trade does not require utilities like fuel and electricity. Fifth, there are 
no capital expenditures like official taxes.  Sixth, it does however return high rates of 
gross income. Finally, net income is determined by three main conditions: a) investment 
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These three net income conditions differ for the two groups of vendors. The net in-
come of door-to-door hawkers mainly depends on their source of credit and any related 
terms and condition (matrix 2.4). Most of the door-to-door hawkers have a credit relation 
which takes the form of a baki (a loan in kind normally taken from shops without interest 
but with the goods supplied at a high price) with fixed traders (matrix 2. 5). They have to 
settle their daily credit transaction on a day-to-day basis. In order to make a net profit, 
they need to work hard selling a good quantity of good. Additionally, the door-to-door 
hawkers living in BBB2 do not need to pay extra protection money to mastaans or police 
for their trading. In contrast, the net income of street hawkers depends on the cost of 
their credit and protection money. They take credit either from wholesalers or fixed trad-
ers with interest as high as 10% per day and have to settle their account on a day-to-day 
basis (matrix 2.6). In addition to this high cost of credit, the street hawkers need to pay 
protection money to the police, mastaans or both to be able to sell their goods in a specific 
place or area. This significantly increases their capital expenditure. Therefore, in order 
make a net profit, they need to work hard for longer periods.  In most cases, younger mi-




Matrix 2.5: Types of informal credit in bustee cash economy  
Local name of credit transac-
tions 
 Meaning 
Hawlat A small loan in the form of cash taken 
from relatives, friends, acquaintances 
without interest. 
Baki A small loan in kind normally taken from 
shops with high price. 
Dhar Similar to  hawlat,  yet it is a larger sum 
taken in the form of cash from relatives, 
friends, acquaintances without interest 
Reen A loan taken on interest. 
 
 Fixed trading is another source of cash in the bustee economy. Fixed trading refers to a 
number of enterprises located in rented out houses or shops in the bustee or in the kitchen 
market. In addition to capital investment, the development of these bustee enterprises de-
pends on locational advantage. For example, Neel Khet slum which is close to Dhaka New 
Market, has become a good place for women entrepreneurs as they supply most of the 
food sold in the nearby hotels. Similarly, many rickshaw and motor repair garage busi-
nesses have been developed in Agargaon located in the central part of Mohammadpur 
thana. In BBB2, fixed trading occurs in four major areas: rented out houses, shops in bus-
tee or  shops in the  kitchen market and rickshaw garages. Often these are all owned by the 
same people. Apart from rented out houses, fixed trading is strongly linked with bustee  
informal credit markets (see matrix 2.5).  
Before going on to describe the link between fixed trading and credit markets, I will 
briefly outline the basic feature of this part of the economy. First, most of the businesses 
are simple in structure and managed on a day-to-day basis. Second, they use their 
household labour in trading. For example, most of the shops in the bustee are run by 
women and shops in the kitchen market are run by other household labourers like 
younger brothers or young sons of the owner. Third, most fixed traders in BBB2 receive 
support from an NGO called ASD, which only has women group members. Fourth, all 




operate baki transactions which ensure a higher rates of income. Sixth, the risk of baki 
transaction is minimised through ROSCAs (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations). 
When considering the link between fixed trading and protection payments it is im-
portant to understand how businesses are orgainised to ensure maximum profit. As men-
tioned earlier, most fixed trading is usually run by the same group of people, who own 
rickshaw garages, or shops. These owners pay regular protection money.  The purpose of 
protection money is two fold: a) it protects the person from other people(police or other 
groups of mastaans) demanding payment, and b) it ensures them monopolistic control of 
their business, since others are prevented from entering.  For example, the richsaw garage 
owners maintain strong networks with mastaans and police by giving them regular pro-
tection money. The main purpose of this protection money is not to protect the garage, 
but to prevent the entry of competitors. In this way, the garage owners monopolise the 
trade and rent out space for others to keep rickshaws or sell rickshaws on a baki arrange-
ment.  Although the capital expenditure of all fixed traders’ is high, they need to pay the 
protection money on a regular basis to ensure themselves of high profits. 
 
Matrix 2.6 : Access to the different types of  credit 






 Vendor takes 
from rela-
tives/friends 
 Fixed traders 
takes from rela-
tives/friends 
 Fixed traders take 
from money lender 
/NGO 
 Vendors  take from 
money lender 
/NGO/ fixed traders 
 
Credit transactions are critical to the profitability of enterprises. There is no formal 
credit support (except ASD) in BBB2 but there is a huge demand for investment and con-
sumption credit. As mentioned earlier, vendors acquire credit support mainly from fixed 
traders in the form of baki transactions. Similarly, most labour sellers are uncertain about 
regular cash income, so they need support for consumption credit. This credit also takes 
the form of baki  transactions and is taken almost on a day-to-day basis. For example, 
wage labourers take goods in some form of baki before going to their work and they pay 




workers also need consumption credit. Rickshaw pullers also buy rickshaws from garage 
owners on credit. All these credit transactions occur through baki  arrangements.  
The successful mobilisation of ROSCA is the main factor of baki transaction which 
helps the fixed traders to charge higher prices. In BBB2, it was almost impossible to find 
anyone who was not involved with a ROSCA. While ROSCAs seem to be a spontaneous 
form of organisation, in reality they are highly managed by the fixed traders. The fixed 
traders receive two main benefits: a) they can mobilise a large amount of capital which 
can be used to finance their  running costs; and b) they use this money as a source of 
guarantee of their baki transactions. Under baki  transactions it is common for goods to be 
priced as much as 50% above the normal level. Loan recovery is also importantly backed 
up through the use of violence supported by the mastaans.  
In terms of support and services, mastaans are trusted. For example, during my field-
work the word spread that all the migrants were to be evicted and this threw most peo-
ple into a state of panic. In order to deal with this situation, they gave a huge amount of 
money to the police and BWDB officials through the mastaans. 
To sum up, the sellers of goods have a wide range of opportunities to ensure high 
profits if they pay protection money. Critical of this process is the mechanism of baki  
transactions. The main factor behind this transaction is the ROSCA, which will be dis-
cussed in more detail in chapter six, and the customary right to increase the price of 
goods. This customary right is ensured by the mastaan on payment of protection money.  
 
6.3. Illicit Occupations 
There are a number of occupations migrants do to earn cash in the bustee economy, 
which may be considered immoral or anti-social. It is not the case that migrants engage 
in these occupations willingly, but this work is casual source of cash income.  There are 
five different types of illicit occupations which migrants use to secure cash. These are 





Matrix 2.7: Carryovers Illicit Occupations 




Thieves X  
Drug selling X  
Gambling X  
Beggars X X 
Prostitution X  
 
In BBB2 most of the so called thieves are involved in stealing  rickshaws. They usually 
belong to organised gangs headed by rickshaw garage owners and guided by the mas-
taans.  They receive all sorts of support and shelter from the mastaans. Although, theft is 
usually a casual or part time occupation, it is difficult to exit the system. Some thieves 
also operate independently, neither organised nor protected by the mastaans. They steal 
on an occasional basis from bustee houses or shops. This group of thieves can ‘exit’ with 
greater ease. 
A second group of illicit workers are drug sellers. However, given the locational dis-
advantage of BBB2, this is not very profitable. Four households sell local wine (normally 
known as tari) and drugs (gaja) under the protection of the mastaans and police.      
The third group is gamblers. Gambling is very common in BBB2, as it is in other bus-
tees in Dhaka. Gambling is organised under the protection of the mastaans, who receive 
regular protection money. Almost all the young male inhabitants of BBB2 participate in 
gambling either on regular basis or occasionally. The participants have the freedom to 
gamble but those who organise gambling have little chance of exit. Even if they stop or-
ganising gambling, they still have to pay protection money.  
The fourth group comprises beggars. There are two types of beggars living in BBB2: 
occasional and professional. Occasional or part-time beggars normally beg in the residen-
tial areas, walking from door-to-door. Professional beggars, on the other hand,  have 
fixed public places like entrances to mosques, courts or  traffic signal spots. The occasion-




must pay protection money to the police through the mastaans in order to use the public 
places for begging. 
The fifth group is prostitutes. ASD provided me with a list of eight casual protitutes 
who had received STD (sexual transmited disease) treatment from them. They are not 
organised or controlled by any gang. These eight women either work as maid servants at 
different dormitories or in garment factories and they get additional cash from prostitu-
tion when they need or get the opportunity.  
6.4. Cost Saving 
When individuals fail to secure work producing cash income, they resort to cost-
saving activities. Most children are engaged in the cost-savings activities, such as collect-
ing fuel, grass for cattle and snails for ducks. They also collect waste vegetables from the 
market place and look after household activities which allows the adults (particularly the 
mothers) to work outside the home. It can therefore be concluded that in the bustee com-
munity only infants are a dependent population given that all the other bustee migrants 
are employed or engaged in cost saving activities.  
7.  Bustee Violence 
When people migrate from the rural area they come either individually or with their  
families, leaving behind their social organisational heritage. In the bustee social organisa-
tion  it appears that two structural levels (neighbourhoods and homesteads) are replaced 
and one level gusti (lineage homestead)  is completely missing. There is therefore,  a lack 
of lineage centered  social organisation in  the bustee  shamaj. This results in a sort of vac-
uum  in the bustee  social organisation which I want to call a ‘structural hole’.  The mas-
taan structure acts as the missing link between the shamaj  and household, to fill this hole.  
Similarly, lack of sufficient formal rights offered by the state force bustee migrants to 
use informal rights produced by intermediaries like mastaans in order to manage risk and 
uncertainty. The absence of adequate formal and legal rights creates a space for interme-
diaries like mastaans to operate as brokers between people and institutions. From the per-












































Informal Rights: Insecurity and Opportunity
 





The ‘‘missing link’ or ‘structural hole’ of the bustee social organisation produces  two 
distinctive features in the bustee. Firstly, the ‘structural hole’ created by the lack of  ‘gusti’ 
creates household tension, insecurity, and violence. Household conflict resolution and 
negotiation of household conflicts take place in the rural society though the murrubi who 
is the  gusti leader. The murrubi has the right to enforce the code of behaviour on his gusti 
members  and  others in  the village through his seniority by age and sex, and as member 
of the shalish (village court). The main responsibility of the shalish is conflict resolution, 
both among the lineage members and the villagers more widely. In the absence of formal 
rights, the shalish is more powerful in the bustee. 
The lack of an enforced moral code leads bustee migrants towards individualistic be-
haviour which is less cooperative and more conflict oriented. For example, wife beating 
is very common in BBB2 and occurs either  for minor  reasons or even without reason. If 
a wife fails to prepare food on time or the husband can not find his shirt before going out 
for work, the husband starts beating his wife. Household violence is the means for re-
solving conflict  and this reinforces the complete subordination of the wife. Although, 
wife beating is also common in rural areas, household conflicts are resolved socially via 
the murrubi and this offers some protection against extreme abuse, divorce or polygamy. 
Women in the bustee are afraid of divorce. This induces distrust and women consequent-
ly try to find sources of cash as an insurance for the uncertain future. This  may lead to 
more violence within households. 
Secondly, the ‘missing link’ between the  shamaj and the household  affects the func-
tion of the social organisation. Rural people obey the enforced moral code of behaviour 
out of  respect for the age and position of the lineage leaders. Sanctions are also obeyed 
because of pressure from the lineage groups. But in the bustee, codes of behaviour and 
sanctions are imposed by the mastaan structure through violence.  
Thus violence is a product of the ‘structural hole’ in the bustee social organisation. The 
level of violence and extent of opportunity given to the bustee migrants depends on their 
relationships with the mastaans. Mastaans never allow anybody to challenge them. I 
found that when bustee migrants challenge mastaans in BBB2 they are punished for this. 
For example, in BBB2, there is a system of paying protection money. Every household 




date, they will be subjected to humiliation or physical  assault.  In the same way bustee 
migrants can be victimised if they fail to  pay back under  bakis. Thus, the lack of an ap-
propriate social institution to impose sanctions and the monopolistic control exercised by  
mastaan induces a   ‘culture of  violence’ within the bustee. 
 
8. Conclusion 
BBB2 is a place where a group of heterogeneous new migrants with different socio-
economic experiences live together. The life of the bustee migrant becomes one of con-
stant struggle for survival within a persistently uncertain, insecure and risky social and 
economic environment. The ‘missing levels’ of social organisation and the legislation free 
cash economy associated with the informal market create gaps which are filled in by the 
mastaan structure. The nature of the bustee social organisation and the bustee cash econo-
my creates both tension and opportunity for bustee migrants. The mastaan structure be-
comes the ‘structural missing link’ in the bustee social organisation and it acts as a source 
both for insecurity and opportunity for the bustee migrants. 
The role of the ‘missing link’ provides mastaans with an opportunity to enjoy the cus-
tomary rights of imposing sanctions in both social and market transactions. Therefore, 
mastaans are in a position to create both constraints on and opportunities for the bustee 
migrants. However, the degree of constraint and extent of opportunity given to the bustee 
migrants depends on their attitude  and disposition to the mastaans. Most of the bustee 
migrants accept various forms of violence orchestrated by the mastaans for everyone 
knows the price to be paid for resisting or challenging mastaans. By submitting to the 
mastaan however they can access opportunities in a protected and relatively secure way. 
  The informal sector is notoriously  uncertain since it is operates outside legislation, 
formal rules and regulations. Mastaans have established their customary rights, though vio-
lence, to keep the informal sector running. The mastaans provide opportunities for higher 
income flows either by assisting people to run their businesses or by allowing them to carry 
out illicit occupations.  The mastaan provides the traders with all sorts of support ranging 
from negotiating with police, other mastaans or any other urban actor. Within such a bustee 
environment migrants surrender completely to the mastaans who in turn ensure the crea-




in the bustee and the migrants internalise this culture and learn to live with it. For migrants 
in BBB2 life is full of insecurity, uncertainty and risk but also opportunities. In the follow-







     1. Introduction 
 As mentioned in the introduction, my Ph.D. research developed out of the Urban 
Livelihood Study (ULS). This was a piece of longitudinal research conducted by Proshi-
ka, a Bangladeshi NGO, in collaboration with the University of Bath and the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). Professor Geof Wood of the Univer-
sity of Bath was a member of the advisory team, and also supervised my Ph.D. Within 
the ULS I was responsible for supervising and coordinating the qualitative research. I 
spent most of the time in Bangladesh with occasional visits to the University of Bath. Af-
ter completing the ULS and producing a monograph (Khan 1998) as one of its outputs, I 
moved to the UK to begin in depth analysis of the field information. 
It is therefore clear that my Ph.D. research did not follow the conventional three year 
research process. The typical pattern for this is for one year of preparatory work, one year 
collecting data and one year writing-up. The process basically starts with theoretical 
study and literature review, which gives the context against which field data is subse-
quently collected and analysed. In contrast, my main research themes emerged directly 
from my field observations. My research methodology both strongly reflects and also ad-
vances the ULS methodology. 
The ‘flexible’ but ‘topic oriented’ process that was used in the ULS qualitative meth-
odology, provided me with the opportunity to develop my own research methodology. 
‘Flexibility’ refers to the fact that the ULS qualitative methodology was developed in the 
course of the research to suit the specific context under investigation. ’Topic oriented’ 
instead refers to the fact that each researcher on the team had a specific research topic 
selected from the initial results. The combination of the  ‘flexibility’ and ‘topic oriented’ 
approach meant that the qualitative team members had to follow their ‘own’ research 
methodology in order to investigate and analyse their own data and produce topic based 
research monographs. As a member of the qualitative research team I therefore followed 
the same process initially. After selecting the bustee, however, I independently developed 




search experiences: the qualitative methodology of the ULS; and the methodology used 
for this research only. 
 
2. The Qualitative Methodology of the Urban Livelihood Study 
As mentioned earlier, my research developed out of the ULS and the research meth-
odology was initiated within the shared ULS process. Therefore, the methodology used 
for this research was strongly linked with the ULS methodology, both quantitative and 
qualitative.  In this section, the qualitative methodology will be described with reference 
as appropriate to the quantitative methodology.  
2.1.  Qualitative Research Design and Fieldwork Plan 
The ULS made use of the resource profile framework developed from Sen’s entitle-
ment approach by scholars at the University of Bath. Since the ULS recognised the im-
portance of “endowment” and “exchange”, the qualitative team placed particular em-
phasis on understanding the constitution of different types of social relations in bustee 
livelihood strategies. With this focus, the challenge was to translate the conceptual 
framework into a practical tool for field research.  This was done through the following 
process. First of all, the team attended several courses and workshops on different tech-
nical methods. In October 1995, I thus attended a course on methodology in the Universi-
ty of Bath. I also participated in the workshop on qualitative data analysis organised by 
the cholera hospital (ICDDR,B) in Bangladesh. Secondly, the team consulted various data 
and documents on the bustees. Thirdly, a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) exercise 
was carried out to get an idea of bustee life. Fourthly, three methodology workshops were 
organised. Dhaka-based academics and researchers attended the first workshop. In the 
second workshop, all NGO activists working with bustee migrants participated. In the 
third workshop, all ULS staff and consultants participated.  To build on all of the activi-
ties mentioned above, a final workshop was organised in Dhaka and facilitated by Pro-
fessor Geof Wood. In this workshop a four-phase plan of action was developed. This is 






Qualitative Research Process 
Time Activities/Methods Out-put 
a. Pre-Phase Activities 
April ‘95-December ‘95  PRA Methods: transact 
walks to different selected 
bustees, social and re-
sources mapping, 
 Group Discussions 
 Oral Histories 








b. Methodology Workshop 
01-04 January ‘96  Review of CUS*, ICDDR,B 
data  and QPS* methodol-
ogy; 
 Share pre-phase PRA find-
ings 
 Visit bustees 




c. Four-Phase Ethnographic Research Strategy 
January ‘96- April ‘96  Use PRA methods e.g. so-
cial and resource mapping, 
matrix ranking; 
 Mini-census; 
 Informal interviewing 




May ‘96- August ‘96  QPS questionnaire, 
 Observation 
 Key informant interview-
ing, 
 Witnessing key events 




September ‘96-December 96  Group discussion,  
 Observation  
 Key informant interview-
ing,  
 Witnessing key events 
 Issue based report 
for in-house presen-
tation and review 
January ‘97 - April ‘97  Weekly discussion meet-
ing among researchers,  




* Notes: CUS is the Centre for Urban Studies at the University of Dhaka. QPS is the 





The Qualitative team of the ULS consisted of five researchers. I was the team coordi-
nator and also had responsibility for liaison with the quantitative team. Although all the 
team members started working together, the team members worked independently in 
different phase-wise activities. I was solely responsible for the fieldwork carried out in 
BBB2. 
At each phase the next phase of activities was identified and the required tools and 
techniques were developed. For example, while developing the bustee profile during the 
first phase, a set of indicators were identified which influence the life of bustee people. 
The experience gathered from one phase of activity thus determined the area of investi-
gation and the methodology developed in subsequent phases. Thus, the field investiga-
tion methodology of this thesis was developed partly in response to the research theme 
selected halfway through the ULS. Before I share my experience in this research, I shall 
place how the bustees were selected for qualitative part of ULS. 
 
2.1.1     Bustee Selection 
As mentioned earlier, my research site of the BBB2 was selected using the ULS meth-
odological framework. The ULS was conducted among sample bustees in one thana in 
Dhaka Metropolitan City. The name of the thana is Mohammadpur. Mohammadpur was 
selected as a suitable site  for a number of reasons. First, it contains the largest propotion 
of bustee dwellers in Dhaka. Mohammadpur thana alone contains 20% of all the bustee 
dwellers in Dhaka (Arefeen and Mahbub 1993). Second, it has various different types of 
bustees: those developed on government land by semi-government organisations, by pri-
vate individuals or partnerships, those established on government land which is disput-
ed. Third, it is close to the city centre but it has peripheral areas, watersides and large 
single rooms in the city. Although the selection of the bustee for qualitative study de-
pended primarily on the Quantitative Panel Survey (QPS) of the ULS, we also considered 
the experiences gathered through the PRA exercises of the pre-phase, which were done 





























































































Following area sampling, twenty-five clusters out of 538 were selected randomly for 
the QPS of the ULS. We wanted to include in our sample a range of government and pri-
vate  land, as well as bustees situated close to and further from the city centre.  Eleven 
were selected from Agargaon (a very large bustee area on government land situated to the 
North East of the thana), five from Beri Badh  (sprawling bustees on the Western edge of 
the thana and the fringe of the city), and nine from the central part of the thana (these be-
ing mainly smaller pockets of bustees situated on a mixture of private, government and 
disputed land). Each cluster contained between 20 and 60 households. 
While conducting PRA exercises in preparation for fieldwork, it was observed that a 
number of factors were particularly significant in defining the livelihoods of Bustee mi-
grants. These were: tenure arrangements; the existence of common property resources 
and entitlement to access; distance from work-places; and the nature of employment 
available in and around the bustee. Control mechanisms developed in the bustees also in-
fluenced people’s access to different resources and their livelihoods. Consequently, for 
the qualitative study a number of important factors were considered in selecting the bus-
tee. These included: capturing a range of experiences particularly in relation to employ-
ment and social relations; finding a reasonable bustee  size in order to explore a variety of 
relations; and focusing on sites from the locations adjacent to the cluster sample of the 
QPS of the ULS mentioned above. 
Considering the above factors, a two-fold selection process was followed. Firstly, three 
locations - central, periphery and fringe - from the cluster maps were selected. These 
were Agargaon, Rayer Bazar and Beri Badh. Secondly, 5 bustees were drawn from each of 
these three locations. Two bustees from Agargaon which were close to the central area of 
Mohammadpur thana, 2 from Rayer Bazar from the periphery area and 1 from Moham-
madpur Beri Badh area which was located in the fringe area of Mohammadpur (see chart 




Chart  3.2: Important Feature of the Selected Bustees 















Private land Private 
land 
Govern-
ment land  
Location Close to city 
centre 
(Agargaon) 
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NGO activ-
ities 




* Notes: Physical environment means such things as drainage, roads, and space in 
homesteads. Social environment means the community situation regarding violence, 
prostitution, drugs etc. 
 
3. Additional Methodology for this Research 
The choice of a specific topic for my research developed out of what I learned through 
the process of selecting bustee and key informant households. As mentioned in the previ-




uisites for their survival in the urban context.  To explore this further it was necessary to 
develop an additional research methodology. In this section I describe this. 
3.1. From  ULS Conceptual Framework  to  People Centred Epistemology 
The first limitation that I found in the ULS methodology was its conceptual frame-
work. Trying to extend this provided a methodological turning point in my research. The 
analytical framework of the ULS gravitates around a livelihoods approach, which exam-
ines the social and material conditions within which targeted participants seek to gain 
access to food and other basic needs. This approach is based on the work of authors such 
as Sen (1982), Swift (1989), Kabeer (1989) and Lewis (1993). Sen (1982) uses the now familiar 
term ‘entitlement’ to cover a set of resources and relationships determining the control a 
household has over basic resources. 
A household’s ‘entitlement’ consists of: ‘endowments’ and ‘exchanges’. Firstly, a 
household is onsidered to be endowed with a set of resources, which conditions the range 
of economic options available to it. These resources include: 
* Material resources: the assets and stores of value including money  
 
* Human resources: the skills and capabilities of people within a household, 
including the age, gender, educational and skill status, and health and nutritional 
condition of household members. 
 
* Social resources: the set of relationships which a household has with other 
individuals, households and organisations - ones that may be used to maintain or 
improve their situation. These are regarded as "claims" to assistance which may 
include claims on food, credit, labour or productive resources or services from kin, 
neighbours, labour groups, patrons, landlords and employers, from government, or 
from NGOs and the international community. 
 
* Cultural Resources:  this dimension refers to the cultural status of the 
household or individuals within households, since the perceptions of others of that 
status will influence the outcome of negotiations and their value to the household.  
 
* Common property resources: natural resources which may be shared by different 
kinds of households either with clearly defined property rights, or adjudged as nation-
al common property. Within the urban context, common property resources may in-
clude water, grazing land, fodder materials, fuel, trees, natural vegetation and garbage. 




Secondly, there is the potential provided by the ‘exchange’ of any part of what is owned 
(for money or kind) to have access to food and other basic needs. For example, human 
labour may be sold for a wage, commodities produced may be used for domestic 
consumption or sold on the market, or used for trade. A household may therefore have 
several possible sources of ‘entitlement’ or resources, including social and common 
property resources, which may be seen as constituting its livelihood, here defined in 
relation to a socially acceptable minimum level of requirements for basic needs.  
One of the most significant features in BBB2 where I carried out my fieldwork is that the 
livelihoods of the bustee migrants are highly influenced by the mastaan structure. As 
mentioned in previous chapters the mastaan structure sets the context of the livelihoods 
options for bustee migrants by both constructing opportunities and producing 
insecurities. The livelihood options are produced through the establishment of informal 
rights in the context of a  ‘culture of violence’. 
While it is clearly important to understand the underlying structures of political 
economy, the danger is that this does not leave any explanatory space for human agency 
(Wood 1998). This means that in understanding bustee livelihoods, the migrants 
themselves would be treated as passive recipients. I reject such an epistemological 
position for four different but interlinked reasons.  
Firstly, the ULS conceptual framework generally adopted a ‘resource profiles 
approach’ which assumes “individuals, households and communities actively manage 
their resources in an attempt to achieve the best possible outcome” (McGregor 1998:7). 
Secondly, there is an insightful literture focusing on Bangladesh which has shown that 
even if the poor appear silent (Chen 1986, Hartman and Boyce 1983), they have the 
capacity and knowledge to act and creatively shape their own world (D’Rozario 1998, 
Devine 2000) and manage their resources efficiently (Van Schendel 1986).  Thirdly, my 
own experience within an NGO actively working with the poor has given me first-hand 
encounters with episodes where the poor are active agents in their own lives. The most 
cited example from Bangladesh in this regard is the success of micro-credit programmes. 
This shows that the poor have a remarkable capacity to create the best possible 
development outcomes within a situation of multiple constraints (Wood and Sharif 1998). 




structural explanations of social action and human behaviour. Instead, there has recently 
been considerable emphasis on human agency (Hulme 1994, Booth 1985). 
Taking a lead from Wood (1998) I therefore approached my research from the perspec-
tive of what can bustee migrants do, rather than how they are constrained. Bustee migrants’ 
action and interaction may be understood as the outcome of both ‘structure’ and ‘agen-
cy’.  These concepts and the relationship between them lie at the heart of sociological 
theory and are highly debated. While formerly theorists tended to emphasise either struc-
ture or agency, recently there has been considerable interest in understanding the relation 
between the two. As McGregor states (1998:3): “The midwife in this respect has been An-
thony Giddens (1984), whose ideas on structuration, if not publicly popular, have been 
extremely influential”. 
 ‘Structuration’ seeks to understand the iterative relation between structure and agen-
cy, in which action is both shaped by social structures and in turn contributes to the re-
production or transformation of those structures in a dialectical relationship. Giddens 
(1987:61) argues that: ”structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both 
constraining and enabling”. Structure thus promotes certain opportunities for action, 
while at the same time restricting others. This presents a picture of social reality as pro-
ceeding through a dynamic process of negotiation (Devine 2000) in which both structure 
and agency play an important part.  
Within the sociology of development, the most influential work in this area has been 
that of Norman and Ann Long’s edited collection (1992) on ‘actor-oriented approaches’. 
Influenced by this and the wider post-modernist move in social theory, the ‘actor-
oriented approach’ has been widely used in development studies as a more ‘people-
centered’ epistemology (Wood 1998, Devine 2000). The central focus of Long’s ‘actor-
oriented approach’ is ‘human agency’ which emphasises people’s abilities, knowledge 
and creativity to construct and shape the world around them (Long 1992). Agency is a 
quality not only of individuals but also organisations and groups. Bourdieu (1989) clari-
fies the concept of the relationship between structure and agency further, through his no-
tion of ‘habitus’. This describes the way an individual’s response to a particular situation 
is the outcome of a habitual disposition, or approach to reality, which is formed through 




periences.  In particular, this ‘habitus’ determines the scope of action, by defining what 
‘can’ and ‘should’ and ‘must’ be done, as well as drawing the boundaries of the ‘un-
thinkable’ and therefore impossible.  As Bourdieu (1989:95) states: “Through the habitus, 
the structure which has produced it governs practice, not by the processes of mechanical 
determinism, but through the mediation of the orientations and limits it assigns to the 
habitus’s operations of invention.” For this research, this means that the mastaans, bustee 
leaders and bustee migrants inhabit a shared social context which is significantly defined 
by the political economy of the world beyond it, and towards which their diverse experi-
ences and social locations dispose them to act in varying ways. Within this context, 
which is both constraining and enabling, they act as social agents, producing in turn so-
cial processes within the bustee which again influence their individual behaviour, action 
and interaction. 
 
3.2. The Native Development Practitioner as Researcher and Rapport Building 
Rapport building in anthropological discourse is considered highly significant for re-
searchers in that it helps outsiders gain inside perceptions (Appadurai 1988). An ‘outsid-
er’ may be both one who is not familiar with the language, and the broader culture of the 
research community and the ‘native’ who is as a Bangladeshi, familiar with the research 
community. Hence, I also needed to follow a process to become an  ‘insider’.    
As a development practitioner, I have been working with the poor for more than 
twelve years.  In this sense, it may be said I am a ‘trained native’. From an anthropologi-
cal perspective, my ‘trained native’ position may be considered an advantage for me. It is 
an advantage in that I faced fewer difficulties in my investigation due to my familiarity 
with the broader society, language, cultural codes and patterns of informants’ behaviour. 
For ‘non-native’ researchers these can all constitute real barriers in the need to establish 
effective communication (Lewis 1989, McGregor 1991, White 1988). Effective communica-
tion as an ‘insider’ provides unique opportunity to observe the way of life of a group of 
people. In narrating her own experiences, Margaret Mead (1977:6) writes: “as the inclu-
sion of the observer within the observed scene becomes more intense, the observation 
becomes unique”. However, despite the advantages I enjoyed, there were still distinc-




There were two ways in which being a ‘native’ brought me negative experiences. The 
first was incidental in nature. At the beginning of the first phase fieldwork, there was a 
clash between BBB3 mastaans and Proshika-organised group members. As a result, local 
mastaans attempted to attack Proshika staff because they had difficulties in collecting tolls 
and in controlling the bustee migrants. Since I am Proshika worker I could not enter BBB2 
to start my fieldwork. In order to get access to the BBB2 I decided to introduced myself as 
a research student of the University of Bath, rather than worker of Proshika.  
The second is related to the nature of typical bustee cultures. There is a mutual distrust 
between middle class people and bustee migrants. The attitude of middle class people liv-
ing in Dhaka city towards bustee migrants is generally negative. Middle class people con-
sider bustee migrants criminals and riff-raff treat them accordingly. Therefore, harass-
ment of bustee migrants by ‘outsiders’ is common. As a result bustee migrants are suspi-
cious of ‘outsiders’. In the Indian bustee context, Chakraborty and Rana (1993:156) argued 
that: ”For the people in the slums the world outside means the government, politicians, 
welfare groups, and the upper and middle class”. I was considered an ‘outsider’ because 
I was perceived as belonging to the middle class. 
To build a good rapport in the bustee I adopted a number of strategies. Firstly, to avoid 
the incidental crisis mentioned above I hid my identity as an NGO staff member. Still it 
was hard to convince the mastaans that I meant them no harm. One evening, while I was 
returning from the bustee, one of the mastaans accosted me and started questioning me. I 
took this opportunity to explain my purpose to them and again presented myself as a 
student of a foreign university. Many bustee migrants have experience with interviewers 
coming from different research institutions6.  In the end, I was able to convince them that 
my intention like other researchers was to understand their life for academic purposes. 
Unexpectedly, the mastaans offered me all sorts of help but they also reminded me that I 
should accept their offer. I expressed my gratitude to them and appreciated their offer. 
Concealing my NGO identity generated two problems. The first problem was obviously 
moral (this will be discussed further at the end of this chapter under The Problem En-
countered); and the second problem was associated with ‘suspicions’. While dealing with 
                                            
6  At that time  ICDDR,B, was collecting information from different bustee in Mohammadpur thana while ASD and 
GSS were collecting data from BBB2 to establish schools there. During our fieldwork, ASD restarted one school in 




mastaans, I encountered distance with the common bustee migrants. I gradually came to 
understand that the ‘suspicions’ were mainly manipulated by the mastaans in order to 
produce distrust to make bustee migrants feel obliged. This will be discussed in chapter 
six.   
Secondly, I drew on my experience of working in an NGO in the ways that I set out to 
generate trust. The very first step taken by an NGO worker in seeking to organise and 
mobilise the poor is to make him/herself trusted. The common strategies used to make 
oneself trusted are: 
 i) ‘Listening’ to the problems of the poor. In BBB2 the common talking place is the 
shops. I was introduced to a few shop-keepers doing business in BBB2. In the afternoons 
I used to chat with some people who spent their time there. By discussing common issues 
and listening to everyday problems, people received me in a friendly way. Many of them 
appeared happy and started relating their stories to me. 
ii) Showing respect to and valuing the poor. While conducting the PRA exercise I tried 
to show the value of my informants’ analysis. During the PRA, the bustee migrants en-
joyed the opportunity to analyse their problems, debate among themselves, and visualise 
common futures. The PRA exercise turned out to be an excellent opportunity to build re-
lationships with people. I wrote their names and noted identification marks of their 
houses in my diary so that when I met them later I could address them directly. 
iii) Making fictive kinship bonds. I tried to memorise and use the names of my in-
formants. Gradually a fictive kin relationship like “bhai” (brother), “chacha” (uncle), 
“chachi” (aunt) was established with many of the bustee migrants of BBB2. This relation-
ship became closer when I gave informants the photographs taken during the PRA exer-
cise and group discussion. This kind of goodwill helped me to get even closer to them 
and become an ‘insider’. 
Thirdly, day-to-day interaction helped me to build relationships of trust with the bus-
tee migrants. For example, I met many  BBB2 bustee migrants at their work places outside 
the bustee.  I used rickshaw pullers of BBB2 and bought goods from their shops. Three 
boys regularly visited my family house when they came by selling nuts. In fact, I re-
ceived a lot of information regarding the happenings in the bustee from them. Even the 




velop trusting relations with the bustee migrants. Over time, I became close to bustee mi-
grants and was eventually like a relative of theirs. Usually they would invite me to their 
social celebrations like marriage ceremony. 
 
3.3  ‘Key Informant’ Household Selection 
Our fieldwork was guided by the ‘keyhole’ approach which provided me with ‘win-
dows’ onto the bustee. I started my observation with 20 households. The selection of ‘key 
informant households’ was considered to be one of the important steps for understand-
ing the structure of relationships among the people living in the bustee.  The ‘key inform-
ant households’ were selected mainly through PRA, but a pre-PRA census was also con-
ducted in order to facilitate  the PRA sessions.  
A simple census for basic information on the types of household, people’s occupation 
and length of stay in Dhaka city was conducted in the bustee. These three indicators were 
identified during the pre-phase and first phase fieldwork as key factors which directly 
influence bustee migrants’  livelihoods. With the help of some assistants, the census 
sheets were filled in by visiting households door-to-door. All five team members worked 
together and five bustees were covered. A list of the total households was made on the 
basis of the census. This census provides basic information on the households living in 
the bustee, it also helped develop a detailed and updated list of bustee migrants. 
As mentioned above, ‘key informant households’ were selected through a PRA exer-
cise conducted among the bustee migrants. But the selection was not straightforward, 
three major steps were followed. Firstly, a series of bustee migrants’ resources were se-
lected using the resource profile framework. These selected sets of resources are present-
ed in matrix 3.1. Secondly, an attempt was made to analyse how these resources affect 
people’s endowments. It was found that a single resource was unable to facilitate ex-
change. For example, one of the households owned a rickshaw which was pulled by an-
other household member. When the owner became sick, he tried to rent it out but he 
could not because the rickshaw was in need of repair.  The owner was unable to use his 
own rickshaw due to his sickness, while he could not repair it for lack of money. People’s 
sense of the inter-relation of resources is reflected in their selection of resources.  Thirdly, 




survival groups are dynamic and they differ from each other according to their ability to  
store and make use of different sets of resources. 
 
 Matrix : 3. 1  Bustee migrants resources 
 Material resources:  house, rickshaw, livestock like cows, shops, land in rural areas, fishing 
tools, agricultural tools,  tools for repairing like key smith,  amenities, ornaments, cloths,  
clock, radio, bicycles, cassette players, savings, cash in hand. 
 Human resources: youth, good health, education, male household members, skilled labour,  
 Social resources: kin networks, non-kin networks like friends and colleagues, networks bustee 
associations,  networks with non bustee organisations like NGO, networks with officials, 
networks with business association like kitchen market associations, networks with law 
enforcing authorities, association with mastaans. 
 Cultural Resources: respected households members, for example, persons working in a 
government office, stable marriage.    
 Common property resources: ground water, grazing land, fodder materials, fuel, trees, natural 
vegetation and garbage. 
 
The dynamic categories identified are: improving, coping and declining. People be-
longing to the upper stratum were termed ‘improving’, the middle one ‘coping’ and the 
lower one ‘declining’. In this exercise, it was clear that while a few people could be con-
sidered to have economic surplus, most bustee migrants didn’t wish to be categorised as 
improving, since they are not socially accepted by the larger community.  However, a 
few households were classified as improving on the basis of their  human or socio-




Matrix 3.2: Indicators used for Bustee Migrants Categorisation 
 
Improving households Coping households Declining house-
holds 
 Surplus income  Balanced income  Deficit income 
 More income earners  Balance income earners 
and dependents  
 Less income earners  
 No/few dependent(s)  Few dependents  High no. dependents  
 Productive assets  Less Productive   No productive assets 
 Multiple Income sources   More than one income 
sources 
 Single income source 
 Income erosion is less   Income erosion is high   Income erosion is 
very high 
 Illness of family members/ 
earners is less 
 Illness of family Members 
is high  
 Illness of income 
earner is high 
 Have savings  Very little  savings  No savings 
 Strong support network  Weak social support net-
work 
 Very weak social 
network 
 Strong relation with dif-
ferent agencies 
 Weak relation with agen-
cies 
 Very weak relation 
with agencies 
 Obtain crops from the vil-
lage 
 Need to send remittance to 
the village  
 Need to send remit-
tance to the village  
 Literate  Illiterate  Illiterate 
 Female HHH is almost nil   Female HHH is less   Female HHH is very 
high 
 Business profession  is 
high  
 Mostly skilled labour   Mostly unskilled la-
bour 
 Serial monogamy is high 
(male) 
 Serial monogamy is less  Serial monogamy is 
high (female)  
 
In the second phase, the household profile was developed mainly according to the in-
formation gathered through the QPS. Interestingly, some discrepancy was noticed be-




was based on economic issues. For example, during the PRA exercise people put Shahid 
Mia in the improving category.  From QPS we found that Shahid Mia’s economic condi-
tion is no better than Abdul Odud who was put in the coping category, and was almost 
similar to Ms. Nurani Begum who belongs to a female-headed household and was desig-
nated a declining household. Both Abdul Odud and Ms. Nurani Begum have very weak 
social ties. Ms. Nurani Begum was not socially accepted because her eldest daughter 
worked as a sex worker. Even though Shahid Mia’s household economy was not compa-
rable to the people belonging to the improving household category, he enjoyed wide 
connections in terms of social network.  At the end of the study, people’s perceptions 
proved to be accurate since Shahid Mia’s social network was very strong.  He eventually 
became the chairman of BBB2, replacing Monir Islam.  After completion of this exercise, 
the aggregated result was compared with the result obtained on the use of ranking and 
bar diagram. The ratio of  'improving', 'coping' and 'declining' is 3:5:2. 
In the third step, 20 key informant households were chosen according to the percent-
age distribution of the specific category and their willingness to participate in the study. 
The selected households of the specific category were again chosen on the basis of a 
range of indicators - such as household structure, occupation and time since migration. 
 
3.4.  Doing Fieldwork  
In doing fieldwork, initially I encountered two major problems. One was the time-
scale of the study. The question arose as to how far I could go within a year in develop-
ing a detailed ‘sociology of everyday life’ of the bustee migrants given that there was no 
previous study. The second problem was related to the question of research skills in 
translating the field information into a research format. The first question will be ad-
dressed here and the second question will be dealt with in the following section. 
In the bustee context of urban life, the dynamics of the livelihoods depend to a great 
extent on how individual actors are associated with different urban organisations 
through which individual labourers can transfer and exchange their resources. As men-
tioned in chapter two, resource exchange is constrained and at the same time facilitated 
by the mastaan structure. The ‘structural constraint approach’ generally focuses on how 




people do?’. Thus, I put emphasis on the power and knowledge of the ‘local people’, par-
ticularly on the ‘actors’ living in a given condition. I used a broadly anthropological ap-
proach with an ‘actor-oriented’ analysis, and PRA methods in undertaking my particular 
study. I began work in BBB2 by developing profiles of various locations and households. 
To achieve this, as mentioned in chart 3.1, I employed a number of tools and techniques 
based on PRA principles with the intention of creating room for participation of the bus-
tee migrants and allowing their own analysis to emerge.  
 
Firstly, I employed a number of tools and techniques developed on the basis of PRA 
principles with the intention of creating room for participation of the bustee migrants and 
allowing their own analysis to emerge. PRA developed from Rapid Rural Appraisal - 
RRA - which was in turn developed in the 1970s by Robert Chambers. PRA is normally 
described as “a basket of techniques” for encouraging participants themselves to con-
struct several tools, like diagrams, maps and charts to analyse their present and past situ-
ation (ULS 1995).  In fact, Chambers (1994) advocates PRA from a theoretical develop-
ment perspective rather than as a methodological tool.  The objective was to make the 
poor the subject of development activities rather an object. Thus PRA was projected to be 
an essential tool for empowering the poor through the participation in development 
planning, changing the ‘top-down’ development approach. 
While, PRA is flexible according to the applicability of the specific community in 
terms of tools used  (Abbot and Gujit 1997) it is not in terms of approaches regarding the 
empowerment of recipients. Therefore, the PRA used in this study is not comparable 
with the theoretical conception of PRA. Secondly, in this study I only used the tools and 
techniques developed for the rural one, with some modification for the urban poor. It is 
used here more as Participatory Rural Appraisal in the urban context rather than Partici-
patory Rapid Appraisal as such. 
My first move was to conduct a mini census containing migration and demographic 
information. This was conducted with the assistance of bustee migrants and checked in a 
PRA session. Secondly, a physical resource map was drawn showing the location of bus-
tee resources like sources of water, roads and common property resources like garbage 




household resource ranking and categorisation. In this session bustee migrants them-
selves identified each household’s resources (Matrix  3.1). While drawing various re-
source maps and diagrams I took notes that helped me conduct further investigation 
smoothly. For example, I wrote the name of different key actors and locations where they 
stayed so that I could easily identify them when I needed them for discussion, informal 
interviews or observations.     
 Resource ranking in the bustee context proved not to be an effective tool to analyse so-
cial and cultural resources, which relate to migrants’ status and power position. More 
detail on this is given in section 4 (Strength and Weakness of the Methodology). The 
point that needs to be emphasised here is that the PRA exercises provided the basis for 
identifying key points of departure. In particular, PRA exercises clearly indicated that 
social resources provide the basis for the accumulation of other resources. In addition 
they served importantly to identify key actors both within and outside bustee, such as the 
sardars on whom they depended to provide access to work opportunities. Similarly, 
when they mentioned that police harassment is very common, I asked who helped them 
to negotiate with them. In this way I built up my knowledge of a number of key actors 
who belonged to the mastaan structure within the bustee and others who did not live in 
bustees but were connected to the bustee mastaan structure. This enabled me to see the bus-
tee as a ‘keyhole’ through which a glimpse of a broader functioning structure could be 
obtained. 
Secondly, I used a number of anthropological techniques which include life histories, 
biographies, profiles, oral histories, observation of participants. As mentioned in the in-
troductory chapter, the objective of my research is to understand how the functioning of 
the bustee mastaan structure influences bustee migrants’ livelihoods. Life histories helped 
me to understand the genesis of the bustee. Thus by fitting together piece by piece the 
various national and community level events which bustee migrants described I was 
eventually able to build up a complete picture of development process of BBB, its initia-
tors and their different connections. The biographies of the key actors of the mastaan 
structure further illustrate the significance of social connections and networks with dif-
ferent individual actors and organisations. Due to my good rapport with the bustee mi-
grants, I enjoyed some sorts of rights to gain access to different places. Participating in 




them and their activities. Sitting in a rickshaw garage or a shop and chatting with the 
owners who generally belong to the mastaan structure provided me opportunities to ob-
serve their interaction with others and the nature and types of exchanges between and 
among them. This sort of informal talk also gave me an opportunity to know more about 
their biographies, both past and present, and so to situate their different actions and be-
haviour. Similarly, sitting and passing time with sardars enabled me to observe and un-
derstand more about the role of social relationships in facilitating market exchange. Rec-
ognising the significance of access to work, I also visited workplaces such as garment fac-
tories and the wage labour market. Visiting the places where gambling was organised, I 
observed how important gambling was for the bustee migrants in terms of making rela-
tionships with mastaans.               
Finally, as far as note taking is concerned, I took notes on the spot only during the 
PRA exercise but maintained a diary that was written at the end of each day. This rec-
orded the facts, events and cases with some explanatory notes. I used my initial findings 
to write thematic field reports including bustee and household profiles. These I later com-
piled into a monograph. All such documents were used in this thesis.       
 
3.5.  The Problems Encountered   
As mentioned earlier, this research adopts an  ‘actor-oriented approach’ to explain the 
process of negotiation between the mastaans and the bustee migrants. In ethnographic 
study, researchers face various obstacles in their fieldwork. This is inevitable given that 
researchers become part of the research process itself through face to face interaction 
with the informants. Difficulties arise from the physical  condition of the researcher 
(Harmmersley and Atkinson 1995), their nationalities (Lewis 1989), gender (White 1992) 
and occupation (D’Rozario 1998). All such potential difficulties do not only refer simply 
to encounters rather they also refer to research ethics. In what follows I offer a glimpse of 
the main difficulties encountered in my research. The nature of my difficulties varied 
over time and extended on into the writing up stage. 
 
3.5.1. Problems encountered in the field 
Tension arose from the fact that I was associated with different stakeholders during 




stakeholders were mostly officials and consisted of Proshika staff and the donors. The 
second group of stakeholders were the research team members, The third group of 
stakeholder were the bustee people, both mastaans and bustee migrants. Each different 
group of stakeholders exerted some influence on my  fieldwork. 
With regards to the first group of stakeholders, the influence I experienced was both 
negative and positive. After a certain period of time, both Proshika and its donors want-
ed understandably to know some of the findings of the ULS. For example, during the an-
nual planning, Proshika planning department wanted a report from ULS team. Similarly, 
when the government was taking serious initiatives to eradicate slums from the city, Pro-
shika desperately sought ULS reports to mobilise people to build a strategy for advocacy. 
Unfortunately, it was too early for the ULS to produce such report. This created a certain 
tension among the ULS team members. This tension, however, produced two immediate 
results: First of all, it gave a new urgency to the research because it had failed to serve the 
immediate needs of the bustee dwellers. Secondly, the whole situation provided a unique 
opportunity particularly for me to observe the relations of bustee migrants with different 
urban actors. For example, I witnessed how the police set fire to and destroyed the bustee 
and how the bustee migrants organised themselves to survive in such a hostile situation. 
The second group of stakeholders consisted of the ULS team itself. There were 40 
members who worked for the ULS. Three coordinators were responsible for academic 
and management aspects, and had to coordinate both the work of their own team mem-
bers as well as between the teams. I often had to spend time in administrative meetings 
and this meant that I had consequently to withdraw myself from the field. Such intervals 
created some information gaps. For example, during one such administrative meeting 
when I was away from the bustee one of my informants was burnt by the mastaans.  I 
came to know about this through the newspaper. 
The third group of stakeholders were the bustee migrants. As mentioned earlier, I 
chose to hide my professional identity from the very beginning my fieldwork due to the 
clash which occurred between  the local mastaans and  Proshika organised group mem-
bers. I did not and was not required to disclose my professional identity throughout my 
fieldwork. Even when I returned to the bustee  from Bath in July 1998, the migrants con-
sidered me a student and asked about my examinations.  
The most serious tension I encountered with the bustee migrants occurred at the initial 




(2000) observed a similar situation to this during his fieldwork in rural Bangladesh. Peo-
ple tried to label him ‘amader lok’ (one of us) or tader lok (one of them).  My interest in the 
mastaans meant that bustee migrants identified me as tader lok (one of mastaans). Eventual-
ly, however, I managed to show that I was a  ‘group neutral’ researcher. I felt my ac-
ceptance among the bustee migrants when they promised to remember me in their pray-
ers.  Trust was built on the basis of my word to my informants that I would not disclose 
or use the collected information other than for research purposes. This was particularly 
an issue in relation to the mastaans.  
 
3.5.2.  The problems encountered during the writing  up period 
As mentioned in the previous section, I enjoyed some advantages during my field 
work as native researcher but a number of factors influenced the research process. The 
problem in the field is more or less commonly found in anthropological literature since 
the ‘fieldwork’ is considered to require a range of ‘field skills’ which are personal in na-
ture (Gudeman 1990). Most researchers face potential difficulties in the field in obtaining 
the required data. The collection of reliable data is an essential part of ethnographic re-
search process, but equally important are the stages of interpretation and analysis. As a 
development activist, I encountered a number of difficulties particularly in the writing 
up stage. 
I finally moved to the University of Bath on January 16, 1999 after completion of the 
ULS and some additional fieldwork in the bustee. The main task I was given after my ar-
rival from the field by my supervisor, was to search for relevant literature in order to de-
velop a solid theoretical basis to interpret the data collected.  I would put the practical 
problem of getting a visa and a place to stay first, the second problem was related with 
literature and the  reliability of data. 
Firstly, a certain amount of tension was involved in arranging my stay in the UK: find-
ing  a house, and extending my visa.  These continued the main sources of tension 
throughout my stay in Bath. Finding a house greatly depends on finding a suitable group 
to stay with. As a non-seasonal student, it was not a easy to get a group to rent a house. 
Such details may appear irrelevant but they affected the process of research. For example, 
to extend my visa (second time) I had to consider when I needed to face my Ph.D. viva.  
Second, I felt somewhat isolated and had some individual problems. In a non-




sor. Also as my research process was unconventional, I needed to find suitable theoreti-
cal foundation after completion of my fieldwork, and this was not at all easy. In my 
search, the most familiar term which values relationships in development discourse, ‘so-
cial capital’, was considered first. Most of the literature that I found related with ‘social 
capital’ were very rosy about community (Levi 1998) which did not seem to fit my field 
information where relationships with the mastaan  were the most important resource for 
livelihoods. However, the idea of the  ‘dark side social capital’ (Putzel 1998)  and ‘ad-
verse incorporation’ (Wood 1999)  gave a  theoretical space to explain  bustee migrants’ 
behaviour and action.  But the question I needed to answer about why bustee migrants 
established their relationship with mastaan structure was not found. At one stage I was 
advised to look at the Mafia literature but I did not find any relevance as most of the lit-
erature was about the ethnography of the Mafia, the process of emergence, their career 
and the way they function. In regular tutorial sessions I shared my progress and problem 
with my supervisor. At one stage, I was advised to study more about ‘networks’ and 
‘trust’ since they were the most important ingredient of social capital. Two further im-
portant ingredient I found which helped me were Boissevain’s (1974)  idea of ‘strategic 
contact’ for accessing resources and Gambetta’s (1968) analysis of the Mafia’s role in 
trust-building.   
 The third problem was associated with the meaning of my data. As mentioned earli-
er, I followed a process of data collection combining anthropological approaches and 
PRA methods. But, my experience says that the available methods are not enough to re-
fine the data and understand the sense of it. I may present here one experience in this re-
gard.  In BBB2, Nasreen migrated after her husband went to jail. Her husband was con-
victed in a murder case. Nasreen sold everything that she had and sent her one year old 
son to her mother and moved to Dhaka. Nasreen became an earth cutter and got regular 
income but suddenly she decided to go back home.  One day when she was crying for 
her son, many of her neighbours blamed her for irrational behaviour.  It was considered 
irrational by her neighbours because affection for her son was going to affect her income 
opportunity. I was also convinced by the argument given by the neighbour because the 
bustee economy is dominated by a ‘cash culture’. In other words, income is the main pri-
ority. But Nasreen did not accept this and left for her son. According to the local people’s 
values and knowledge, I considered Nasreen’s behaviour to be irrational. But after, one 




impossible for me to imagine my son at the age of 20 months. I saw him last when he was 
only around four months old. My pain pushed me to reassess Nasreen’s behaviour from 
a totally different perspective. In an article, Nobonitha Sen, expressed her feelings when 
she went abroad with her husband, Professor Sen, leaving her son in Calcutta. Nobinitha 
Sen never forgave her self-interested behaviour (Nobonitha Sen 1998). Rational behav-
iour, thus, does not depend always on rational choices. People consider the cost of gain 
according to a particular context. Accordingly Bourdieu (1989) says a combination of 
three elements influence people’s moment-to-moment behaviour. These are: 
i)  ‘forthcoming reality’,  what is actually happening in the actors’ setting; 
 ii) ‘objective potentialities’ ,  consideration of what to do or not to do 
 iii) on going structure of habitus 
  This simply suggests that the meaning of data may change according to the interpre-
tive context, creating a tension. Being a development practitioner, I valued people’s 
knowledge, their perception of their own position. Acquaintance with new experience 
and theories led me to revisit the data and appreciate there a new sense.  
 
4.  Strength and Weakness of the Methodology 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, my research is one of the outputs of the 
ULS, which was a mullti-disciplinary research project. Although I was responsible for 
coordinating the qualitative part of the ULS, the study was very much embedded in both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. For example, selection of bustees for qualitative 
research depended on a multiple sampling procedure.  In this section I will present my 
experience, first in relation to the qualitative/quantitative issue and in the second part I 
will describe the methods used. 
4.1. Combination of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
The setting of this research was highly dependent on a quantitative approach where 
logical justification demanded the use of quantitative techniques which included the dif-
ferent data sets, particularly CUS and ICDDR,B’s data,  and which had developed an ac-
ceptable sampling procedure. Systematic questionnaire procedures were also used. When 




bustee livelihoods, this pushed me towards a more qualitative ethnographic approach. 
However, the research as a whole involved a mix of the two approaches. 
There is no point in making general judgments on the relative merits of qualitative 
and quantitative approaches in research. Many researchers agree that both approaches 
have their own value and the value depends on proper use of the approaches. Moreover, 
the proper use of a specific approach, it seems to me, greatly depends on the nature of the 
research, research topics, the commitment of the researcher, and the context. 
In the belief that research is a continuous process of refining data, interacting with a 
process of interpretation, my research approach is similar to Hammersley (1992) who 
thinks the complexity of social phenomena cannot be conceptualised in a single ap-
proach. However, my research experience convinced me of the value of qualitative 
methods. This experience is confirmed by others (Cottle 1972, Bogden and Taylor 1975). 
The qualitative approach provides a unique opportunity for the researchers to interact 
directly in a face to face  manner with the informants and this helps make more sense of 
data,  allowing the sharing of views, and  the research can be refined accordingly. 
Such a process may be seen negatively when people over-emphasise ‘objectivity’. As 
Walker (1983:13) states:  
“What a researcher learns from his research greatly depends on the quality 
of his interaction with the people, his ability to interpret what he observes and 
is told and his ethical and social values [...] consequently, there can be no abso-
lute objectivity but only agreements on truth and validity shared by people who 
hold the same meaning system, most notably by researchers of the same meth-
odological persuasion”. 
There are two points here: reliability of data and reliability of research. The reliability 
of data in this research will be considered in the following section when the major meth-
ods used are discussed. The ‘objectivity’ of research greatly depends on conceptual un-
derstanding. In my case, I used an  ‘actor- oriented approach’ as mentioned earlier. 
4.2.   Anthropological Enquiries and PRA Methods 
In this research the combination of anthropological and PRA approaches is especially 
appropriate, considering the requirements of multiple levels of data collection at com-
munity, household and individual levels. At the community level, participatory tech-




mote understanding about vulnerability and to identify households exposed to different 
economic trends and social support. At the household level, structured and semi-
structured in-depth interviews were taken. At the individual level, oral histories were 
taken to elicit key insights into different issues. 
 The participatory approaches were exercised at different stages for different purpos-
es. At the initial stages, some selected tools of PRA were used to understand the bustee, to 
learn bustee vocabularies and at the same time to build rapport with the bustee migrants 
who later provided a range of inside information. It was particularly useful in identifying 




Triangulation of information 
 
Information gathered by using
Participatory
Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools
Information gathered by using Participatory
Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools




The use of quantitative questionnaires in offering a comparison with the information 
gathered through qualitative methods is mentioned above.  In addition, the observation 
and witnessing of key events provided me with the opportunity to triangulate the infor-
mation. Furthermore, the qualitative study included four approaches, which distinguish 
it from most of the poverty studies available. First, a macro level approach, combined 
households and communities as the major units of analysis. Secondly, a long study peri-
od over which shifts in the communities and households could be observed longitudinal-
ly. Thirdly, a comparative framework offered cases that vary with different levels of eco-
nomic development and institutional context. Fourthly, the incorporation of emic (insid-
er's point of view) perspectives in the analysis allowed the subjects’ own understanding 
of various issues to come to the fore. 
The strength of this research is its capacity to comprehend migrants’ responses at 
household and community levels. This complements research that focuses on individuals 
by highlighting the role that informal and formal social and financial institutions play in 
different contexts to facilitate or limit the capacity of households to adjust to external cir-
cumstances.  It is also intends to highlight and strengthen, rather than deny or substitute 




To develop a bustee resource-profile during the first phase of fieldwork,  a number of 
exercises developed on the basis of PRA principles were conducted. The experiences 
show that such an exercise was not very easy to conduct in the bustee where migrants are 
dependent on a group of people. One such experience is presented in example 3.1. 
Example 3.1 
During the exercise of resource mapping (a PRA tool) in a bustee called Sareng Ba-
ri Bustee under Mirpur thana, one of the bustee leaders became angry and refused to 
continue the exercise. None of the bustee migrants dared speak out in front of him 
since he was the most influential leader in the community. Considering the situation, 
it was decided that one of the team members would tackle the leader through appreciat-
ing his positive contributions to this locality in the next exercise.  Accordingly, two 
team members arranged the discussion, two of them took note and one kept the leader 
engaged in talking separately in front of a tea stall. The result of the exercise was 
unique as all the participants took part in developing the resource map. 
 
Thus, during the first phase PRA exercise, the team was able to avoid interference by 
influential people on particularly sensitive issues like land holding, power base etc. Ex-
periences such as this taught the team to devise different strategies and techniques for 
undertaking PRA in the bustee context. 
 Experiences gathered from the pre-phase activities indicated  that  PRA is not a suita-
ble method in a heterogeneous group in which people are related to each other in a verti-
cal manner as in a patron-client arrangement.  To avoid 'courtesy bias' and 'audience ef-
fects' the whole team worked together in all five bustees, devised tools and arranged the 
exercises accordingly. The process involving strategy development is described here.  
As was done in Sareng Bari Bustee, two of the team members led the exercise, two took 
notes and one was busy in managing troublemakers, if any. When the team brought to-
gether a group of people and started talking about daily events, gradually the size of the 
group started growing. Step by step the two leaders brought the selected issues to the 
floor for discussion. At the same time information gathering and analysis of the types of 
occupation in the bustee and working conditions continued. Although occupation in gen-




ployer, the former try to avoid speaking in front of the latter.  This follows the broader 
custom that subordinates should show deference by keeping silent in the presence of 
those on whom they depend. Most of the participants who could not express their own 
options and experiences in a group situation, were quite different when talked to indi-
vidually. There was also a tendency to summarise for others.  If one person was hesitant, 
or did not explain or illustrate fully, others might take over, in drawing conclusions, or 
even to encourage exaggeration depending on the topic of discussion, participants' com-
position and the position of the participants in the bustee.  A case of such 'audience ef-
fects' is illustrated here in example 3.2. 
 
Example 3.2 
Salimuddin, aged 17, has been living in this bustee for three years, pulling a rick-
shaw and renting from Faruque Mia. In the PRA exercise it was found that Salimud-
din could not speak freely as he was interrupted by  Faruque Mia. Observing this ten-
sion between them, Faruque was brought to a shop and he was asked to tell about his 
success in business. After talking to Faruque Mia it appeared that one of his rickshaws 
had been stolen from Salimuddin and two thirds of the price of the  stolen rickshaw  
would have to be repaid by Salimuddin. The repayment decision was taken by Faruque 
Mia and accepted by Salimuddin. In the absence of Faruque Mia Salimuddin partici-
pated in the PRA exercise. 
It was also observed that the cultural composition of the group affected the session 
both in terms of data gathering and analysis. As with patron-client relations mixed-sex 
group sessions were found to be less effective than single sex. Although bustee women 
are more vocal than rural ones, most of the working women were found to be deferent to 







      A PRA session was arranged one evening with a group of earth cutters living 
in the bustee. In discussing employment access, they started narrating different 
experiences. But, in the course of the discussion, it was noticed that most of the 
time men were repeatedly supported by the women participants. In a different ses-
sion organised only for women, individual articulation by the same participants 
was quite different 
 
In addition I found in all exercises that common bustee migrants avoided talking about 
persons who are placed in advantageous positions because the resource-poor bustee mi-
grants have an obligation to those actors who can often help them to have access to jobs 
and resources. Due to scarce resources, people belonging to the same stratum do not 
share such information with each other for fear of losing the competitive edge they have 
through the patron-client type of relationship. This situation affected individual behav-
iour in group sessions.  
Due mainly to 'audience effect' and 'courtesy bias'; it was clear that 'PRA' method was 
not sufficient to understand the complexity of relationships developed on the basis of 
access and the use of different  types of resources available in and around the bustee. PRA 
was unable to identify the key “power players” living both within and out of the bustee. 
Therefore, PRA was not a suitable tool to understand the relationship between common 
migrants and the people who control the bustee.  
While PRA has limitations, it proved useful in that it identified actors and issues 
which were later followed up. Thus the pre-exercise helped identify different categories 
of households reflecting different livelihood contexts. As my information of these house-
holds increased, I was slowly able via chain interviews to review and triangulate my da-
ta. At the same time, the level of trust between myself and the households grew and this 
resulted in the latter introducing me to their important external contacts as well as ‘in-




had many limitations, it offered me access to the most important events and people who 
subsequently informed by research. 
 
5. Conclusion  
In this chapter I have presented how the progress of my research resulted in my entry 
into the everyday life of a particular group of people. To achieve this, information cannot 
be quickly attained and research methodologies need to be flexible and open to innova-
tion and revision. Although the epistemology of research “tells us, sometimes descrip-
tively, more often prescriptively, about what we can know, and about how we should go 
about gathering knowledge” (Law 1986:3), the practical situation is itself a teacher, and 
what it says may not be fully reflected in our prescriptive models. 
This thesis is exploratory in nature. The exploration began with an extensive and in-
tensive survey methods and was followed by a period of study and idea building in or-
der to make analytical sense of the data collected from the field. In the next chapter, I in-
troduce the main conceptual idea of social capital which helped me analyse, organise and 








CONCEPTUALISING SOCIAL CAPITAL RESOURCES 
 
1. Introduction 
My observations in a Dhaka bustee suggests that the structure of relationships are an 
important resource to be used for maintaining urban livelihoods and that the mastaan 
structure is central to the creation and nurturing of these relationships. While the mastaan 
structure is mainly organised for the benefit of the mastaans, it nevertheless offers various 
services to the bustee dwellers which help them maintain their livelihood in the urban 
economy. This point was made in chapter two. In this chapter, I set these observations in 
a broader theoretical context.  In particular, I draw on the concept of ‘social capital’ to 
explore how it analyses the social structure of relationships and focuses on how human 
behaviour and institutions are affected by social relations. 
The term ‘social capital’ entered development discourse with some force in 1993 fol-
lowing the publication of Robert Putnam’s book, Making Democracy Work.  Social capital 
is therefore a new term, which has not been systematically analysed (Harris and De Ren-
zio 1997). It is however used increasingly in diverse development and research develop-
ment contexts (Portes 1998) and this attests to the importance of the issues it identifies. 
The problem of understanding social capital is related to its various interpretations 
and use. Different elements of social capital are emphasised in different empirical and 
analytical contexts. For example, the element of trust is widely cited as an important in-
gredient for economic prosperity. A theoretical foundation has also been developed 
around the  ‘reputation effect’ in game theory (Arrow 1999). Similarly, social networks 
have long been considered one of the most important elements of social capital. Thus 
Wood (1998) argues that the notion is critical to understanding slum livelihood strategies 
since "people use networks, associations and broad principles of social organisation as a 
means of reducing risks, accessing services, protecting themselves against degradation, 
and acquiring information”.  
The wide and multi-dimensional use of social capital can been divided into two broad 
dimensions: the empirical observation of social capital as a resource and its theoretical 




tions which occur between individuals and their social environment, through which 
people satisfy their material and social needs (Rahman 1998). Theoretically, social capital 
emphasises how actors’ actions and transactions are embedded in structures of social re-
lations.  The need to understand people’s livelihoods therefore also addresses one of the 
classic questions of social theory, that of how actors’ behaviour is affected by social rela-
tions and institutions.  
In this chapter, my primary concern is to conceptualise social capital as resource.  To 
explore this, I focus on three issues: the conceptual background emphasising actor’s ac-
tion; the analytical foundation emphasisng different views; and empirical studies, em-
phasising the effects of social capital resources.   
 
2. Conceptual Background 
The understanding of actors’ action as a foundation concept within social capital has 
emerged through academic controversies between sociologists and economists. Sociolo-
gists typically emphasise the socialisation of actors seeing "the actor as socialized and ac-
tion as governed by social norms, rules and obligations" (Coleman 1988: S96). Economists 
tend to promote a view of self-interested individuals, seeing "the actor as having goals 
independently arrived at, as acting independently, and as wholly self-
interested"(ibid:S96). Both approaches have attempted to capture the actor’s action with-
in the given social and economic system where economic transactions take place by em-
phasising the limitation of each discipline and adapting tools both from within their own 
discipline and from others. In this way, both have contributed to developing the new in-
tellectual traditions of 'new institutional economics' and 'new economic sociology'; and 
both have helped social capital become a more general term referring to the means actors 
adopt to achieve their economic goals. Social capital theory in development discourse 
may therefore be seen as the confluence of two streams of works. Before explaining how 
these two traditions have helped promote the concept of social  capital, we need to  first 
look at how they each conceptualise actors’ action. 
 
2.1. Economic Approach: From Utilitarian Tradition to Institutional Account  
The economic approach to actors’ action is primarily dominated by the utilitarian tra-




pact of social structure and social relations on production, distribution or consumption 
(Granovetter 1985). The utilitarian tradition is influenced by two basic assumptions: 
market behaviour and individual satisfaction. 
The first assumption is that the modern market is perfectly competitive and focuses on 
and emphasises economic capital and  ‘economic man’ in analysing the actions of actor 
(Rahman 1999). Neo-classical economics ignores actors’ relations or interactions within 
the system. “Under perfect competition there is no room for bargaining, negotiation, re-
monstration or mutual adjustment and the various operators that contract together need 
not enter into recurrent or continuing relationships as a result of which they would get 
know each other well” (Hirschman 1982 1473). However, in reality, the market does not 
operate in isolation from social ties, personal or institutional trust. Granovetter (1985:484) 
for example makes the point that Hobbes’ “conflict free social and economic transactions 
depend on trust and absence of malfeasance. But these are unlikely when individuals are 
conceived to have neither social relationships nor institutional context - as in the ‘state of 
nature’”. The market is therefore considered to have institutions and social networks 
which facilitate exchange (Baker 1981, Godelier 1967). 
The second assumption is that ‘economic man’ is the product of the market and its ex-
change norms and that market influence shapes individuals’ economic action. Neo-
classical economics focuses on the idea that actors act rationally to maximize utility be-
cause it is thought that “individuals are goal-oriented, and once goals are known, the ac-
tions taken will be those that individual perceives to be most efficient toward that goal” 
(Coleman 1994b:167). Utility maximization, thus, makes the actor an ‘economic man’ 
through individual motivation. Neo-classical economics therefore assumes that the actor 
is rational and acts for economic gain in a market system. The motivation involves the  
“logically most simple types of motivation: rational, selfish, outcome oriented” (Elster 
1989:37). Economic utility maximization motivated by economic gain thus leads the actor 
to seek  control over resources. An actor increases “utility by gaining control of a re-
source and loses utility by giving up control over a resource unilaterally” (Coleman 
1994b: 169). Action taken to achieve the goal of economic gain and control over resources 




The above-mentioned understanding of actors’ action meets two empirical problems. 
First, the assumption of a perfect market limits the influence of institutions on market 
behaviour, and second, the conception of ‘economic man’ assumes an individualism 
which limits links between actors and other structures and institutions.  Both of these as-
pects have been highly contested. For example, with ‘new institutional economics’ many 
economists consider the market is influenced by institutions and they analyse how hu-
man actions are affected and influenced by these institutions. 'New institutional econom-
ics' considers  the value of organisations to show how economic institutions develop in 
certain social contexts and influence the maintenance of systems. It questions individual-
ism and moves analysis towards system levels and structural aspects.  This not only 
gives more of a role to formal institutions but also constitutes fertile ground for the dis-
cussion of social capital (Loury 1977, North 1990, Furubon and Richter 1989, Williamson 
1985). 
2.2 Sociological  Approach: From Utilitarian Tradition to Relational Accounts 
Actors’ action in relation to economic transactions is addressed by 'economic sociolo-
gists' who consider that the role of social organisations together with economic activities 
facilitate economic action. This notion is influenced by, and emerged through, the ration-
al choice theory within economic sociology. Actor’s action in economic sociology, unlike 
neo-classical economic utility maximization, does not focus on individual interests alone 
but also on social relations. Actors’ actions are, therefore, constituted through socialisa-
tion. 
In this sociological approach, the issue of action is addressed in reaction to the ‘over 
socialised conception of man in modern sociology’. Wrong (1961) approved of the break 
with the ‘atomized utilitarian tradition’ developed by neo-classical economics and the 
subsequent emphasis on the embeddedness of all social action. This approach, however, 
is rather problematic in that society is seen to influence the actor’s action and behaviour 
in a mechanical manner. On this issue Granovetter (1985:486) comments: 
 “Once we know in just what way an individual has been affected, 
ongoing social relations and structures are irrelevant. Social influences 
are all contained inside an individual’s head, so, in actual decision situ-
ations, he or she can be as atomised as any Homo economicus, through 




Granovetter then refers to the dynamic properties of culture which keeps actors as ac-
tive and strategic decision makers. A cultural analysis of market makes clear that “cul-
ture is not a once-for-all influence but an on-going process, continuously constructed and 
reconstructed during interaction. It not only shapes its members but also is shaped by 
them, in part for their own strategic reasons” (ibid 1985:486) 
Unlike neo-classical economists, economic sociologists believe utility can also be 
gained by giving up control. Rational choice theory in economic sociology cites examples 
of actors’ giving up control of action to others.  When one believes that transferring the 
control of one’s action to another will lead to a better outcome or minimise risk or uncer-
tainty, then it is rational to transfer control of one’s action to another. “Such transfers, or 
trust, or influence, can be expected when information is scarce, that is, when there is 
great uncertainty about the outcome of an action” (Coleman 1994b:169). Moreover, the 
actor’s action is  also likely to be determined by the  pattern of distribution of rights. “Yet 
rights have their origins as the outcome of social processes, in which individuals act ra-
tionally to further their interests by collectively establishing a rights allocation that will 
benefit them”(Coleman 1994b:170). Therefore, utility maximisation in the economic soci-
ology approach focuses on others’ action along with the action of the actor him/herself. 
In contrast to the neo-classical approach of  ‘methodological individualism’ economic 
sociology focuses on actors’ actions in relation to others in a pay-off situation. For exam-
ple, according to rational choice perspectives in a two person game outcomes depend on 
the actions of both actors. Figure 4.1 shows that the first number is the payoff to actor A 
and the second number is the pay-off to actor B.  According to the pay-offs figure 4.1, A 
can become better off by 1 unit by taking action 2, while B can makes A worse off by 2 
units. In this situation if both take action 2, it gives a pay-off 0 for both. While if both take 
action 1, it gives a pay-off 1 unit for both and both are better off than the action resulting 
from 2. This means, the actors action depends on the structure of the pay off structure, 
and the actor acts for minimising risk and prefers a win-win action than a win-lose or a 
lose-lose game. 
Figure 4.1: Actors’Action in Relation to Other in a Pay-off Situation 
                                                                             Actor B 




                   Actor A                   1 1,                      1 -1,                 2 
                                                    2 2,                      -1  0,                0  
                                                                Source : Coleman (1994b) 
 
However, according to economic sociology institutions play two roles in terms of ac-
tor’s action. Firstly, institutions combine individual actions and produce systematic out-
comes. For example, individual action within a bureaucratic institution produces joint 
outcomes as it has its own  coordinating structure. The second role is related to orienting 
the actor. For example, communication media may determine actors’ cognitive worlds 
and so influence their actions. Economic sociologists, thus, consider institutions as en-
gines of economic action and utility maximization. In this approach sociology economic 
transactions are understood as embedded phenomena. The economic actions and social 
institutions develop at the same time. Thus the importance of personal relations and 
networks of relations which generate trust, produce expectations and create enforcing 
norms are equally valued. 
The new economic approach in analysing economic action and transactions within 
stable social relations produces fertile ground for the use of social capital as a more gen-
eral term. Two major theoretical contributions have occurred, developing similar ap-
proaches with two different notions: the notion of symbolic forms of resources by Bour-
dieu (1977) and of social structural function by Coleman (1988, 1994a). Bourdieu consid-
ers social capital more as symbolic capital used to achieve resources through the media-
tion of cultural resources. Coleman considers it more as a means of resource gaining; ‘the 
value of which depends upon social organisation’. In this perspective Coleman values 
social capital for its ‘structural function’. Although these views offer different approaches 
to social capital, both recognise it as a less tangible resource. This will be further dis-
cussed later in the chapter when I look at the analytical foundations of social capital. 
 
2.3 Social Capital : A Common Term from Two Perspectives 
Both the economic and sociological approaches described above share in their respec-




understanding the conceptual development of the idea of social capital. From an eco-
nomic perspective, Polyani’s notion of embeddedness emphasises institutional arrange-
ments in terms of modes of transactions: reciprocal, redistribution and exchange.  From a 
sociological perspective, Granovetter (1985) puts emphasis on the importance of personal 
relations and networks of relation in generating trust, in establishing expectations, creat-
ing and enforcing norms, which he calls 'social embeddedness'. Therefore, both the aca-
demic traditions contribute to the term social capital but keep distinct identities in terms 
of their approach to the issue. 
Matrix: 4.1: The Disciplinary Perspectives on Social Capital 





Coleman 1988, 1994a; 
Putnam 1993) 
Analysis of norms, networks and 
organisations 
Analyse how networks 
and organisations help 
actors gain access to 
power, decision making 
processes and policy 
formulation, help them 
access and redistribute 
resources, and help them 
organise more effective-
ly.  Analyse how all of 
these influence actors’ 
economic actions.   
Economics 
(Loury 1977, North 
1990) 
Analysis of contracts and institu-
tions 
 Analyse actors’ econom-
ic behaviour, how ra-
tional actors engage in 
investment and  transac-




These different approaches which have considered the term social capital and which 
are  widely used in empirical analysis, all focus on actor’s action. Although theoretical 
treatment of the term social capital has been established in both sociological and econom-
ic forms, it does not fall exclusively in either. As Coleman (1994b:175) notes: 
“The term ‘capital’ as part of a concept implies a resource or factor input that 
facilitates production, but is not consumed or otherwise used up in production. 
This term, while central to economic theory, is foreign to social theory, which is 




of the concept, “social”, refers in this context to aspects of social organisation, 
ordinarily informal relationships, established for non-economic purposes, yet 
with economic consequences.” 
 Both anthropologists and political sociologists tend to approach this concept in ana-
lysing actor’s economic action through the analysis of norms, networks and organisa-
tions while economists focus on analysing incentives of contracts and influences of insti-
tutions on rational actors and their economic behaviour towards investments and trans-
actions (matrix 4.1).  The root cause of this differences lies in the different notions of ac-
tors’ action. 
 
3. Analytical  Foundation 
Both the disciplines (economic and sociological) have contributed to developing the 
term of social capital, providing analytical inputs, empirical evidence and thought pro-
voking interpretations. The pastiche of the terms creates a loose theoretical coherence but 
allows for its multi-dimensional applications within broader frameworks. For the pur-
pose of my research I want to emphasise the structure of relationships in understanding 
the analytical foundation of social capital. To possess social capital as a resource and 
make use of social capital, actors need to belong to a structure of relationships. Further-
more, the benefit of social capital depends on the response of other actors who share the 
same structure of relationships.  Thus two main analytical sources - motivational and 
structural - broadly used by Coleman (1988) will guide my discussion here.  Firstly, how-




3.1  Social Capital: a contested concept 
Social capital has been defined and used in many different and sometimes contrasting 
ways. Despite this, it is possible to identify common ideas. The most common definitions 
of social capital (Box 4.1) express the broad idea that social capital facilitates action. This 
has been influenced by the publication of Putnam’s work on Italy in 1993, although it is 
thought that Bourdieu (1977) was the first to give the concept  systematic treatment 
(Portes 1998). Around this time Loury (1977) also published work criticising the method-






Box: 4.1 : Commonly quoted definitions of Social Capital 
Bourdieu (1993:32) 
“…one can give an intuitive idea of it [social capital] by saying that it is 
what ordinary language called ‘connections’…by constructing this concept 
one acquires …clubs, or quite simply, the family, the main site of accumu-
lation  and transmission  of that kind [economic] of capital” 
Loury (1977:176) 
“The merit notion that, in a free society, each individual will rise to the 
level justified by his or her competence conflicts with the observation that 
no one travels that road entirely alone. The context within which individ-
ual maturation occurs strongly conditions what otherwise equally compe-
tent individuals can achieve. This implies that absolute equality of oppor-
tunity ... is an ideal that cannot be achieved”. 
Coleman (1988:S98, 1994) 
“Social capital is defined by its function. It is not single entry, but a va-
riety of different entities having two characters in common: They all con-
sist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions 
of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of social cap-
ital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of cer-
tain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. Like physical capital 
and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible, but valuable 
in facilitating certain actions which may be useless or even harmful for 
others. Unlike other forms social capital inheres in the structure of rela-
tions between persons and among persons. It is lodged neither in individ-
uals nor in physical implements of production”. 
(North 1990:vii) 
 “the evolution of institutions that create a hospitable environment for 
cooperative solutions to complex exchange provides for economic growth” 
. 
Putnam (1993:167) 
“Social capital ... refers to features of social organisation, such as trust, 
norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitat-
ing coordinated actions”. 
Bourdieu (1989) identifies social capital as intangible resources and all resources other 
than land  and livestock appear to fall into his category of ‘symbolic capital’. He uses the 
term symbolic capital in combination with economic terms like guarantees, investment 




material gain or loss, but also the symbolic gains and losses. These symbolic gains or 
losses include such things as honour, name and cultural standing. 
This then is a symbolic treatment of the concept of social capital and it focuses “on the 
benefits accruing to individuals by virtue of participation in groups and on the deliberate 
construction of sociability for the purpose of creating this resource” (Portes 1998:3). 
Bourdieu, therefore, firmly believes that social networks are the outcomes of calculative 
investments of actors seeking to institutionalize group relations  so as to then acquire 
other benefits. He identifies two main ways of acquiring access to economic resources: a) 
through direct contact with experts and individuals; and b) through affiliation with insti-
tutions. These he terms embodied cultural capital and institutionalized cultural capital 
respectively. Therefore, the acquisition of social capital requires deliberate investment of 
both economic and cultural capital. Outlining different forms of capital, Bourdieu (1977, 
1993) says that both social and cultural capital tend to be characterized by less transpar-
ent and more uncertain exchange and transactions such as obligation and violation of 
reciprocity which ‘euphemise’ or disguise economic exchange. 
Loury’s (1977)  contribution to the notion of social capital is also worth mentioning. 
Although Loury (1977) does not systematically deal with the concept as such, his ‘anti-
individualist’ theoretical position has strong links with elements of the concept of social 
capital.  His notion of ‘anti-individualism’ emerged while analysing racial income ine-
quality in America. He observes that the black minority suffers from poverty for two 
main reasons: a) inherited low material resources which makes black parents unable to 
invest for their children’s education; and b) the weak networks and connections of black 
young people which fail to provide the right information in getting jobs and economic 
opportunities. The notion of ‘anti-individualism’ captures the reasons behind the une-
qual access to labour market, making social contact and connections responsible for in-
come inequalities. His ideas of the creation of information flow are well connected with 
the perspective of social capital. 
Coleman (1988, 1994a) develops a theoretical foundation for this social capital concept 
which is close to the ideas of Bourdieu and Loury, although Coleman himself makes no 
reference to their work. Coleman focuses on an analysis of different forms, quantities and 




concept, linking it with its creation, maintenance and destruction. Citing many different 
examples, Coleman (1988, 1994a) argues for the importance of the function of  social capi-
tal in facilitating social action . 
Coleman points out that social capital influences the structure of relations between 
and among actors in a similar way to other forms of capital. He also points out that so-
cial-structural relations may constitute a capital asset for one individual, but nevertheless 
be harmful for others. This arises in the context of discussing public-good aspects of so-
cial capital that arise as a by-product but nevertheless have implications for a wider au-
dience. Thus, he says that social capital differs according to circumstances and for differ-
ent groups of actors and elaborates separate structures of horizontal and vertical relations 
stating that social capital may be positive or negative and may facilitate social actions 
and economic transactions. His view of social capital focuses on two aspects: a) its role in 
constructing actors’ action as a means of gaining resources; b) its role in constructing ac-
tors’ structure of relationships. 
Just as Loury and Coleman consider dense networks to be essential in emerging social 
capital, Baker (1990) and Schiff (1992) consider social relationships as resources within 
social capital. Baker (1990:619) defines social capital as “a resource that actors derive from 
specific social structures and then use to pursue their interests; social capital is created by 
changes in the relationship among actors”. Emphasising the social structure Schiff 
(1992:161) defines social capital as “the set of elements of the social structure that affects 
relations among people and are inputs of the production and/or utility function”. Utility 
gained through relationships is also the focus of Burt (1992) even if he arrives at quite 
different conclusions.  He labels the relative absence of ties as a ‘structural hole’ that pre-
vents individual mobility. Therefore, he sees social capital as “friends, colleagues, and 
more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and 
human capital” (Burt 1992:9). He contrasts this with the idea of ‘dense networks’, arguing 
that these tend to convey redundant information while weak ties can be an effective and 
reliable resource. This is somehow similar to Granovetter’s (1995) argument of the 
‘strength of weak ties’. 
North (1990) and Putnam (1993) pursue approaches that contrast with this stress on 
the relationships between actors or between an individual actor and a group. Rather, 




with the significance for rates and patterns of economic development of formal institu-
tions which produce contract law, transparent governance, civil rights and prescribed 
codes. He argues that: “the evolution of institutions that create a hospitable environment 
for cooperative solutions to complex exchange provides for economic growth” (North 
1990:vii). Formal institutional relationships and structures facilitate the interaction of a 
wider community beyond the face to face relationships of individuals themselves. For 
North, therefore, a key function of social capital is to link together ‘distant strangers’. 
Furthermore, the social interaction created through such formal institutions has a posi-
tive impact on efficiency which affects transactions and production costs.  
Putnam (1993)  identifies social capital with the level of ‘civicness’. He sees 'civic en-
gagement’ or 'civic tradition' as being responsible for the difference between southern 
and northern Italy. Greater harmony in civil society is seen to play an important role in 
explaining better institutional performances. The southern villages of Italy with more 
feudal traditions were caught up in vicious downward spirals. In this situation social in-
stitutions reflect an adjustment to pervasive mistrust. The north and centre, on the other 
hand, had experienced communal republicanism  which enabled  them to develop in a 
virtuous upward spiral. He thus concludes that what has made democracy work more 
efficiently in the north as compared to the south of Italy are traditional historical norms 
of reciprocity and social trust among these respective citizens, and the existence of hori-
zontal networks of civic engagement. 
Putnam considers only those types of associational relationships which are desirable 
for different  groups, communities and the nation as a whole. His main argument is that 
an active and democratic civil society with a high level of civic engagement through 
dense informal networks will generate greater social trust and collective action, and 
thereafter produce a 'strong economy’ (Putnam 1993). Consequently, the heart of a 
'strong economy' lies in the  'stock' of social capital which contains norms, trust and net-
works.  
As has been mentioned earlier different disciplinary roots generate differences regard-
ing the role of social and institutional relationships.  These lead to the question of wheth-
er the concept of social capital applies only to ‘desirable’ relationships or also to those 




ture of relationships and their outcomes, we can follow Wood(1998)  in considering  three 
main positions. 
* The first perspective on social capital considers only desirable outcomes. Here, 
the term refers to  ‘civicness’ which is fostered by sets of horizontal relationships that link 
individual and civic institutions. These sets of relationships are non-formal and non-
hierarchical and promote cooperation among communities and nations, fostering ‘desir-
able’ outcomes. This narrow conceptualisation of social capital  is reflected in Putnam’s 
(1993) work. 
*  In the second perspective social capital is more broadly conceptualised and in-
cludes all relationships which allow actors to meet their goal and maximize their utility. 
Coleman (1988,1994a) for example considers both horizontal and vertical (i.e. hierar-
chical) relationships. Hierarchical relationships may distort markets and reflect unequal 
power relationships, but nevertheless facilitate action and interaction, and  they may well 
contribute positively to the coherence of society.  
* The third perspective on social capital focuses on institutional aspects. In this per-
spective the definition of social capital includes formal institutional relationships and 
structures that influence social interaction through contract law and codes and which 
link together ‘distant strangers’. As mentioned earlier, North (1990) is a pioneer of this 
approach.  
As the development discourse on social capital is mostly associated with Putnam’s 
work it is important to note the main criticisms of his analysis. A first point is that Put-
nam treats social capital as an endowment which is transmitted over generations. It can 
therefore not be created or used up. This makes it useless for development practitioners 
seeking to increase the capabilities of actors (Harriss and de Renzio 1997). Levi (1996) al-
so points out that Putnam ignores power or social differentiation. Levi argues that specif-
ic sections or groups of people may maintain privilege by gender, ethnicity etc due to 
their accumulated social capital, keeping other groups in a position of relative or absolute 
disadvantage. Putnam has a very rosy notion of social capital, only considering horizon-
tal relationships that foster development, and completely ignoring the role of conflict in 
social change (Hulme 1999). By contrast, Coleman (1988, 1994a) argues that both the hor-
izontal and hierarchical relationships may foster social capital and facilitate actors’ action 
and may produce both positive and negative outcomes. My own fieldwork suggests that 




can be explained with reference to their respective access to and control over social capi-
tal. For example, mastaans become advantaged through accumulated social capital while 
common bustee dwellers use their relationships with mastaan, keep their payoff through 
hierarchical relationships in order to access greater opportunities.  
 
3.2 Distinguishable forms and common themes 
These differences in terms of understanding social capital and their applications can 
be identified, categorised and placed under distinguishable forms in a thematic manner.  
 
3.2.1 Distinguishable forms 
As discussed earlier, the multiplicity of ways social capital is understood makes it ei-
ther confusing or narrows its range both in terms of its understanding and application. In 
order to clarify some of the ensuing ambiguity Harriss and de Renzio (1997) have distin-
guished different forms of social capital and placed them under six different headings.  
These are as follows: 
   
Family and kinship connections:  blood and other kinship ties are a social asset. Peo-
ple naturally share information within such close-
knit circles for their collective benefit. 
Social networks or associational life:  common interests of different social groups or kin-
ship groups bring them together on the basis of 
'common activities for different purposes'.   
Cross-sectional linkages:  contacts across sector or power differences can be 
called 'network of networks' because organizations -
- both government and private -- are linked together 
to have a workable,  if not ideal,  formula for run-
ning society.   
Political capital:  informal institutional arrangement for maintaining 
relations or co-operation between civil society and 
the state. It is characterised by clientelist relations 
and exclusion on the one hand, and effective repre-
sentation, accountability and participation, on the 
other.  
Institutional and policy framework: a set of formal rules and norms -- constitutions, laws 
to name a few. In this form it works more as macro-
level as well as micro level capital. At this stage so-
cial capital has a 'double nature' because of its influ-




and also its capacity to co-ordinate action by differ-
ent classes of people. 
 Social norms and values:  Each society has distinct norms and values which 
have their   influence on all forms of social capital.   
 
3.2.2 Common themes 
Although there are many different forms of social capital, there are also clear common 
themes which are covered by the concept. Adopting from Wood (1998) the most common 
themes are presented here. 
*  Social capital focuses on relationships in terms of networks of connections and 
contacts which foster effective and efficient action, both collective and individual. 
Social capital enhances the interaction among individuals and helps them partici-
pate in a range of actions in an effective manner. 
* Social capital is an important resource that is required to gain access to other re-
sources. 
* Social capital may be achieved through processes and these processes can be cre-
ated and strengthened. 
* Social capital comprises both ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ social relationships and 
it has a ‘public goods’ aspect. Such social relationships and institutions merit pub-
lic support. 
* Social capital assumes that social relationships are equally important in economic, 
social and political spheres. It influences market and state operations and is also 
influenced by them. 
* Its influence through social relationships makes a positive contribution to devel-
opment, livelihoods and quality of life because it produces trust and norms that 
make reciprocal relationships and reduce opportunistic behaviour. It fosters the 




4. Sources of Social Capital Resources 
4.1. Sources of Social Capital Resources :Motivational Factor 
As mentioned earlier approaches to social capital recognise the structure of relation-
ships as an important resource. The structure of relationships refers to a person’s rela-
tionships with others which effectively become his or her source of advantage. Practical-
ly, it means that an actor’s benefit depends on eliciting the effective responses from oth-
ers belonging to the same structure of relationships. The generation of benefit relies on 
motivating others to be obliging. The motivation for the donors and recipients in this 
case are guided by obligations and norms (Coleman 1988). Two assumptions support this 
statement. Firstly, it is thought that social capital depends on two elements: the trustwor-
thiness of the social environment and the actual extent of obligations held. The trustwor-
thiness of the social environment means that obligations will be repaid. Secondly, inter-
nalised norms as well as the social environment produce social capital. Different concen-
trations of obligations and norms of reciprocity constitute different motivational inputs 
which motivate both donors and recipients, involving beneficial transactions within the 
structure of relationships. Portes (1998:9) distinguishes these further, as he states:  “the 
motivations of  others to make  resources available on concessionary terms is not uni-
form. At the broadest level, one may distinguish between consummatory versus instru-
mental motivations to do so”. 
 
 4.1.1 Consummatory motivation : value introjection  and bounded solidarity 
Consummatory motivation is described by Portes (1998) as having two main aspects: 
value introjection and bounded solidarity. Value introjection emerges from internalised 
norms which motivate actors to satisfy obligations that enhance behaviour which can be 
appropriated by others as resources. Such norms make actors less self-interested and in-
crease collectivity. Effective norms and positive sanctions motivate people for collective-
ness and the community shares the outcome. Coleman (1988:S104) gives an example of 
this. “Effective norms that inhibit crime make it possible to walk freely outside at night in 
a city and enable old persons to leave their houses without fear for their safety”.  
A second aspect of the consummatory source of social capital is bounded solidarity. 
This is a powerful motivational force which leads actors towards altruistic dispositions 
and action. This altruistic disposition and action is not universal but is limited by the 




in a common situation and becoming conscious of their exploitative situation.  This con-
ciousness does not derive from norm introjection during their childhood, but emerges as 
a product of their common fate (Portes 1998). The common situation acts as an incentive 
to achieve a common goal which then functions as a strong source of  motivation. This 
mechanism of motivation becomes ‘zeal’ and Coleman (1994a) identifies it as an effective 
antidote to free-riding by others in collective movements. Examples such as the IRA 
hunger strikers in Northern Ireland and the PLO activists in the Middle East are cited to 
support the notion that  actors can bear extreme costs, including the risk of losing their 
lives.   
 
4.1.2. Instrumental motivation: reciprocity exchange and enforcement trust 
Instrumental motivation is also described as having two main aspects: reciprocity ex-
change and enforcement trust. Reciprocity exchange is found in the theory of social inte-
gration and the sanctioning capacity of group rituals as described by Durkheim (1984). 
This has been further linked with Mauss’ (1954) work on gift exchange. The socially me-
diated gift is instrumental but the repayment does not come directly from recipients. The 
donor may be motivated to invest in gifts which are then repaid in the form of honour, 
status and collective approval. This reflects Bourdieu’s notion of ‘symbolic capital’ men-
tioned above.   
The second instrumental source of social capital resources (enforcement trust) ensures 
the repayment of obligatory debts. Obligations are enforceable through law, violence and 
community sanction. Portes (1998:9) says that :”trust exists ... precisely because obliga-
tions are enforceable, not through recourse to law or violence but through the power of 
the community”. This is admittedly a rather vague or partial observation because com-
munity power may be exercised, in many cases, through violence. My field works sug-
gests that mastaan structures ensure approval, status and honour through the exercise of 
violence. However, since enforceable trust provides benefit for both the donor and recip-
ients this is accepted as a condition of the transactions environment in which the struc-
ture of relationships of donors and recipients operates. For example, bustee dwellers, as 
members of the bustee community, receive different forms of guarantee required for get-
ting jobs or access to the informal credit market from the mastaan structure, and so expe-





4.2. Sources of Social Capital Resources : Structural Factors 
In the previous section I have highlighted the value of actors’ motivation in translat-
ing relationships into resources. The structure of relationships in general terms refers to 
‘simplex relations’ (Gluckman 1967) that may constitute social networks. The question 
may arise then, do all sorts of networks or structures of relationships provide benefit to 
the actors who belong to it?  I will look at how relationships provide benefit to the mem-
bers who belong to the networks.  
 
4.2.1 Closure of social networks: effective norms and trustworthiness     
The literature on social networks regards social networks as an effective means of 
gaining access to services. Yet there is a strong debate on the use of networks.  First, it 
may be questionable whether it is a necessary condition to be a member of a certain net-
work  in order to get things done.  Examples from the literature show that people can 
make use of certain networks as outsiders through contacts and connections or simply 
knowing someone who belongs to it (Boissevain 1974). This would suggests that people 
may make use of this resource without being member.  Second, it is not clear whether an 
actor possesses or can store resources as a member of a certain network.  According to 
Coleman (1988), membership of a certain network does not necessarily mean a person 
owns social capital resources, rather it depends upon the nature of the structural ar-
rangement of relationships, which creates effective norms, and trustworthiness. Coleman 
calls this structural arrangement of the relationships ‘closure of networks’. The ‘closure of 
networks’ refers to structures of networks which generate benefit to the members of 
them.  
 
The arrangement of a structure of networks provides two elements that translate it in-
to social capital resources. Firstly, there is the element of effective norms. This refers to 
the possibility of imposing positive and negative externalities on others. In an open clo-
sure network, one may get the opportunity to impose negative externalities on others and 
others can do the same. For example, A1 has direct relations both with A2 and A3, but A2 
and A3 are not linked. In this situation, A1 can influence both A2 and A3, but A2 and A3 
cannot impose combined sanction on A1. If all three have relations with each other in-
stead, any two can join as a combined force on the others. Thus, the ability to impose 




iour of the people belongs to the community. For example, as I  observed in my field-
work, in the bustee context mastaans have the right to impose effective sanctions  on oth-










Figure  4.2 : Closure of networks Coleman (1993) 
 
 
A lack of closure in networks has consequences for reputation and collective sanction. 
Reputation which is generated though personal transactions is important to reduce the 
risk of fraud and cheating. The undersocialised concept of reputation sees it as a general-
ised commodity, constituting an incentive not to cheat others at the cost of losing one’s 
reputation.  In reality, this issue largely depends upon good information which one can 
obtain through trusted informants who have dealt with particular individual and have 
found them to be reliable through personal experience. This then encourages future 
transactions because: i) it is cheap; ii) it is known to be accurate; iii) those in established 
relationships have an economic motivation to be trustworthy, iv) continuing economic 
relations become overlaid with social content that creates a strong expectation of trust.  
Such multi-period games which actors act through repetitive transactions generate per-
sonal experience and abstention from opportunism. In this way, “social relations, rather 
than institutional arrangements or generalised morality, are mainly responsible for the 
production of trust” (Granovetter 1985:491) and trusted relations enhance reputation 
among people who know each other and who belong to the same structure of relation-
ships. In the case of mastaan relations that I observed in the bustees in Dhaka, common 
bustee dwellers trust the mastaans although they are generally members of criminal gangs. 
This is because from the personal experience of the bustee migrants and personal experi-
ence of others, the reputation of the  mastaans becomes known and is developed on the 




The structure of relationships with closure can combine to provide a collective sanc-
tion or can reward others for sanctioning someone in the community. Imposing sanctions 
encourages trustworthiness in the social structure and helps monitor and guide commu-
nity behaviour.  
  
4.2.1 Appropriate organisations: focused interaction and multiplex relationships 
Appropriate organisations are another structural source of social capital resources. It 
is possible to gain insights into the benefits gained through organisation by looking at 
two concepts: ‘focused interaction’ and ‘multiplex relations’. ‘Focused interaction’ helps 
us understand the formation of organisations which help provide immediate advantages, 
while ‘multiplex relations’ focus upon the actor’s practical use of resources.  
Coleman (1988) cites as an example a housing project in United States during the sec-
ond world war where there were many problems in the construction.  The residents or-
ganised and confronted the builders and finally won the case through their organisation-
al strength. In this case, the residents organised under a certain ‘focused interest’. When 
the housing project was finished, they continued organising themelves and later their 
organisation was used as a tool for solving other community problems. The general point 
of organisational resources is that “organisation, once brought into existence for one set 
of purposes, can also aid others, thus constituting social capital available for use” (Cole-
man 1988 : S108). 
Such activity has been viewed as the focused organisation of social ties:  “a simply fo-
cused situation is an ideal type in which there are multiple foci, but each individual is 
related to a single focus” (Feld 1981:1021). When an organisation is brought into exist-
ence based on a single focus, it can nevertheless be used in many ways with different sets 




4.3 Stock of Weak and Strong Social Capital: Institutional and Relational 
The previous section suggests that social capital resources come from two different 
but interrelated sources i.e. motivational and structural. These interrelated sources, can 




may produce social capital resources but in a non-applicable form. For example, motiva-
tional sources cannot produce applicable or practical forms of social capital resources as 
they do not exist without structure. Therefore, practically applicable or usable social capi-
tal exists in combinations of motivational and structural forms.  
Interesting and useful efforts have also been made to understand the intensity of so-
cial capital resources. When considering the sources and nature of motivation for collec-
tive action, Berman (1997) classifies two forms of capital: institutional and relational.  
These are presented in matrix 4.2. Citing Cook (1990), Krisna (1999:77) says: 
“ Institutional capital is structured. Rules and procedures exist to guide 
individuals’ behaviour, supervised by people acting out well-organised 
roles. Relational Capital is more amorphous and also more diffuse. This 
distinction parallels that which is made between specific and generalized 
patterns of exchange”.  
 
Matrix: 4:2 Two Forms of Social Capital 
 Institutional  Relational 
Basis of collective action Transactions Relations 
Source of motivation Roles 





Nature of motivations Maximizing behaviour Appropriate behaviour 
Examples Markets, legal frameworks Family, ethnicity, religion 
 
Institutional capital is guided by formal institutional regulation, while relational capi-
tal is guided by norms, goodwill and trust. However, taken independently, these two 
forms of capital can not be effective and efficient in terms of translating individual be-
haviour into coordinated and goal oriented attitudes. This is because, for example, trans-
lating people’s feelings, mutual trust and reputation requires structures or roles of some 
form or another.  Equally institutional capital which has formal rules, procedures and 
sanctions is not enough by itself and requires additional norms of reciprocity to secure 




According to Berman (1997) cooperative behaviour flows from the combination of 
both institutional (networks) and relational (norms) capital. Given the insufficiency of 
each form alone to facilitate cooperative action, Krishna (1999) attempts to present an op-
timum combination through a classificatory scheme (matrix 4.3). She proposes a matrix 
in both ideal and empirical situations. Boxes 4.1  (1) and (4) are ideal types but are not 
valid empirical categories, while boxes (2) and (3) are empirically suggestive.   
 
Matrix: 4.3 A Classificatory Scheme 
Relational capital 
                                                                                    Strong                                     Weak 






High social capital 








                                             
                                      




Task: introduce rules, pro-







ture and norms 




5. Social Capital Resources: Effects and Uses  
Most approaches to conceptualising and understanding social capital focus on its 
character as a social resource.  This resource enhances the ability of the poor to allocate 
available resources efficiently and increases their resilience to hazards. Although in gen-
eral, research emphasises the positive consequences of social capital, many studies have 
also shown its less desirable and sometimes negative consequences. These differing con-
sequences - desirable and undesirable - make the notion of ‘social capital resources’ even 
more complex. This means that social capital resources need to be viewed from a variety 
of perspectives. In order to explore this I present here, a) the both psitive and negative 
effects of social capital resources, and b) the ways that social capital resources feature in 
Latin American urban studies. The focus on Latin American urban literature has one of 
the richest and detailed traditions of urban research.  
5.1 Effects of Social Capital Resource  
As mentioned above, social capital resources can be possessed by individuals, groups, 
organisations, communities and nations, with many different consequences, both posi-
tive and negative. In this section I will look at these beginning with the positive effects of 
social capital resources. 
5.1.1 Positive effects 
Social capital research mostly emphasises the positive outcomes of social capital re-
sources. The empirical literature uses social capital to analyse and predict a variety of is-
sues ranging from school attrition and academic performance to good governance. The 
application to such a wide range of issues creates difficulties in understanding the char-
acter and meaning of the expected consequence. A survey of the empirical literature on 
social capital suggests that those who possess social capital resources achieve three posi-
tive outcomes: i) social control, ii) family support, and iii)  networks mediated benefits 
(Portes 1998). However, as noted above, persons who do not belong to the same structure 
of relationships or do not have the same social capital resource, may also gain in either  
direct or indirect ways. I will present the positive consequences in terms of the effects of 
different structural constructions - horizontal structure of relationships and hierarchical 





The horizontal structure of relationships that produces ‘social capital resources’ con-
tributes a range of positive outcomes. Many studies on schools highlight the role of both 
bounded solidarity and enforceable trust. They found a tight community is useful for en-
forcing discipline (Portes 1998). Coleman (1988) also considers the importance of inter-
generational networks in enhancing school performance. His approach is to consider so-
cial capital mostly as an individual resource which may promote human capital. In de-
veloping the human capital, the family plays the most important role (Coleman 1988, 
1994a). So, the primary beneficiaries of social capital resources are the children whose 
education and personality development are enriched accordingly. Bourdieu (1977) con-
siders parental support to children’s development a means to develop cultural capital. 
In development discourse, the most common positive results of social capital resource 
are network mediated benefits. The research on network mediation reflects various is-
sues and arenas where actors may acquire direct benefits. The most discussed areas are: 
access to resources and services; social mobility; ethnic business; ensuring accountability; 
reduction of urban crime; and the every day survival of the urban poor. Although vari-
ous network studies directly refers social capital resources, many do not. For example, 
Coleman (1988) considers Lin et al’s (1981) work Social Resources and Strength of Ties to be 
a noteworthy contribution to social capital although there is no mention of social capital 
in their original writing. A range of literature on networks similarly highlights the im-
portance of social capital resources in securing employment. Granovetter (1974, 1995) for 
example puts forward the value of weak ties in getting jobs. He shows how friends out-
side the family and kin circle play an important role in circulating trusted information 
and serve as an informal referral system. 
In contrast Lin et al (1981) move in the opposite direction, emphasising the  ‘strength 
of strong ties’. The ‘strength of strong ties’ is shown to be important in the case of ethnic 
business where the family circle plays the  most important role in  business transactions 
and where strong ties produce obligatory trust,   a pre-requisite  to gain  access to  infor-
mation and physical capital. This is common in the USA among Jewish and Chinese im-
migrants (Wong et.al 1998). It is equally applicable in Pakistan in the surgery equipment 
business (Nadvi 1998). Stack (1974) in his research showed the value of kin and close cir-




their kin groups in almost every aspect of their vulnerable livelihood in the urban econ-
omy. 
 A good example showing the advantage of mediating networks is provided in case 
studies of ROSCA. Here weak ties but a strong sense of trust have enabled members to 
acquire significant financial benefits (Putnam 1993, Ratherford 1997). Moser (1996) in her 
cross-country study has also shown how community networks reduce significantly the 
level of crime and violence. 
Whereas horizontal relationships or networks are often used in the social capital liter-
ature, the potential role of hierarchical relations are generally overlooked. 
However, studies of rural Bangladesh show that patron-client relationships constitute 
important  strategies to ensure survival, reduce and spread risks and secure livelihoods 
(Wood 1994, McGregor 1991, Devine 2000). A similar argument is made by Watts (1983) 
in the African context. He shows that moral entitlements allow food to be given to poor 
people during famine thus considerably reducing food insecurity. In my own fieldwork, 
as mentioned earlier, the mastaan structure was found to occupy this ‘patronage’ role in 
the bustee. 
Finally, there are also indirect effects of social capital resources that benefit people. In 
Bangladesh, NGOs organise and develop different levels of networks among the poor 
which bring them a range of benefits such as  access to micro credit and even land (Wood 
1994, McGregor 1991, Devine 2000). 
  
 5.1.2 Negative effects 
As mentioned earlier social capital research mostly concentrates on the positive rather 
than negative consequences. Portes (1998:15) comments on this: 
“It is our sociological bias to see good things emerging out of sociability; 
bad things are commonly associated with the behavior of homo economics. 
However, the same mechanisms appropriable by individuals and groups as 
social capital can have other, less desirable consequences. It is important to 
emphasis them for two reasons: first, to avoid the trap of presenting commu-
nity networks, social control and collective sanctions as unmixed blessings; 
second, to keep the analysis within the bounds of serious sociological analysis 




He identifies four negative consequences of social capital resources:  i) restricted ac-
cess to opportunities, ii) restrictions on individual freedom, iii) excessive claims on group 
members and iv) downward levelling norms. It is worthwhile noting that these negative 
consequences have not been fully explored in the empirical studies of social capital. 
Firstly, restricted access to opportunities can be identified in many  studies like social 
exclusion studies, market studies, and development literature particularly on co-
operatives and NGO organised groups and in urban studies. In Bangladesh while NGOs 
facilitate mobilisation activities which include many people the same process actually 
constrains others. Both the poorest of the poor and tomorrow’s poor are excluded from 
the process of NGO mobilisation (Rahman 1997).  In  studying market participation 
among the ethnic migrants Waldinger (1995:557) additionally observes that “the same 
process of social relations...[that]....enhance the ease and efficiency of economic exchang-
es among community members implicitly restrict outsiders.”  
Secondly, the negative effect of social capital on excessive claims can be observed in 
networks-mobility literature. Most networks-mobility studies argue in favour of the 
‘strength of weak ties’ for two main reasons: a) weak ties channel more trusted infor-
mation and b) actors are not constrained by obligation. Many studies show how strong 
ties constrain actor mobility. For example Amin (1993) in his Dhaka study finds that one 
of the reasons why enterprises do not flourish is people feel obliged to employ kinsmen. 
This restricts potential employers from recruiting skilled and efficient staff. Geertz (1963) 
also observes that entrepreneurs lose out in fulfilling obligation to  job-seeking kinsmen.  
Thirdly, restrictions on individuals. The dilemma between community solidarity and 
individual freedom is a classic general debate. Development tends to laud the collective, 
but this can be criticised  for its conservative and populists outlook (Levi 1996). 
 Fourthly, downward levelling norms are  considered a negative effect of social capital 
because in many situations individual success stories undermine group cohesion. In 
many situations group solidarity is cemented by a common experience of adversity and 
opposition to mainstream society. Citing African examples Portes (1998:17) makes the 
remark that: “the emergence of downward levelling norms has been preceded by lengthy 
periods, often lasting generations, in which the mobility of a particular group has been 




of an oppositional stance toward the mainstream and a solidarity ground in a common 
experience of subordination”. 
From the negative effects perspective of social capital resources, many social groups 
like Mafia and gambling rings are considered ‘public bads’ (Portes 1998). My next step is 
to explore the ‘public goods’ and  ‘public bads’ aspect of social capital.  
 
5.2. Social Capital Resources in Latin American Urban Literature  
While the urban poor have long been the subject of study in the Western context, the 
founding studies in the developing world have mainly been undertaken Latin America.  
Researchers such as Lewis (1966), Robert (1978, 1995), and Perlman (1976) have generated 
the debates which have brought urban poverty issues to the attention of the academics, 
planners and development practitioners. While these may be seen as an associated body 
of literature, the studies of course differ from one another in methodological perspective 
and theoretical interpretation. In addition, there are a number of studies conducted sub-
sequently in Latin American cities which seek to analyse the changing situation of the 
1980s. The 1980s are considered a ‘lost decade’ for Latin America due to severe political 
and economic crises. Thus Alvarez and Escobar (1992:317) comment: 
“Latin American persistent economic crisis and the collapse of ‘real exist-
ing socialism’, lead many to the premature conclusion that the continent is 
doomed. Structure would appear to have over whelmed human agency once 
and for all.” 
 The issues of structure and agency are reflected through many studies conducted on 
the survival of the urban poor in different cities of Latin America. The purpose of this 
sub-section is to show how this literature discusses social capital resources, and their use 
by the urban poor during this ‘lost decade’.  
As mentioned earlier, social capital is a potential and effective resource for livelihoods 
maintenance which enhances the ability of the poor to allocate available resources effi-
ciently and enhances their resilience to hazards. It is important to note that the Latin 
American urban literature reviewed here, may not use the notion of social capital directly 
but nevertheless refers by proxy to the major elements which comprise it. The major 
components of social capital resources may grouped under two headings: a) social capital 
for increasing  options and b) social capital for articulating strategies.  
 




In order to understand the processes of increased impoverishment, household re-
sponses to crisis as well as  opportunities, and policy interventions, the analysis of pov-
erty and well-being has to move out from a limited focus on income-consumption 
measures to explore wider of livelihood strategies (Rakodi 1999). This shift is reflected in 
the Latin American urban poverty literature. For example, Moser (1996, 1998) carried out 
a number of comparative studies among different  communities of urban poor living in 
different cities including some in Latin America. These studies directly refers to social 
capital. Moser (1998) presents a conceptual framework known as ‘asset vulnerable 
framework’, which has been discussed in chapter 1. Chant (1991) studied women’s re-
sponses and  survival strategies to different cities in Mexican cities.  She considers social 
capital in a proxy manner while reviewing the significance accorded by women to kin-
ship and culture in getting, securing  and maintaining jobs. 
 Moser (1998) highlights informal support among households as another category of 
network, distinct from the reciprocal networks generated by credit transactions. She im-
plies that networks of reciprocity contain a higher level of trust than other kinds of net-
work when she states that: “When households are coping, they support others. But when 
their assets are desolated, they cease to support the community” (1998: 13). This indicates 
that households need to have a certain level of resources in order to be able to generate 
benefit from social capital, in another words it does not function in every and all situa-
tions. Chant (1991) examines the survival strategies of low-income urban poor house-
holds in Mexican cities during the economic recession in 1982-3. She places the micro 
analysis of the household level in the wider environment of gender relations, culture, 
kinship, and class.  The study shows that the participation of women in the labour mar-
ket does not only depend on the simple logic of demand and supply, but on the nature of 
households, culture, and the working environment choices of employees. Within this 
wider perspective, Chant considers that kinship and culture are particularly significant 
factors in getting, securing and maintaining jobs. Although she does not use the term  
social capital, she implicitly acknowledges importance in creating survival options. 
Both of the above authors value structure and agency in creating opportunities for 
survival. In her conceptual framework, Moser (1998) considers the poor to be efficient 
managers of complex portfolios in which assets owned are inter-related, complementary 
and/or substitutable. In particular she identifies three main benefits which the urban 




ments, b) informal support networks among households and c) community level activi-
ties.    
The urban poor receive substantial benefits from informal credit arrangements. Infor-
mal credit operates within the domain of networks of weak ties, which often occurs be-
tween friends and neighbours, benefitting them  in  reciprocal way. Such weak ties entail 
a strong sense of trust. As Moser (1998) observed, informal credit arrangements in cities 
occur when people need to borrow money on a short-term basis from their relatives, 
friends and neighbours in order to meet their daily consumption needs. She also shows 
how networks of reciprocity extend beyond the locality, increasing the benefits they 
bring to the urban poor. In her study, Moser considered credit as aa asset in its own right, 
because of its significance in generating networks. 
Chant (1991) places considerable emphasis on the issues related to households and 
human labour and relates this to the conventional explanations in terms of supply and 
demand. Female labour may be used in order to combat household crisis, but that also 
depends on the demands of the labour market which is itself structured by genderFor 
example, cultural barriers bar women from certain work. In addition, Chant (1991) notes  
that women preferred not to do certain types of work.  For example, they avoided work 
in bars for fear that customers would consider them to be prostitutes.  While kinship and 
culture were considered in terms of the environment within which people make deci-
sions, Chant considers such social capital resources mainly in relation to the household.  
She does not consider in any detail how such resources figure at the level of the market 
as a  whole, besides recognising its gendered character.  
 
Thirdly, community level social capital  extends survival options for the urban poor.  
Moser (1996, 1998) particularly refers to the role of community-based organisations 
(CBOs) in increasing stocks of people’s social capital. She found that in Guayaquil, Ecua-
dor, social capital resources consolidated  “through long processes of conflictual negotia-
tion with political parties and government, have developed horizontally structured CBOs 
capable of negotiating for improved services, supplied by the government agencies or 
non-government organisations (NGOs)” (Moser 1998:13).  Community participation, 
built on stocks of social capital resources, provides quality services like school repairs, 




er the possibility of extending beyond the ‘local’. To articulte and engage with macro lev-
el realities.  
 
5.2.2  Social capital resources for articulating strategies 
Latin American evidence shows that social movements may articulate survival strate-
gies. As mentioned at the beginning of  this section, the 1980s was a ‘lost decade’ for Lat-
in American countries due to economic and political instability. As a result of this, mas-
sive social movements took place throughout the Latin American region. These social 
movements provoked  a strong  and often violent response from the then governments. It 
has been argued that these social movements helped articulate strategies for survival (Es-
cobar and Alvarez 1992). The question thus arises as to what are the links between social 
movements and social capital in terms of generating benefits for the poor. Below I will  
attempt to understand how these social movements are embedded in social capital re-
sources, and  then show  how they generate  benefits  for survival. 
Social movements and social capital 
In order to understand the link between social capital and social movements with re-
spect to survival options, it is first necessary  to understand the concept of social move-
ment. The social movements which took place in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s 
constitute a kind of collective action (Bennett 1992, Schneider 1992 Cardoso 1992). Tou-
raine (1984) identifies three kinds of collective action: conflictual (defensive collective ac-
tion); social struggle (actions that modify decisions); and social movements (collective 
actions that are explicitly intended to change relations of power in key areas of society). 
In considering the nature of organisation involved in social movements, Calderon 
(1986)  categorises four types of  collective actions: a) small groups which create their 
own forms of organisations; b) collective action for  decentralisation of urban politics and 
neighbourhood democracy; c) action for transformation of socio-cultural relations; and d) 
urban movements that create communication between different groups. The movements 
created in Latin American cities to build connections between groups, associations and 
alliances are considered to be urban social movements (Bennett 1992).  
An overview of  how these urban movements were organised reveals their relation-




create wider and stronger networks with other actors and agencies, and generate mutual 
trust and solidarity among the members who participate in them.  The combination of 
these ingredients of social capital resources enables the collective action to achieve goals 
of social change. 
The strength of the collective action determines the level of achievement or outputs of 
the social movement.  Tilly (2000) measured the strength of social movements according 
to the degree to which they display certain core symbolic elements, which he summa-
rised with the acronym WUNC. The strength of social movements thus becomes a func-
tion of  W x U x N x C , with each element  running from 1 to 0. 
WUNC refers to the following characteristics: 
 “Worthiness: sobriety, propriety of dress, incorporation of priests and other dignitar-
ies, endorsement of moral authorities, evidence of undeserved previous suffering. 
Unity: uniforms, marching or dancing in unison, chanting of slogans, singing, cheer-
ing, linking of arms, wearing or bearing of common symbols, direct affirmation of com-
mon program or identity. 
Numbers: filling of public space, presentation of petitions, representations of multiple 
units (e.g. neighborhood associations), direct claims of numerical support by means of 
pools, membership subscriptions, and financial contributions. 
Commitment: persistence in costly  or risky activity, declarations of readiness to per-
severe, resistance to attack” (ibid 2000:2). 
From a social capital perspective, it may be said that ‘WUNC’ reflects the quality and 
quantity of resources required to facilitate collective action for social change. However, 
the Latin American urban literature does not directly label social movements as social 
capital. This may be because the reference points of social capital for this literature are 
mainly taken from developed countries. However, it would seem useful to relate the 
strength of different social movements to the social capital resources they can draw on, in 
terms of the degree of trust between members and norms of solidarity. Taking this view 
the generation of benefit to the actors depends on the strength of social movements 





Effects of social movements for creating survival option 
    As mentioned earlier social movements in Latin America did not necessarily achieve 
their initial objectives. They did however generated different levels of benefits for the ur-
ban poor. These benefits may be categorised into two types, first those which relate to 
policy and service provision, and second those concerned with citizenship rights and po-
litical participation. 
 
     Firstly, Mexico offers an example of highly significant achievements with regards to 
policy and service delivery. Urban social movements were evident in many Latin Ameri-
can countries like Chile (Schneider 1992), and Uruguay (Canel 1992) but without bring-
ing such benefits to the urban poor. There is a long tradition of social movements among 
the urban poor in Mexico, with organising around housing and public services dating 
from the 1950s, with major social movements occurring in the early 1970s, between 1979 





     In Mexico multiple social movements facilitated by an organisation called the Urban 
Popular Movement (UPM) forced the government to create a pro-poor policy with re-
gards to land tenure stopping mass evictions and providing public services such as  wa-
ter, transportation and education (Bennett 1991). They also resulted in the government 
creating a ‘Ministry of Settlement and Public Works’ and passing a ‘Law of Human Set-
tlements’. This represented the first initiative in Mexico to make systematic regulation 
and planning for urban areas. 
    The scope and strength of this and other similar  social movements were remarkable. 
In the early 1970s, for example, the UPM organised various kinds of associations such as 
neighbourhood groups, tenant groups, collective firms, vendors, street photographers 
and various working class sub-groups comprising between 50,000 and 350,000 people. By 
offering  support to these groups, the UPM generated a high level of solidarity. The 
strength of these social movements is reflected in their capacity to articulate the demands 
of the poor.  For example, a massive social movement occurred in 1980 when the gov-
ernment decided to remove 125,000 low-income residents to promote tourism develop-
ment. The movement articulated four demands: a) no eviction and relocation; b) im-
proved urbanisation of the threatened neighbourhoods; c) a halt to repression within 
those neighbourhoods; and d) the regulation of land tenancy. One year later another coa-
lition articulated six concerns: land tenure; public services; pollution; excessively high 
property taxes; mass evictions; and the right of independent popular organisations to ex-
ist (Bennett 1992). The result of such action was the generation of various pro-urban poor 
policies.   
    The second type of social movement mentioned above was those oriented towards citi-
zenship rights and political participation. The ‘marginalisation thesis’ was developed  to 
highlight the lack of political rights of the Latin American urban poor (Robert 1975, 1995). 
This also inspired many mass social movements in Latin America. While the character of 
these varies, many were directed by political parties. For example, the urban movement 
in Chile in the early 1970s was led by the Communist Party. When the elected socialist 
government was uprooted by the military, many people in the shantytowns were tor-
tured and killed.  Nevertheless, social movements in these same communities played a 
vital role in bringing back democracy to Chile in 1990 (Scheinder 1992). Chile is not  an 




litical participation rights through social movements (Bennett 1992). The democratization 
process initiated through the urban social movement in Brazil is also considered to have 
been of major significance in facilitating the return to (Cardoso 1992). 
     To sum up, it may said that social movements as collective a form of action are inti-
mately connected to social capital resources.  This connection has not been appreciated 
mainly because of divisions between the literatures which deal with these two subjects.  
Social movements have mainly been discussed in political science, with the West as the 
major point of reference.  Social capital has come to the fore in development studies, and 
has been applied mainly in relation to developing countries. Evidence from Latin Ameri-
ca  however show that a)  the achievements of urban social movements depend on the 
quality and quantity of social capital resources and b) the movements themselves pro-
duce social capital resources for their participants in that they  construct collective identi-
ty, and strong communities of mutual trust and reciprocity (see for example Alvarez and 
Escobar, 1992).  
 
5.3  Mastaan Structure: Public Goods or Public Bads? 
As noted earlier ‘social capital resources’ can be possessed by individuals, groups, or-
ganisations, communities and nations, with many different consequences, both the posi-
tive and negative. At the community level, positive consequences can be conceptualised 
as ‘public goods’, while negative ones as ‘public bads’. Here I consider both of these in 
relation to the mastaan structure. 
There exist two overlapping phenomena within the ‘public goods’ aspect of social cap-
ital: a) it is less attractive as an area of investment; b) it is a by-product of other action.  
Firstly, the public goods aspect of social capital differentiates social capital resources 
from other kinds of capital like physical capital. Physical capital has its private goods as-
pect which encourages actors to invest optimally since they expect to obtain a direct re-
turn. Investing in social capital resources does not ensure an equal return because “the 
kinds of social structures that make possible social norms and sanctions that enforce 
them do not benefit primarily the person or persons whose efforts would be necessary to 
bring them about, but benefit all those who are part of such a structure” Coleman 




Secondly, when social capital resources are created through associations and relation-
ships this can produce positive externalities which could be internalised particularly in 
terms of increased quality of life. The public goods quality of most social capital in most 
cases emerges as a by-product of other activities. Coleman (1988) cites examples of par-
ents who do not have full-time jobs outside of the home, but who create and acquire ben-
efits from the sets of association created around the school. The most important benefit is 
the quality of education provided to their children. The network that develops among the 
parents that extends their children’s education does not develop intentionally rather it 
develops  as bi-product of the fact that this  bring their children to the school. 
The public goods aspects of social capital contains a strong property that brings social 
capital from individual accounts to public ones.  In this sense it can be, in a narrow sense, 
compared with Putnams’ sense of  public civicness through which everybody in the civic 
community can obtain the benefits.  From this point of view, as we have mentioned earli-
er the correlation between effects of social capital resources with public goods aspects is 
positive. As mentioned above, this is the aspect of social capital that has received most 
attention in the development context.  
The negative effects of social capital have not yet been seriously analysed.  Those 
writers who have noted it have tended to employ ambivalent or judgemental terms, such 
as ‘negative social capital’, ‘dark side of social capital’ and ‘adverse incorporation’ 
(Portes 1998, Putzel 1997, Wood 1999). Testify a widely cited organisation in this regard 
the  Mafia which has been  labelled as a ‘public bad’  by (Portes 1998). Most of the litera-
ture focuses on Mafia organisations as agents of crime (Blok 1974, Sterling 1990). Howev-
er, despite their overall negative image, some studies also recognize the role of the Mafia 
as intermediary agents that facilitate market organisation (Gambetta 1988, 1993, Stein-
berg 1983, Walston 1988). There are obvious parallels here with the mastaan structure in 
Bangladesh. Despite its  negative image  in the  urban landscape the mastaan structure in 
the Dhaka bustee plays a vital role in facilitating the bustee economy. This is further dis-
cussed in relation to changing and creating relationships in the urban context. The func-
tion of mastaan structure is twofold and contradictory. On the one hand they are violent 
gangs; on the other they produce trust and security. This leads us to the question: how 






In this chapter an attempt has been made to conceptualise social capital as a social re-
source encompassing social relationships which influence both actors’ action and the en-
vironment in which action takes place. The notion of social capital is enjoying great pop-
ularity both as a theoretical concept and in attempts to address social problems. However 
it is also a highly contested notion and this makes its application  problematic. Social cap-
ital has been conceptualised in many ways: some have focused on its structural arrange-
ments of relationships (i.e. horizontal or hierarchical relationships among the actors); 
others have distinguished its positive and negative effects. When it is taken as a social 
resource which encompasses social relationships, it is again conceptualised differently.  It 
may be considered a resource for individuals, groups, communities and for nations. One 
common characteristic to social capital approaches is that they all stress positive out-
comes. Social capital is equated with civicness, trust, cooperation, mutual benefit and 
‘public goods’.  Such qualities are also the characteristics of social movements, even if 
little attention has been given to the ways that these are intimately connected.  
 
My observation in the Dhaka bustee suggests that the mastaan structure is a means of 
generating social capital resources through different relationships (this will be discussed 
chapter six) and that these relationships are important for the livelihood of others. In this 
situation, the emphasis on the positive aspects of social capital resources seems to be lim-
ited in two ways. Firstly, it does not consider how power permeates the structure of rela-
tionships facilitating  actors’ action and generating benefit.  Secondly, the ‘public civ-
icness’ or ‘public goods’ aspects only contain such social organisations that encourage 
cooperation and mutual benefit for everyone in the community. This notion therefore 
does not permit us to address the ‘public bads’ functions which  facilitate  action and 
generate  benefits. In order to overcome these limitations, I would argue that the ability 
of hierarchical structures of relationships that may create ‘public bads’ to create benefits 
for others should not be ignored. In subsequent chapters of this thesis, I will consider the 
range of social relationships that constitute social capital resources for the urban poor in 












COMING TO THE TOWN: MOBILISING KIN-NETWORKS 
 
1. Introduction 
I once asked Kuddus, a 17 year old man, to explain why he migrated to Dhaka. He re-
plied by saying “Dhaka shohore taka ure berai, dharte shikle borolok howa jai” – “In 
Dhaka town money flies round in the air. If you learn to catch it you can get rich there.” 
To the rural poor, Dhaka is a rich place where every one has good job. It is this idea that 
draws people to move there. The contrast with the realities of life in the bustee is sharp. 
As Afsar (1995) says: in the bustee, people “suffer all kinds of deprivations in terms of 
physical amenities, utilities and insecurity.” Not only do they live with an almost total 
absence of city services, they also have to live under the threat of the demolition of their 
homes7. In addition, as mentioned in chapter two, the bustee is dominated by a ‘culture of 
violence’.  This raises the question as to how the migrants settle down in the bustee, con-
struct their livelihoods and  bring up their families in the urban setting. 
Migration can be considered an important livelihood option from two perspectives. 
The first perspective is related to material issues. Most of the literature on migration con-
siders it from an economic perspective and examines the ability of migrants to send re-
mittances back home. The second perspective focuses on migration as an exit option from 
an exploitative social structure. The purpose of this chapter is to look at both perspec-
tives. In particular, I intend examining the relationships between rural-urban migration 
and social capital resources, a relationship which in my argument constitutes the founda-
tion of livelihood in the urban economy. In so doing, I will examine two phenomena: a) 
the exit from the rural sector, and b) the entry into the urban sector.  This will be organ-
ised under two sub-headings; a) why the poor come to the town; b) how the poor settle in 
the town. 
 
                                            




2. Why do the Poor come to the Town? 
Existing migration literature is dominated by a particular framework which argues 
that  ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors are responsible for poor people’s movement to urban areas. 
Recent studies of migration in Bangladesh have adopted and endorsed this framework. A 
variety of factors have been identified in this literature. Thus Hussain (1996) stresses eco-
nomic factors, Majumder (1996) socio-psychological factors while Alamgir (1993) argues 
that the decline in land-people ratio encourages rural to urban migration. What is com-
mon however to all the approache is that they tend to emphasis either ‘push’ or pull fac-
tors. 
I found that there were indeed many elements, which push the poor to move from ru-
ral areas, as there were also elements, which attract the poor to come to town. My argu-
ment, however, is that ’push’ or ‘pull’ alone cannot fully explain migration patterns. In-
stead both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors create opportunities for migration. My observation in 
BBB2 confirmed that both push and pull factors were responsible for migration (table 
5.1). This finding is based on interviews with 20 key informants who had migrated to 
Dhaka before my study started and 32 temporary migrants who had arrived during my 
fieldwork. Temporary migrants refer to those who engage in seasonal or circular migra-
tion as a supplement to livelihoods in the rural areas. Permanent migrants instead refer 
to those who are settled permanently with their families in the bustee. The distinction is 
important for my analysis.  There was a significant difference in the reason for migration 
between permanent migrants and temporary migrants. While ‘pull’ factors ensured the 
migration of the temporary migrants, it was not the case for permanent migrants. 
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Table 5.1 is based on responses to the QPS (quantitative panel survey) questionnaire. 
These showed that 80% of permanent migrants came to the bustee for the reasons which 
could be classified as ‘push’ factors while 84.25% of temporary migrants migrated be-
cause of ‘pull’ factors. 
When the people narrated their journey to Dhaka, the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors became 
more clearly distinguishable. For example, when permanent migrants stated that a ‘rural 
push’ played an important role in their migration, they did not talk of urban pull factors 
such as employment opportunities. Whereas when temporary migrants emphasised 
‘pull’ as the main factor leading to migration, they meant that better information helped 
them to reach a decision. It seems the permanent migrants, in a sense were ‘forced’, while 
new migrants were ‘motivated’ to move to the town. 
This highlights the problem of understanding the relation between factors responsible 
for migration and migrants’ response to these factors. For example, if someone becomes a 
victim of river erosion in a particular village and is forced to leave that place, does this 




not necessarily to the city.  Below, I will first show how rural push factors make migra-
tion an option, and secondly, how urban pull factors are associated with social capital 
resources and this facilitates migration. 
 
2.1.  Creating Options for Migration to the City: Push Factors 
My argument here is that rural push factors may produce migration options but they 
do not necessarily force migration. I will explain this statement by examining the re-
sponses collected from those who identified rural push factors as the causes behind their 
migration. Table 5.1 offered four different sets of responses: lack of income opportunity, 
conflict with family and community, dissolution of marriage and river erosion (natural 
disaster).  
Firstly, the lack of opportunity to earn income – or poverty - pushed many people 
(37.5% of permanent and 12.5% of temporary migrants) from their place of origin to the 
bustee. The lack of employment opportunities in the rural areas, particularly during both 
pre and post-harvest periods means that many rural wage labourers, face an extreme in-
come deficit. People then migrate to minimise such income deficits and may try to find 
alternative livelihoods options in the rural area. This creates patterns of circular migra-
tion (Toufique 2000). In this situation, the decision to migrate is the result of calculated 
behaviour.  
Secondly, amongst the permanent migrants, 20.8% reported that they migrated be-
cause of some family conflict. Resource-oriented conflicts and contradictions are known 
to be common in rural Bangladesh, particularly in the context of scarcity (Datta 1991, 
Arens and Beurden 1977, Jansen, 1987). Conflict also follows from the abuse of power, 
when for example powerful family members or rural elite take possession of others’ land 
or other resources. Such experiences often facilitate the migration of the poor and weak 






Haron Hawlader migrated to Dhaka six years ago at  the age of 23. After a 
quarrel over the share of paternal property with his elder brother, he stole his 
brother’s money and migrated to Dhaka. He started living in a mess (dormi-
tory) with his friend who helped him learn how to pull a rickshaw. He spent a 
few months in Dhaka and realised that the income opportunity for him was 
great. He found the address of a cousin who had migrated a long time before 
and went to live with him. He became a rickshaw puller and soon after his 
migration he married his cousin and settled in the bustee.   
 
 
 Example 5.2 
 Shahnaz, aged 33, was separated from her husband and lived with her parents in Bhola. 
After the death of her father, she became a burden on her brother and continuous  pressure 
was put on her to find her own way. Except for  a piece of land measuring 20 decimals that 
her father left for her, she did not own any tangible resources. After selling her land for a 
low price (as she  had to sell it to her  brother) she lost her meagre income source.  Searching 
for an alternative source of  income she found one of her fictive kin who lives in Dhaka and 
was told that there were employment opportunities there.  Without any further delay 
Shahnaz  made up her mind to leave her brother’s house. She shared her decision with her 
younger unmarried sister, Momtaz, aged 13, who was also interested in migrating Dhaka to 
find a job in the garments factory. They both migrated to  BBB2 in June 1996. They rented a 
house for TK.200.00. Shahnaz started working as a daily labourer with a road construction 
contractor in a mixed group of male and female workers. Her sister got a job in a garments 
factory as a casual labourer. Both now have to work for more than 12 hours a day, leaving 
Shahnaz’s children at home without anyone to take care of them. Momtaz was  however 
eventually forced to leave the BBB2 as she was assaulted by the rangbaj8 living in the BBB2. 
 
 
Thirdly, a few women (4.2%) reported that the reason for their migration that their 
marriages had broken up. The collapse of a marriage is strongly related to economic im-
poverishment since when a woman is divorced, she loses both her economic and social 




tion, and purdah restrictions on women’s activities are strong, women are unable to earn 
sufficient money to support themselves. For divorced women who are not taken care of 
by their natal families, the only option open to them is to move to the city. The following 
examples illustrate this. 
 
 Example -5.3 
 Saleha, aged 43, along with her daughter and son migrated to BBB2 from  
Rangpur. Saleha was divorced 15 years ago and since then had been living 
alone  close to her parental family. In August 1996, Saleha met one of her 
neighbours who lives in BBB2. Knowing from her neighbour that there are 
employment opportunities in Dhaka, she made up her mind to migrate with 
her children. She migrated to Dhaka  to join her neighbour, rented a house and  
was introduced  to  mastaans living in the BBB2. The mastaans helped her 
find employment as a maid.   Her daughter-Nazma Khatun, aged 13, with the 
help of the mastaans received a job in a garment factory as a casual labourer. 
 
 
These cases can be considered examples of ‘distress migration’ since the people are 
forced to migrate for lack of alternative options. However, the women migrants involved 
also considered their migration to offer an opportunity to escape from the cultural con-
straints prevalent in rural areas. In the bustee context, they enjoy a certain freedom in that 
they are more mobile and can earn, keep and use their own resources. From this perspec-
tive, ‘distress migration’ actually offers a positive exit option to women. 
Fourthly, 12.5% of permanent BBB2 migrants move to Dhaka after some form of natu-
ral disaster.  This is a low percentage since the BBB2 migrants, as mentioned in chapter 
two, are mostly from Southern districts which are renowned for hazardous flooding and 
river erosion. Natural disaster is generally considered one of the most common causes of 
rural-push migration. A case of river erosion-led migration is illustrated in example 5.4. 
 
                                                                                                                                   






Example  5.4 
Kadir migrated from a village in Bhola after his cultivable land, in-
cluding his homestead, was inundated in 1987. Together with his family 
members he migrated from his village to the nearest town - Bhola. After 
one year he contacted his uncle who had been living in Dhaka for a long 
time. With his family, he migrated to Dhaka, rented a house and secured 
employment as a wage labourer with help from his uncle. From 1987 to 
1990, Kadir has moved his place of residence five different times. In 1990 
he moved to BBB2 and became a rickshaw- puller. 
 
 
This example shows that even in the case of an extreme push like a natural disaster 
people do not take the risk of moving to big cities like Dhaka immediately.  They first 
seek proper information and support to get a job and temporary shelter. More commonly 
‘push’ leads towards seasonal migration, which in many cases turns into circular migra-
tion. It was observed that most of the seasonal migrants had two major objectives for mi-
gration: a) to get employment in rural slack seasons and, b) to find a way to  acquire 
skills  which would help them secure better employment. 
All these examples, as mentioned at the beginning, are drawn from those who identi-
fied rural push as the main cause of their migration. These examples suggest that the 
‘push factor’ framework is not sufficient in explaining migration. People do not take the 
option to move from one uncertainty to another level of uncertainty, rather people’s mi-
gration decision depends upon reliable information in order to ensure a level of security 
of livelihoods. Migration is not automatic or mechanical rather it is deeply rooted in in-
formation exchange, contacts and connection. 
To sum up, it may be said that while rural push creates a situation when people are 
forced to make some move or seek some exit option from the rural society, migration also 







2.2 Facilitating Migration Options through Social Capital : Pull Factors 
The migration literature which highlights ‘pull’ factors to explain rural-urban migra-
tion tends to use several generic terms such as labour demand’ and  ‘city glamour’. These 
terms reflect the attraction of the city or its capacity to accommodate newcomers and ab-
sorb labour. As mentioned in chapter two, accessing the informal sector does not depend 
simply on labour supply-demand relations, but on peoples’ networks and connections. In 
the previous chapter (chapter four) I have described how from a theoretical perspective 
such factors are conceived as social capital resources. Here I pursue in more practical 
terms the role of social capital resources in migration, describing the different sources of 
information and initial supports required by new labour migrants those who identified  
urban pull factors as the causes behind their migration (see table 5.1). 
The main objective of rural labour migrants in moving to urban areas was to diversify 
their livelihood options. Therefore, before migrating, they collect information on the level 
of income, mode of payment and housing possibilities through informal but reliable con-
nections. Direct visits, work experience, physical communication and household net-
works are all used to collect information on the urban context. The structure of infor-
mation flow operates through several channels, which are presented in matrix 5.1. This 
matrix arose out of a PRA exercise with the temporary migrants migrated in BBB2. 
Matrix: 5.1: Information channels 
Channels Ranks 
Through kin, friends and neighbour visit 
to rural area 
05 
Through direct visit to bustee 03 
Through employee 01 
Note: Highest score is 5 while lowest is 1.  
The informational channel considered primary by the migrants was their kin living in 
the bustee. The most reliable information source are kin members, particularly household 
members, who can provide accurate information regarding the urban labour market. 
Most of the households living in the bustee act as strong motivators to members of the 




and timely information supply, b) arrangement of initial shelter and c) support to help 
migrants  secure  a job. The role of kin in providing information and helping new mi-
grants settle into the bustee is illustrated in the following example 5.5. 
 
 Example 5.5 
Bassu Mia, aged 33, migrated 3 years ago after receiving positive information from 
his cousin who lives close to BBB2. Bassu had become unemployed during the rural 
slack season and was tempted by his cousin’s that  “Dhakai din geli eksho taka” – “In 
Dhaka a day’s labour brings you 100 taka.” His cousin could provide a known source 
of employment. Comparing this wage to his local wage of 15 taka per day, Bassu de-
cided to migrate to join his cousin. He  borrowed Tk. 350  from one of his relatives for 
a period of three months. He started living in a bustee dormitory.  After 11 p.m. when 
Manik Mia Avenue (a major, broad road in Dhaka) became quiet and almost deserted, 
he was taught how to pull a rickshaw and in four days he had mastered the art. He did 
not have any difficulty getting a rickshaw since his cousin introduced him to the rick-
shaw owner from whom he rented his own. His average daily income is more than one 
hundred taka. Regularly he has been sending money to his wife who is still living in 
his rural home.  
 
 
The above example can be read as showing the moral obligations of the cousin who 
lives in the bustee to supply information and support to his kin living in the rural area. 
However, in the bustee context, many migrants bring their relatives to town in order to 
increase their power. As mentioned in chapter two, a new form of  social structure  oper-
ates in the bustee, constituted through different levels of netha, and mastaans. The netha 
and mastaans are self-designated but also need bustee migrants’ support. Bringing in your 
own close kin is one of the surest means to extend your ‘client’ group, so whenever the 
nethas  get an opportunity, they are ready to provide all sorts of help to secure this.  
As mentioned in the earlier section, distress migration often occurs when woman lose 
their  social and economic options.  This does not happen, however, without social capi-
tal support. For women, securing shelter is a major consideration in migration.  Many 
single garment workers join the urban labour market after getting assistance from their 




 Example 5.6 
Rebeca, aged 20, migrated alone to BBB2 in June 1996 from Barisal, leaving 
her three year old  daughter with her parents. She made up her mind to migrate 
when she met her aunt on a visit to the village from Dhaka. Rebeca’s husband was 
in prison, serving his term for murder. Rebeca realised that there was no way of 
securing  her husband’s release  from jail and she had to earn money  for her sur-
vival. She came to Dhaka and started living with her aunt. She works as wage la-
bourer for a road contractor. 
 
 
A second effective way to secure information is to visit the bustee.  Most of the bustee 
migrants keep contacts with their rural family, kin and friends. Just as they visit their ru-
ral homes they also receive guests from  their places of origin. These visits allow rural 
dwellers to explore the idea of migration. People then make occasional visits to their rela-
tives living in Dhaka and get acquainted with the job market and local networks. Their 
physical presence in the urban area helps them see the comparative advantages of living 
in the city and gauge the level of support their kin may be able to offer. Example 5.7 illus-
trates the importance of visits. 
 
 Example 5.7 
Rahim visited his brother-in-law Mokter Mias last year. His nephew, Babul, is a 
rickshaw puller who taught him rickshaw pulling. Rahim stayed with them almost 
one month and pulled rickshaws. Returning home from Dhaka, he compared the local 
wages with those of Dhaka and made up his mind to migrate to Dhaka. He migrated 
to BBB2 and has been living as a paying guest with his uncle since July 1996. He 
looks forward to a better economic future.  
 
 
Like Rahim, many wage labourers decide to migrate after they become acquainted 
with the informal labour market through casual visits.  However, the existence of work 
opportunities is not the only form of information that people need.  They also need to 
know the structural character of the community, and the terms on which it operates. Af-





 Example 5.8 
Afser Ali, first came to Dhaka as a member of an earth cutting labour team in 
March 1996. At that time a number of real estates  were being developed by private 
owners around BBB2. They needed professional earth cutters who were not in suffi-
cient supply  in Dhaka. So, contractors brought in outside teams managed by tradi-
tional labour leaders called sardars. The contractors erected temporary shelters close 
to BBB2. This gave the labourers a chance to interact with the bustee dwellers and 
make friends with some of them. Afser Ali was able to learn about the process 
through which one finds work in the informal labour market. He came to know that 
one needs recommendations to get a job or to rent a rickshaw. He also realised that it 
would be difficult to stay in the bustee without a protector. Returning to his rural 
home, Afser Ali prepared to migrate to Dhaka. In July 1996 he returned to BBB2 and 
has been living as a paying guest with a bustee leader whom he came to know during 
his time there as an  earth cutter. Afser Ali  has started pulling  rickshaw.. 
 
The third way rural labourers migrate is though direct recruitment. The most common 
case is that of maidservants. Many middle class people living in the cities bring a maid 
from their own rural areas. There are also some enterprises that have developed in 
recognition of the demand for such domestic labour. Although the commercialization of 
domestic servants is not big business,  a few people who have links with the rural areas 
have learnt how to  cash in on the demand. The following example (5.9) slows this clear-
ly. 
 
 Example 5.9 
Mollica, aged 19, is a divorcee who got acquainted with a woman who lives in BBB2 
and frequently visits Barisal to sell secondhand clothes. At the insistence of the woman 
cloth seller, Mollica made up her mind to migrate to Dhaka. She stole Tk.100 and came 
to BBB2 with the woman. The cloth-seller arranged a job for Mollica as a housemaid, in 






On a very different scale, this commercialization of domestic servants has allowed an 
established commercial firm in the Farmgate area of Dhaka to set up a ‘maid trade’ sup-
plying domestic maids for a service charge.  Example 5.10 illustrates one case of  a ‘maid 
trader,’ Rahima Khatun.  
 
Example  5.10 
Rahima Khatun, a 50 year old woman from north-western district of Jessore,  is 
a trader in maids from the rural areas. She has earned a reputation in this business 
amongst both her clients and maids. Every month she makes three visits to the city 
and brings at least 50 maids. During each of her visits to Dhaka she sees all the 
households where she has supplied maids. If someone wishes to change their maid, 
he/she can do so during her visit. At the same time she also carries messages to and 
from the maids’ family, maintaining a diary to manage it all efficiently.   
 
The ‘maid trade’ has also become an attractive business in the international labour 
market. So many bustee migrants want to send their female family members abroad, par-
ticularly those who have gathered experience working as house maids. There are some 
who have left their villages for the bustee, precisely in the hope of gaining opportunities 
to go abroad. Many manpower agencies act as recruiting agencies to send labourers to 
different countries for a service charge. Although they charge a very high rate, many 
people are ready to pay whatever is necessary even if it means selling all their assets or 
taking loans. This is illustrated by example 5.11 below. 
 
 Example 5.11 
Karim Majhi, a rickshaw puller, has three daughters and one son  His son, 
Allauddin, is also a rickshaw puller. One of his three daughters is married. With 
the aim of sending the eldest daughter abroad he brings her to Dhaka. He sells 
his rickshaw-van to collect the required money. He sells his only means of earn-






A few women in BBB2 themselves take an active role in seeking to join the interna-
tional labour market. Example 5.12 illustrates this well.   
 
  Example 5.12 
Selina had been in Malaysia for a period of three years, working for a fish 
processing company. She received Tk. 5,000 per month.  Returning home, she 
was not able to do anything with her savings. Finally she decided that she 
would go abroad again and came to the bustee with the hope of finding further 
work abroad . Almost every day she visits the airport, 40 km away from her 
bustee to see if there are any opportunities.  
 
All the examples cited above are different, but one aspect is common.  People move to 
Dhaka for its economic attraction as reflected through the flow of information they re-
ceive. The existence of a demand for labour example is circulated through information 
channels which in turn operate through social networks. This observation confirms the 
observations of Granovatter’s (1965), made almost 35 years ago in the American social 
context. 
To sum up, it may be said that rural push factor alone do not ‘cause’ rural to urban 
migration.  Rural push factor only create the opportunity to consider the option to mi-
grate, but the real decision to migrate depends on social networks through which  infor-
mation about the urban situation, and particularly the labour market are channeled. This 
information flows primarily through kin networks. Other forms of support can influence 
the decision to migrate, but the role of kin networks is critical. 
Recent migration literature in Bangladesh shows that the dominant form of migration 
is rural to urban, and predominantly permanent in nature. It can be argued that labour 
migration following a chain or circular migration is a step or phase towards permanent 
migration. My observations suggest that migration is determined by a complex process 
discerned by calculating actors. In the following section I want to look at the process 





3. How Do the Poor Settle in the Town? 
As already described above, once arrived in town, new migrants have to face a range 
of difficulties besides securing employment. The literature uses a number of terms to re-
fers to the process whereby migrants adjust to new places. These include: adaptation, ad-
justment, acculturation, assimilation, integration and inclusion. Although they appear 
similar these terms carry different meanings and are widely contested and debated. 
Alden Speare Jr. (1984), for example, describes adjustment as “a process by which a mi-
grant responds to a change from one place to another in the physical, economic and so-
cial environment” (in Huq-Hussain 1996:52). Germani (1964), on the other hand, consid-
ers ‘adjustment’ as one of the three stages of assimilation. Taft (1988) urges further that to 
understand the adaptation process we need to look at “the history of the individual’s as-
pirations, expectations, learning and coping strategies, and attitude changes, and struc-
turally ... (analyse)... the internal and external status of the migrant” (in Huq-Hassain 
1996:52). These different terminologies are conceptually difficult to unpack and even 
more difficult to capture empirically.  Rather than seeking to enter these debates, my 
main objective here is to look at the process through which migrants settle down in the 
bustee and manage to organise themselves using their social capital resources. 
 
3.1. Mapping Migration  
I began this chapter by citing a common saying: Dhaka shohore taka ure berai, dharte shi-
kle borolok howa jai  - “In Dhaka town money flies round in the air. If you learn to catch it 
you can get rich there.”  This describes the predominant image which attracts young mi-
grants to the city. However, when migrants have to bring their family to the bustee, a va-
riety of processes emerge and different mechanisms are followed. These are the subject of 
the following sections.  
In order to understand the migration process and mechanisms, I followed two proce-
dures. First I identified two different processes of migration through a PRA matrix exer-
cise with bustee dwellers (matrix 5.2).  These: a) repetitive and b) non-repetitive.  ‘Repeti-
tive migration’ refers to seasonal and circular migration which is guided normally by 
pull factors. ‘Non-repetitive migration’ refers to a permanent shifting and is normally 











Matrix 5.2: Different Processes of Migration Leading to BBB2 
Processes and Types of Migrant Migratory factors Ranks 
Repetitive 
 Single and  married after arrival in bustee 
 Single during migration, married and taking 
family to the bustee 
 Married taking family later 










 Single and married after arrival to the bustee 
 Family migrants experienced reverse migration 
after arrival to the bustee 
 Family migrants followed staggered strategy 
Rural push  
 01 
 01 













Figure 5.1: A mapping of repetitive and non-repetitive mechanisms 
The second procedure was to draw maps on migration mechanisms followed by dif-
ferent types of bustee migrants. The first map (figure 5.1) shows how the two mecha-
nisms, repetitive and non-repetitive expand to become three, as the non-repetitive sub-
divides into two, ‘staggered’ and ‘reverse’. This procedure thus identified three mecha-
nisms whereby migrants manage and organise themselves to settle in the bustee. In the 
following sections I discuss how social capital resources affect and influence these mech-
anisms. 
 
3.2 Social networks and migration mechanisms 
Social networks affect decisions about major changes in life events such as the deci-
sion to migrate (Wong and Janet 1998). As mentioned above, different factors facilitate 
migration but it is managed through social capital resources, particularly through kin 
networks. In order to understand this better, I will present here in turn both the repetitive 




3.2.1. Repetitive mechanism 
As mentioned above, the repetitive process refers to seasonal or circular migration. In 
this process, rural people migrate seasonally or occasionally but in a continuous manner 
following their set networks of information channels. This repetitive visiting provides 
further opportunities to widen their networks and acquaintance with the urban setting. 
New networks, familiarity and new friendships influence migrants to settle in the bustee. 
In our PRA exercise, four groups of migrants were identified who adopted repetitive mi-
gration (see matrix 5.2). Amongst these there were three broad mechanisms through 
which migrants settle in the bustee. These comprise those male migrants who: a) were 
single labourers during their arrival and married girls from bustee; b) brought family 
members to the bustee after some time and c) brought their family members with them 









The first group settled in the bustee marrying a girl from the bustee. The migrants be-
came acquainted with other bustee migrants and with various social organisations during 
their seasonal or occasional migration.  As most of the single migrants moved with the 
assistance of their kin, in many cases, they ended up marrying some one from the same 
kin circle. 
The second group went through a complex process of gradually shifting family mem-
bers as they settled in the bustee. The common factor within this group is that they were 
not initially willing to bring their wives to the bustee. They preferred instead to keep their 
family members in their rural homes together with other relatives. There are two reasons 
for this. First, young unmarried wage labourers sent their remittance to their parents who  
did not want their sons to migrate permanently.  Secondly, young married migrants were 
reluctant to bring their wives mainly due to the socio-cultural environment.  Most of the 
temporary migrants living in BBB2 said  that they did not want permanently to migrate 
to Dhaka,  rather they want to improve their families’ situation by sending them money. 
Bustee permanent migrants had the same desire when they first migrated. Over a period 
of time however they changed their mind and moved completely into the bustee.  There 
are again two reasons for this. First, over time they gradually created wider networks in 
the urban setting. Second, sending remittances  back home became complex. 
When bustee migrants start sending remittances to their family members, some prob-
lems arise. The proper management of the money sent by the migrants becomes quite 
problematic. This is particularly so in the context of a family that has little cash flow be-
sides the money sent. In the context of joint or extended family structures where a large 
number of people live together, it was found that in most cases the major portion of the 
money was used to fulfil immediate subsistence needs. So, as there were little or no sav-
ings, when the migrants returned home they found their families in the same situation as 
before. Thus, they had simply to migrate again, thus gaining greater familiarity with the 
urban settings and other employment options there. 
At the same time, the overall management of the household became difficult as two 
different interest groups formed. One group centered on the migrant’s wife and children 
and the other of the other family members. The first group looked for betterment for 




Thus, two different types of expectations and aspirations created significant pressure on 
intra-family relations.   
In addition, the migrant family was also affected by the changing relationships be-
yond the household. Urban influences in the behaviour of returning migrants made them 
relate differently to those around them. The comparison between Dhaka and village 
market prices made some local commodities seem cheap to migrants, and their greater 
purchasing capacity enabled them to display themselves in ways that caused resentment. 
Also, their newly found wealth and urban exposure meant that many migrants were in-
vited to the shalish (village court), to speak on behalf of the poor community. Such ad-
verse relationships often ended in conflict. This situation was a positive disincentive to 
the generation of any tangible resources or to investment in the rural area.  
Over a period of time, therefore, the social capital of the bustee migrants in rural areas 
degraded  through intra and inter household conflicts. Crises in intra-household  man-
agement and  a failure to save, forced bustee migrants back into the urban labour market. 
While this process,  as mentioned above, cumulatively degraded migrants’ social capital 
in the rural area, it at the same time  increased their social capital in the town. This en-
couraged the migrants to bring their families to the bustee after all. As mentioned in the 
second chapter, divisions within the bustee (bustee angsho) developed on the basis of re-
gionalism. This is again evidence of the significance of social capital.  The bustee angsho is 
thus both the output and input of social capital resources. On the one hand, such region-
ally defined neighbourhoods are forged through existing social ties, and on the other 
hand, this sense of community generates a basis of trust within which migrants seek to 









There are three different types of bustee migrants who followed a non-repetitive pro-
cess. The first group comprises those who migrated and settled in the bustee through 
marriage. The second group are those who initially migrated due to rural push factors, 
but could not survive and so returned home or elsewhere. This is known as reverse mi-
gration. The third group consists of people who finally reached the bustee, following a 
short migration to smaller towns. All of these groups developed urban social capital 
through mobilising their kin to the bustee. 
The first group migrated through contracts with friends and acquaintances. A large 
number of young boys who mostly became street children belong to this category. Many 
very young boys migrated through various connecting transports like railways and water 
ways. In Sadar Ghat, a river port in Dhaka, many such young boys live under the control 
of an  organised gang (Daily Star 1998). Working first as kolis (labourers), they main-
tained good networks through which they managed to reach the bustee. Many of them 
became mastaans as they had good connections and contacts, while others settled in the 
bustee through marriage. Their own networks and the networks of their wives’ natal fam-
ilies enabled them to become members of the bustee communities. 
Another non-repetitive strategy is to make use of their contacts and social networks 
with the bustee angsho. On the one hand distress migrants, and on the other people with 
strong networks of acquaintances, both migrated together with their family members. 
For example, most of the people living in the Shahider Tek Bustee9 migrated together 
with their family members and settled. This was because in this bustee a large number of 
people migrated from the same locality and developed into a village-like community, 
thus expanding their household networks. In addition, local affinities allowed people to 
adhere more to the values they were accustomed to and to keep strong relations with the 
rural setting. Thus people of the same rural area who have strong networks find no prob-
lem in migrating together with family members (example 5.13 ). 
                                            
9 The Shahider Tek Bustee (STB), which  was developed on government land ,was one of the  bustees  chosen for quali-






Together with his wife and two children, Rahim Hawlader, aged 37, migrated to BBB2 in July 
1996. Before his migration he  made a couple of  visits to Dhaka to meet other members of his fami-
ly. His brother has been living in BBB2 since 1993. During his last visit to his brother Rahim real-
ised that he could earn a better income in Dhaka. He returned from Dhaka and within a month he 







Figure:5.3  Non-Repetitive Mechanism with Reverse Migration 
The second group of non-repetitive bustee migrants experienced reverse migration. Ex-
treme rural push factors force many people to migrate to Dhaka, particularly from places 




forced to leave their place of origin. In such a situation migrants took a high risk. They 
managed to find shelter and a job but many of them were harassed, even beaten mainly 
for  failing to pay toll money. Young wives and girls were humiliated and raped.  Many 
could not cope with the bustee’s culture of violence. Failing, or refusing to adapt to the 
urban economy and culture they decided to leave the bustee.  In some cases the poor situ-
ation at home forced them to return to the bustee nonetheless.  
Most reverse migrants moved towards the peri-urban areas rather than returning 
home. In the peri-urban areas, the environment of the community is better. So, people 
think it is better to join the urban informal market, living in the peri-urban area. This ar-
rangement helps them reap the economic benefits of the informal labour market and yet 
avoid urban cultural hazards. Example 5.14 illustrates this. 
 
Example 5.14 
Karim, together with his family members migrated to Dhaka from Faridpur and 
started living in BeriBadh Bustee. His family did not want to stay there since they faced 
difficulties in coping with the urban culture. Finally one of his colleagues, who rented a 
rickshaw from the same garage as Karim and lived in the peri-urban area - Savar, 20 kil-
ometers from Dhaka, helped him to find a house there. Karim now travels  to Dhaka 
from Savar early in the morning and returns home in the afternoon. 
 
 
Day-migrants, both men and women, travel to Dhaka for employment in the informal 
market mainly as wage labourers. Amongst these, those who preferred to live in the peri-
urban area gradually moved towards Dhaka. They managed to move for two resons: a) 
their acquaintance with urban culture and b) their development of networks. The case of 





 Example 5.15 
Karim had been living in Savar for a couple of years with his family of four mem-
bers. He has been working as a rickshaw puller in Dhaka. Following divorce, his sis-
ter-in-law together with her child also  became members of Karim’s household. But 
all the family members started feeling that it would be rather difficult to maintain 
the family on just one person’s  income. They decided to migrate to Dhaka to find 
work for all the household members in the urban market. Karim and his household 
have been living in BBB2 since June 1996 and all except two children have become 
income earners.  
 
 
The third non-repetitive bustee migrants are those who were pushed to migrate but 
managed to get only as far as the nearest town to find employment and better wages. 
Working near the urban centre provided them with new opportunities to develop social 
networks, which in turn helped them find suitable routes to Dhaka. It was observed that 
initially people did not have any intention to migrate to Dhaka. Better knowledge of the 
urban labour market in Dhaka and linkages with nearest urban centre, inspired people to 
migrate on.  As the case of Siddique Mia (5.16) below indicates, this process may also be 
preceded by a rural to rural move, which doesn’t yield the hoped for new economic op-
portunities, but may build up the social capital through which an urban move becomes 
thinkable.   
Example 5.16 
Siddique Mia’s family had been living in a coastal village in Bhola district.  In 1987 
due to river erosion, they lost their village and had to migrate to Bhola district town as 
wage labourers. They lived there for three years. During their stay in Bhola they devel-
oped social networks with a number of people working in the informal labour market in 
Dhaka. Finally, in late 1990 Siddique migrated together with his family to BBB2. Now, 












Figure:5.3 Non-Repetitive Mechanism with Staggered 
 
  
     In summary I would say that the various temporary labour migration situations offer 
migrants opportunities to develop wider networks in the urban areas, while at the same 
time it can undermine their existing social networks in the rural areas. The shift from ru-
ral to urban takes place through a tension in which decision  making becomes more 
complex than labour migration only. This tension is mediated through the social capital 
developed by the bustee migrants through the migratory process they follow. Therefore, a 
combination of migratory factors and migrants’ personal structure of networks deter-






Migration is considered one of the most important survival strategies commonly used 
by the bustee dwellers to maintain livelihood in the rural areas. People living in the bustee 
have migrated either directly from the rural areas and peri-urban areas or from other bus-
tees in the city if the threat of bustee demolition is marked. The most important feature of 
bustee life is the continuous flow of an unskilled labour force from the rural area, who 
take shelter in the bustee and over a period of time become bustee dwellers. 
Rural labour migration to the bustee not only means a change of geographical location 
but also refers to access to the community, urban labour market and urban culture. How-
ever, participation in the labour market as a single labourer and participation in the 
community as a member of a family is different. Most of the single labourers are young 
and predominantly male who take shelter in the bustee as guests of relatives, or paying 
guests of another household.  Single migrants, due to the ‘pull-back factor’ of strong fam-
ily ties in the rural area, need to return home. Thus they follow a circulatory pattern of 
migration which provides rural residents with contacts in the urban labour market and 
inspires chain migration. Economic factors influence the decision of single labour mi-
grants more than they do family migrants. By contrast, the cultural setting of the living 
place is an issue of concern for those who migrate together with family members. The 
contradiction between economic pull and urban structural push also forces some bustee 
migrant families to take the route of reverse migration. A point in common is that both 
repetitive and non-repetitive strategies in some way involve keeping links with the rural 
areas and do not or cannot start living in the bustee with the members of their families 
from their initial arrival. 
The process followed for migrating to the urban setting also helps build links there. 
These links act as resources or enable to other resources. Access to different urban re-
sources (networks, organizations) ensures the maximisation of the labour put in. Thus, 
the migration process operates with the aid of the network and in turn contributes to an 
effective network for maintaining different types of livelihoods in the urban setting. This 
connects the rural and urban labour forces in terms of information sharing.  Information 
sharing is a form of investment for both parties’. With circular migration the single la-




the labour market to the job seekers in the rural community. The migration of the latter to 
the city further increases the range of their formers’ networks. 
In the case of bustee migrants, economic factors influence most the  decision to mi-
grate. Repetitive (occasional and seasonal migration, following a circular process) and 
non-repetitive arrangements create space for migrants to access the wider networks 
which mediate  participation in the community and market. This, in a sense, reduces de-
pendence on rural kin based networks. For example, the migrants who follow the circula-
tory type of migration, come in touch with different institutions operating in the com-
munity and in the market, or in the both. Labourers, for example, go through a process of 
interaction with the sardar  and gangs who are familiar with and have some control over 
the migration route. As information providers who live in the bustee prove to be signifi-
cant resources for other people, the status of bringing people to the city in turn helps 
them either to develop new network or to extend an existing one in both the bustee com-
munity and in the market. The opening of new networks which are founded through the 










The main point I have focused  on in the previous chapter is that the migration pro-
cess is embedded in social networks. Migration takes place through social networks and 
the migration process itself creates new social networks for the migrants. Both networks 
are kin-based. The migration process extends lineage centered kin networks to non-
lineage kin networks. Migrants move to the bustee by using lineage-based and non-
lineage based (fictive) kin, but get involved with different associations through friend-
ship after their arrival. 
As mentioned in chapter two, the bustee is place where heterogeneous people with 
various social, economic and cultural experiences live together. Bustee migrants live 
amongst strangers. This makes trust a problematic issue. In the rural area, the roots of 
trust are embedded primarily in the kin based structural relationships. People thus de-
velop trust there through long-term acquaintance and multi-period game dealing with a 
known person in repetitive interaction (Lewis, Wood and Gregory 1996, Wood 1999).  
The establishment of new relationships in the bustee involves a process of shifting so-
cial ties from the kin to the non-kin sphere i.e. from fictive kin relations to friendship. 
Through friendships bustee migrants become involved with new coalitions and associa-
tions. These associational engagements create new structural arrangements which pro-
duce new trustworthy environments through what Coleman (1988) has termed ‘closures 
of networks’. These together form different types and levels of social capital resources in 
the urban context. I will focus in this chapter on how bustee migrants remake and extend 
social capital resources by creating structural arrangements, mobilising non-kin ties, to 




2. Making Non-Kin Ties Into Social Closures 
As mentioned above, rural people migrate and establish their livelihoods in the bustee 
through mobilising their kin-networks. The migration process itself creates an opportuni-
ty to extend their kin based networks through new connections and contacts in the bustee. 
Repetitive migration in particular helps bustee migrants diversify their ties through 
friendships and new links. In this context, ‘ties’ refers to simple connections among peo-
ple and does not necessarily refer to trustworthy relationships, while closures of net-
works refers to trustworthy relationships among the actors (see Coleman 1988 and chap-
ter four).  
Although all the people living in the BBB2 are migrants, they have not migrated from 
the same area at the same time and do not have the same experiences. Personal qualifica-
tions and abilities also differ. These decide how the migrants connect or not with the ac-
tors and organisations existing in the urban areas. New social capital resources are made 
and extended in terms of structure through two broad ways. Firstly, kin-ties are extended 
to friends and closures of networks assume a new shape through these social groupings. 
These may be categorized as ‘simplex’ relationships (see section 4.2.1).  Secondly, clo-
sures of networks extend to and link different socio-economic and political organisations 
which again extend closures produce diverse and diversified multiplex relationships. 
 
2.1. Widening Closures through Coalitions and Associations 
As mentioned in chapter two, two levels of social organisation are missing in the bus-
tee compared to the rural social organisation. Lineage based kin-ties are limited com-
pared to rural situation, even if the  mobilisation of kin is the main means for migration 
to the bustee. Thus, the moral institutions founded on the identities of kinship, descent 
and family obligations which are present in village are no longer applicable in the urban 
context. The migration process, as mentioned earlier, creates opportunities to diversify 
the migrants’ ties and extend networks. In order to maintain livelihoods in a new com-
munity which is heterogeneous, full of strangers and where the environment has a ‘cul-
ture of violence’, migrants try to make and extend closures of networks to create a trust-




come involved in other social groupings, coalitions and associations.  Thus, BBB2 mi-
grants form alternative associations extending closures of networks from kin-ties to non-
kin ties in order to survive in the urban economy  under a new structural set up of 
'shared but separate interests'. In the following sections I consider two contrasting forms 
of this: a) simplex coalition based arrangements and b) multiplex mastaan centered struc-
tures. 
2.1.1 Coalition as a source of social capital resources 
In the bustee, there are different types of coalitions. The most simple way to classify 
these would be to refer to the various local names used.   Unfortunately, I found that lo-
cal terminology did not distinguish consistently between different types of grouping.  
The same terms are sometimes used to refer to social groupings which are functionally 
quite distinct. ‘Dalbal’ or ‘pal’ refer  to a gang, particularly when it refers to  the leader. 
The gang leader is known as ‘paler goda.’  ‘Dal’ , which is commonly translated as ‘faction’ 
in political anthropology on Bangladesh, may be used for  simple groups, gangs and fac-
tions although the structure and functions  of these are quite different. This is consistent 
with the many different local names associated with mastaans, which was mentioned in 
chapter two.  Not only can the same name cover different groupings, but different names 
sometimes refer to the same social groupings. ‘Manikgor’ literally refers to peer groups, 
but in practice it is often used for a  clique, while a clique is also known as ‘addabagider 
dal’. In such a situation where different names are used in a confusing way, I follow the 
lead of Blok (1974:6) in his study of the Mafia in a Sicilian village: 
“The study of native categories of thought is essential for any under-
standing of social reality. But in the end the anthropologist must trans-
late the idiom of the culture he investigates into his own conceptual 
framework”  
My primary concern was to understand different coalitions in terms of their closure of 
networks. This led me to an understanding of how bustee migrants extend their ties to the 
fabric of social networks in the bustee context. In this respect, I will present here three 





Cliques as a source of extended closure of networks 
The first source of making and extending closure of network in the bustee context is 
cliques. Cliques are informal social groups with a loose structure of relationships based 
mainly on familiarity and friendship. Two different types of cliques were observed in the 
BBB2. These two cliques are different from each other in terms of age of participants, 
regular meeting place and size of their membership. The first type of clique is composed 
of teenagers and the second type of labourers. 
The teenage cliques include child labourers who are members neither of gangs or fac-
tions. They meet each other in a specific place, public or private, but do not go far from 
their own locality. Normally all the members gather in street corners or under trees situ-
ated close to the bustee. The maximum size of each teenage clique is eight persons.  Their 
common topics of discussion are cinema and different occurences in the bustee and city. 
The clique is a good instrument for spreading rumours.  
Labour based cliques include the members of other coalitions like gangs or factions. 
They involve men between the ages of twenty and forty. The size of each clique is rather 
small, with a maximum of 4.  These men spend their day time in their workplace and 
then they get together in the evening and play cards and gamble. As gambling is the 
main activity, they do not meet openly in the bustee. They meet in backyards, dormito-
ries, houses or in open areas outside the bustee.  Although, such cliques are informal, they 
are also leader centred. The leader is responsible for paying regular tolls to the police to  
be allowed to  gamble. 
The common feature of these two types of cliques give some impression of their ca-
pacity  to extend closures of networks. For example, the teenage clique does not have any 
specific goal other than conversation and the sharing of emotional experiences among its 
members. Similarly, the clique formed amongst the labourers does not have any specific 
goal, but the networks developed through close association are commonly used to en-
hance their livelihoods. Thus though they do not have any specific goal, familiarity with 
each other creates relations of  obligation and trust.  
Cliques extend closure of networks in two different ways. The first way is related to 
trustworthiness and obligation to each other and the second way is to extend familarity 




ticularly the cliques which are composed of teenage boys are more emotionally attached 
and feel more obligation towards each other particularly in times of  crisis. The members 
of the clique develop norms of behaviour because that is how they show their loyalty to 
the clique. This is illustrated in the following example (6.1). 
 
Example 6.1 
Alauddin and his six friends get together  regularly on the bank of the marsh in the after-
noon after completion of  their work outside the bustee. The other six members are Kaleque, 
Nazrul, Jamal, Moinna, Sahid and Jalil. The main purpose of their association is to gossip. 
They can be considered a source of rumours.  As they share a lot of their own feelings and ex-
perience they never disclose the theme of their discussion to others even though they can be 
closely associated with them. The following episode indicates the strength of solidarity amongst 
them. Monna works as minthi  (labour) with Amin in a vegetable market in Mohammadpur. 
As a friend of Monna, Amin is also trusted in the cliques where Monna is a member and Amin 
is also allowed to join them from time to time. The group members are very close. For instance, 
all the members will share one cigarette if cigarettes are scarce. Another example of the group's 
closeness is that when Alauddin was arrested by the police while going to other bustee, all the 
members went to the leader of the bustee to have him freed by mobilising protection money for 
him. The clique members also took him to the doctor and arranged treatment for him , while his 
parents became simply on-lookers. 
Similarly, as a member of a labour based clique, bustee migrants get reciprocal or fa-
voured benefits. Such cliques provide an opportunity for bustee migrants to become fa-
miliar with mastaans as common members of the same ‘club’. This closeness with mas-
taans through being members of the same clique can bring important benefits.  For exam-
ple, it may offer bustee migrants some security for their wives and daughters during  pe-
riods of their own absence. 
The second way to extend the closure is extension of networks. The non-violent and 
flexible characteristics of the clique help to develop more horizontal and reciprocal bonds 
among its own members and members of other cliques.  It is also flexible in terms of exit 
and entry because it allows its members to maintain relations with other cliques. For ex-
ample, a member of a clique may lose his membership due to long absence, but  after his 




bers of the clique. This suggests that there is little competition among the cliques and 
members who belong to other cliques are trusted by the clique members if they have 
friends in this clique. The trust produced by the loose closures of networks and the tem-
porary nature of membership nevertheless contains a strong sense of  obligation and  
mutual affection. 
Gang as source of extended closure of networks 
A clique takes on a different form when it becomes leader-focused.  Many associations 
or cliques amongst young men are linked with each other and find themselves under a 
single leader. This clique is known as a gang. The gang is another source of extended clo-
sure of networks.  
The gang is considered a source for making and extending social capital for two rea-
sons. The first one is its own characteristic of enforcing trust among its members, and the 
second is that it offers an opportunity for others to generate social capital.  In the first in-
stance, the gang’s very structure, leadership and goal creates ‘closure of networks op-
tions’. A gang is primarily oriented towards conflict in that it has rivals for its territory. 
They fight for honour, control over territory, women and criminal enterprises since their 
prime motive is to maximise their income through establishing monopoly rights of con-
trol over bustee activities. In order to ensure these, the gang maintains strong  bonds of 
solidarity among members, mobilising its structure of networks and enforcing trust. The 
overall structure of gang spreads its relations and networks over different urban actors 
and organisations. The gang leader always offers protection against the members of other 
gangs, police or any other external attack.  This norm of protection helps develop inter-
dependency and a relationship of trust among members. The only condition one needs to 
fulfil to receive this protection is that one  should be an assertive and trusted member of 
this gang. The penalty for members who break this trust or who are mistrusted by the 
leader can be serious and may even include death. Furthermore, exit options for gang 
members are limited. They either challenge leaders through fighting them or leave the 






In BBB2, Raja, Samsu, Lablu, Monu, Shahaalam belonged to a mastaan gang under the lead-
ership of Hamid. This is the only violent gang in this bustee.  Hamid, due to his strong and as-
sertive personality, was unchallenged, not only in this bustee but also in other  bustees developed 
around BBB2. In 1994, a new group of police increased the rate of toll money which the police 
usually receive from the gang. The gang refused to oblige  because they thought the police were 
demanding a higher rate than other areas. Moreover, it being the  rainy season, the  bustee mi-
grants’ income was low. In this situation the gang refused to charge bustee migrants higher pro-
tection money. Thus, they told the police to accept the same amount they had received earlier. 
Because of this, the police- gang relationship turned sour.  To avoid conflict Raja requested Ha-
mid to negotiate  with the police. But Hamid was determined not to change his decision. Lablu, 
one of the gang, was arrested. Raja was blamed for this situation by the leader Hamid. Since Ra-
ja had good relations with other gang members, he then challenged Hamid’s leadership. He was 
not only supported by his fellow gang members but also by other coalitions like factions and 
rangbaj. Finally, after three days of battles, Raja took control of the bustee and Hamid along with 
his few remaining followers left the bustee. Raja remains the leader of the gang.  
There are also non-violent gangs. In this case the gang offers the opportunity to devel-
op social capital resources to others. A non-violent gang emerges through different asso-
ciations like labour gangs and functions under the leadership of a sardar (traditional la-
bour leader). But in the bustee context, there is no association that can exist without get-
ting support from the type of violent gang mentioned above. The labour gangs are direct-
ly controlled by violent gangs either through their members or through their trustworthy 
nominees. The non-violent gang is looser in terms of structure and more flexible in terms 
of exit options, but it also requires members to observe informal norms and generates 
obligatory relations and wider connections.     
Factions as source of extended closure of networks 
Factions in the bustee offer a source of extending closure of networks due to their goal 
oriented and leader centered characteristics. The goal-orientation motivates the faction to 
develop strategic relations with other urban actors and the leader centeredness ensures 
trustworthy behaviour. These general features of factions motivate bustee migrants to join 
in order to extend their closures of networks. 
The faction is a coalition which arises from conflicts between or among actors who 




which either exist or are being created in the bustees arises. Men join factions to access 
bustee resources. As emphasised in chapter two, the establishment of a bustee itself indi-
cates control over a set of resources achieved by groups of people working together. Af-
ter getting possession of resources, the leader needs support from his followers. To con-
trol the resources, the faction leaders develop two strategies to extend the closures of 
networks: a) bringing people from their own area of origin and b) developing alliances 
with other coalitions, particularly with the gang in order to achieve their goals. 
The characteristics of a faction, thus, are it is leader-centred, goal-oriented and creates 
trustworthy behaviour. The leader has to take the challenge to manage the faction in or-
der to achieve the goal of controlling resources. The responsibility of the leader is to 
manage and lead the faction in the right direction. Thus the leader exercises strategic op-
tions to create closures of networks. Accordingly the leader seeks to mobilize politically 
symbols of solidarity that will promote trust and cooperation. All the faction leaders thus 
use having come from the same place of origin as a means to create identity through re-
gionalism. This inspires an atmosphere of solidarity amongst members which is especial-
ly  important in conflict situations. Secondly, the faction leader develops a very bureau-
cratic arrangement within the faction. The leader delegates some of his authority to his 
close followers and thus creates sub-leaders. For example, in the Barisal faction there are 
five sub-leaders active in the BBB2. These ensure two levels of trust and networks. The 
first level consists of a vertical relationship between the leader(s) and the followers. This 
arrangement indicates patron-client types of relationship and clientelism. The second 
level involves a horizontal relationship among the subleaders. Most of the faction leaders 
who deal with bigger groups of followers delegate the authority among different sub-
leaders, which creates a sort of sub-faction within a faction. The sub-faction then contains 
both the vertical relationship within its followers and a horizontal relationship with other 
sub-factions. This gives the followers more security in their search for trusted actors. 
2.1.2. Associations as sources of social capital 
In order to minimise risk and insecurity in the bustee context, the migrants organise 
themselves into or get involved with different associations. However, bustee migrants not 
only need to follow a learning process on the basis of trial and error in order to construct 
useful social relationships, they also face difficulties in establishing durable economic rela-




legal regulations and survives on local technology and low skilled labour. These points 
lead immediately on to two important aspects of the informal economy: a) the uncertain-
ty of jobs and b) crimes associated with enterprises. In order to adapt to such new eco-
nomic situations, the migrants need to develop or be linked to various types of associa-
tions which create certain forms of solidarity. Based on the primary occupation, many 
associations have been formed with the aim of tightening networks from a ‘knowing you, 
knowing me’ sort of relationship. These create 'free-floating' social relationships by 
choice and mutual expectation. The mutual expectations of the actors encourages them to 
get together under networks of association. 
Several different types of associations exist in the bustee context. First, there are a 
number of different committees such as the mosque committee. Relief committees are 
commonly formed after evictions, and bustee protection committees are formed when 
there is threat of eviction. All such committees function like associations. The existence of 
different associations and bustee migrants’ participation through a set of overlapping 
memberships with different associations make bustee life fundamentally different from 
the rural one. Associations are particularly essential for economic solidarity. The forms of 
bustee economic solidarity emerge from  actors’ 'familiarity' as friends and colleagues.  To 
demonstrate this I will focus mainly on labour based associations which are deliberately 
created by bustee migrants in order to achieve certain economic goals.  In the next sec-
tions, therefore, I consider those associations formed by sellers of labour and sellers of 




Employment (job)  based associations  
As mentioned in chapter two, there are four broad categories of   labour sellers in 
BBB2. Most of the labourers are linked to the different associations in BBB2. The primary 
association normally reflects the main occupation. For example, wage labourers are asso-
ciated under the leadership of the labour sarder. These groups may even develop into 
normal trade unions. The importance of such associations in bustee life is reflected in the 
intensity or number of associations. For example, as Table 6.1. shows, there exist twelve 
associations based on rickshaws alone.  
Table 6.1:Rickshaw-Based Associations 
Sl. No. Basis of Associations  Associations/Organisations 
01 Rickshaw Garage  i.  Garage Owners + Rickshaw 
Owners 
ii.  Garage Owner + Rickshaw 
owners + Pullers 
02 Rickshaw i. Only Owners 
ii. Owners + Pullers 
03 Rickshaw License  i. Only Licence Holders 
ii.  Licence Holders + Rickshaw 
Owners  
04 Rickshaw Puller i. Licence Holder Pullers 
ii. Non-Licence Holder  Pullers 
iii.  Owner cum Pullers 
05 Somity (NGO fostered) i. Garage based ROSCA/Lottery 
ii.  Shop based ROSCA/Lottery 
iii.  NGO Somity 
 
Table 6.1 also  shows that there are two major categories of association  which create 
closures of horizontal and hierarchical networks. Firstly, there are associations which 
produce simple and wider networks. These associations can be considered as alliances of 
different clients who are related by  employment and who want to organise on the basis 




with a particular type of relationship developed through associational closures of net-
works. In the rickshaw pullers' networks, relationships are more friendly and horizontal 
and this produces a stock of social capital resource. By contrast to the horizontal relation-
ships of employment-based associations, there are also associations founded in hierar-
chical relationships. The one may also develop into the other.  For example, the ROSCA 
which is formed and operated by rickshaw owners leads to the creation of a more infor-
mal type of rickshaw puller's association which is based on an extended network of closer 
friends. This means that the new association is formed not only by the participants of 
ROSCA, but also by others who may belong to a garage-based ROSCA or who may not 
be members of any association. 
The simple but wider networks developed through informal association especially 
among women are strong and extremely functional. For example, the garments workers 
develop their own solidarity on the basis of their workplace. This association is informal, 
developed among friends who share their pains and pleasure. Migrant women get shel-
ter both physically and psychologically through this association. For example, if women 
fail to negotiate for their own interests with the factory owner, they use friends to find 
jobs elsewhere with higher salaries. They continue to move from one factory to another, a 
move made possible with the help of friends who belong to the same working communi-
ty. 
There are also associations which produce multiple sets of relationships through net-
works of networks through overlapping memberships with different associations. This 
results in wider networks and produces other forms of social capital. For example, a cen-
tral association connects all the different associations developed by local rickshaw pullers 
in Dhaka city. This wider network of association particularly directs its attentions to-
wards the informal rickshaw puller community where solidarity of all the rickshaw-pullers 
is central. Most of the trade unions have wider networks in the city and such types of 
networks are composed mainly of transport based associations.  
Economic co-operation 
Like labour sellers, sellers of goods also create closures of networks engaged with as-
sociational activities. The most common organisation active in the bustee economy which 




ised mainly by sellers of goods. Even the garage owners organise ROSCA. This means 
that while ROSCAs are organised mainly by the sellers of goods they create closures of 
networks among both labour sellers and sellers of goods. 
The primary basis of the ROSCA is an association developed by the goods sellers in-
volved with labour sellers which ends with their indebtedness and obligation. For exam-
ple, as participants in a shop-based ROSCA, a rickshaw puller may develop a credit rela-
tion with the shopkeeper by buying goods on credit. Goods sellers thereby mobilise fi-
nancial capital and monopoly profit making opportunities. Firstly, this produces closure 
of networks based on the other associations in which ROSCA members are linked. Alt-
hough the ROSCA has its own system developed through enforced trust (this will be dis-
cussed end of this chapter) its main basis is the closures of networks developed from oth-
er associations. For example, the labour sellers associated with sardar, can easily become 
members of a shop based ROSCA. This may  be clarified through example 6.3. 
 
Example 6.3 
Both Salam and Abul migrated from Barisal district. Salam was a sardar and 
Abul was the owner of a shop and four rickshaws. Abul organises a ROSCA on a 
regular basis. Most of the members of his ROSCA are the tenants of Salam. While 
asking Abul why all of his ROSCA members are the tenants of Salam. He re-
sponded: ‘for security?’ Abul explains that all the members take goods from him 
as baki. He takes a risk in transacting baki with strangers who are new in the bus-
tee but Salam knows them and they are his tenants. The labourers trust Abul in 
depositing money because Salam is his friend. When I give them baki, the cost is 
normally higher but do not care since they are living in Salam’s house. 
As the example illustrates, experience with actors and associations make the migrants 
trustworthy. The experience is gathered through a process of direct human interaction in 
which obligation is a key factor. Such obligation helps to conduct economic transactions. 
When migrants get involved with ROSCA and ASCA, types of economic associations, 
both the parties involved put value on their common benefit - the circulation of savings. 
It is clearly observed that in the case of ROSCA or ASCA, the organiser depends on an 
intermediary who is reputable and trustworthy. This reputation is based on previous 




also attach value to the word of people who are established in the bustee. Therefore, alt-
hough the ROSCA is a loose closure of networks, it produces a sense of trust among par-
ticipants. Secondly,  the ROSCA also produces financial capital for the organisers and 
participants. The internal relations and economic character of ROSCAs are discussed fur-
ther in chapter seven, section three.   
 
2. 2. Focused Interaction and Multiplex  Relationships in Mastaan Structure 
As shown in the previous section, bustee migrants get an opportunity to make and ex-
tend their closure of networks through bustee coalitions. The common characteristic of 
bustee life which is fundamentally different from rural life is its high level of associational 
engagements. Bustee  migrants link themselves to a number of coalitions and associa-
tions. In addition, there are organisations which constitute social capital available for use 
both to members and non-members. According to Coleman (1988) such organisations 
serve their set purposes, and can aid others to use their social capital. The organisation 
can provide such wider advantages for different people when its formation takes place 
through actors’  ‘focused interaction’ and facilitates ‘multiplex relationships’.   
A ‘focus interaction’ oriented organisation provides unique options to extend effective 
social capital and in the bustee context the mastaan structure is such an organisation. In 
the bustee context a group of calculative actors collectively develop a mastaan structure by 
creating and extending closures of networks thus linking a wide range of urban actors. 
This helps to establish their monopoly rights and maximise their profits. To ensure the 
maximisation of profit, the mastaan structure also offers advantages in the form of ser-
vices to others through a set of multiplex relationships. 
The members of the mastaan structure have become an essential part of relatively sta-
ble bustee communities. They may be either intermediaries, leaders or mastaans. The basic 
characteristics of the  mastaan structure have been  conceptualised in chapter four.  There 
I argued against the judgemental and normative way mastaans are labelled as ‘public 
bads’. Here I will focus on the  ‘focused interaction’ of the mastaan structure which helps 






2.2.1 Mastaan structure as a source of social capital resources for its members 
The mastaan structure in the bustee context is a very  ‘focus interaction’ oriented organ-
isation. A group of people develop it in a collective and calculated manner in order to 
maximise profit. The main feature of the mastaan structure is capacity to diversify ties 
and produce closures of networks. The mastaan structure connects a wide range of urban 
actors across the urban landscape. The networks of BBB2 mastaan structure are presented 
in figure 6.1 below.  
As presented above, there are two different types of relations among the actors of the 
mastaan structure. These are ties and closures of networks. Ties, as mentioned earlier, are 
simple connections among people which do not infer trustworthy relationships. Closures 
of networks instead refers to trustworthy relationships among actors. The nature of con-
tacts and concentration of contacts determine the shape of the organisation and the ac-
tors’ position in it. The nature of contacts and concentration of contacts of mastaan struc-











































Figure 6.1 Mastaan structure and multiplex relationships 
 
The above figure 6.1 shows two distinct features: a) the networks of the bustee mastaan 
structure go beyond the bustee boundary; and b) it contains two types of connection (ties 
and closures of networks) through which the networks are developed. These two fea-




ownership of social capital resources. At the same time, the concentration of connections 
in particular determines the  main power players. 
First, I want to look at the nature of contact which indicates the stock of social capital 
resources.  Figure 6.1 shows that there are wider networks among the actors connected 
through ties and closures of networks. It clearly shows that the closure of networks is es-
pecially dense among different categories of mastaan gangs. Other actors within the bustee 
are connnected through ties. Similarly, important urban actors beyond the bustee are con-
nected through closures of networks in the mastaan structure. The connection through 
closure of networks refers to the trustworthy relationships which act as insurance against 
cheating, moral hazards and opportunistic behaviour. The opportunism is diminished 
through mutual orientation among the actors. The opportunism is minimised by the 
sanction of reciprocity. All this leads to the creation of strong solidarity across the diverse 
range of actors belonging to the mastaan strucure. Therefore, the mastaan, structure which 
because of its wide range of closure of networks produces solidarity among its members, 
contains quality social capital resources. 
Secondly, having emphasised here the main actors’ settings within the organisation,  I 
now want to focus on the concentration of closure of networks. Figure 6.1 shows that 
mastaan gangs are connected through closures of networks which refer to trustworthy 
relationships. Furthermore, the highest concentration of connections both through ties 
and closures of networks is linked with former and present mastaan leaders and both are 
again connected through closures of networks. To talk of a ‘mastaan structure’ refers to 
two things: a) their cooperative relations and b) the main actors involved. The mastaan 
gang established the structure in order to monopolise control over the bustee and maxim-
ise their own profit. For example, the mastaan gang gets access to public goods, like elec-
tricity, through their connections, and illegally connect up the bustee migrants in ex-
change for money.  Therefore, the mastaan gang primarily using its social capital resource 
to generate benefit for itself. The next section will discuss how the social capital generat-





2.2.2 .The Maastan structure as source of social capital resources for others 
As shown in figure 6.1, the network of the mastaan strucure is wide and  goes beyond  
the bustee boundary connecting a number of actors in different ways. They differ because 
the social ties and closures of networks are multiple and varied. A variety of associations 
are formed around notions of regionalism, politics, coalitions, and corporate background. 
As mentioned in the previous section, a gang is one such coalition. As a simple focus an 
organised gang seeks to maximise profit. The gang as a main actor of the mastaan struc-
ture uses different ways with different sets of relationships and structure. For example, 
the supply of illegal goods like electricity to the bustee migrants is  made possible because 
of the  mastaan’s closures of networks  with political, government and law enforcing au-
thorities. These connections help distinguish the mastaan structure from simple gangsters. 
Their role as intermediaries provides connections between suppliers and users. However, 
the mastaans are distinguished from other intermediaries in two other ways. First, they 
make use of the gaps in communication between bustee migrants and mainstream urban 
society. Second, they ensure and support their intermediate position through threats and 
the practice of physical violence. Such multiplex relationships are reflected in the social 
fabric of bustee migrants’ life. 
 The multiplex relationships of the mastaan structure are reflected through three 
broader sets of relationships: a) the relationship within the mastaan gang;  b) the relation-
ship among bustee actors; and  c) the relationship between bustee actors and non-bustee 
city actors. I have already dealt with the first set of relationships in the previous section. 
Here I will look at the relationships among bustee actors and the relationship between 
bustee actors and non-bustee city actors to demonstrate how a single focus (the mastaan 
gang’s profit maximisation) based organisation becomes multiplex and so offers  a  
source of  social capital resources for others. 
Firstly, the mastaan structure connects different actors, both individuals and organisa-
tions.  As mentioned earlier, non-violent gangs like sardar centered labour gangs or 
ROSCA are examples of multiplex relationships of the  mastaan structure. The mastaan 
gang extends their relationships to other organisations in the bustee and makes it possible 
for them to operate and generate benefit. As mentioned in chapter two under the cash 




the mastaan structure and generates benefit to a number of actors. An organisation like a 
ROSCA is created through enforced trust and operated through rights which are infor-
mally  established. 
Secondly, non-bustee city actors, both individuals and organisations, are networked 
through multiple and varied ties and closures of networks as shown in figure 6.1. As 
mentioned in the previous section, connections through the closures of networks and the 
actors’ power position creates both mutual support and the sanction of reciprocity. This 
complex of relationships offers a counter-balance to the opportunistic behaviour which is 
commonly considered typical of the urban poor. Trust and solidarity focused relation-
ships extend social capital resources for non-bustee actors. This generates resources from 
which they in turn derive benefit. For example, the police consider mastaans  to be  relia-
ble sources to collect regular toll (protection money) from different spheres of the city,  
including the bustees.      
To sum up, it can be said that the use of violence or the threat of violence gives the 
mastaan structure an edge over other competitors in the race for public goods. On the 
other hand, the mastaan structure exhibits public goods characteristics of social capital as 
it becomes a resource for others. Their involvement in criminal activities ensures both 
high profit and the delivery of quality services. Their ability to deliver quality services is 
strongly related to their illegal access to public goods. They ensure their illegal accesss by 
manipulating social capital resources and in turn provide quality services in order to give 
their business a better chance of making a profit.  In order to ensure the maximisation of 
profit, the actors belonging to the mastaan structure do not hesitate to use different 
measures, including violence and even killing.  There is no denying the fact that the mas-
taans have a negative image in the urban landscape because they are generally criminals. 
Nevertheless, the members of the mastaan structure have become an essential part of the 
relatively stable bustee community due mainly to their own social capital resources which 






3.Mastaan Structure and its Motivational Inputs 
I have highlighted two major points in the previous section. Firstly, common bustee 
migrants invest in making and extending their social capital resources by getting in-
volved in various coalitions, associations and organisations. Secondly, the mastaan struc-
ture produces social capital resources both for its initiators and for others. Most im-
portantly, the mastaan structure basically incorporates all actors, both individuals and 
organizations, with itself in the pivotal position. 
Social capital resources bring benefits to actors when they get an effective response 
from others belonging to the same structure of relationships. Therefore, besides the struc-
ture, motivation is equally important to make social capital functional. As mentioned in 
the discussion of social capital  resources in chapter four, the motivation of donors and 
recipients is produced through the trustworthiness of social environments and the exten-
sion of obligation. These two elements of social capital resources guide actors’ responses. 
The notion of social capital resources at the community level is considered positively in 
that mutual reciprocal benefit sharing implies notions of ‘civicness’ (Putnam 1993).  But, 
as mentioned in chapters one and two, and in the previous section, bustees are   dominat-
ed and operated by mastaan structures which contain  ‘dark sides of social capital re-
sources’ and are often  termed ‘public bads’. However, I will present here how the mas-
taan structure produces community level social capital resources in the bustee context, fa-
cilitates trust and extends obligations.    
 
3.1. Trustworthiness in Social Environtment Created by Mastaan Structure 
As shown in chapter two, the bustee contains two contradictory elements: a) ‘culture of 
violence’ and b) social integrity. The first element implies mutual distrust. Migrants con-
stantly  face violence in the bustee. The main cause of this is, as I stated in chapter two, 
that the bustee has a  ‘social structural hole’ which creates problems of social sanctions 
both at the family and community levels. This leads towards mutual distrust. The second 
element of social integrity infers solidarity among bustee migrants as they distinguish 
their social identity from mainstream urban society  as bustee dwellers and they become 




tions i.e. value introjection and bounded solidarity. I will present here how the mastaan 
structure influences bounded solidarity by cultivating distrust and value introjections by 
imposing sanction. 
 
3.1.1  Bounded solidarity through  cultivation of distrust 
Bounded solidarity emerges when actors face common situations and learn from this 
experience.  This leads actors towards altruistic dispositions and action.  As mentioned 
earlier, bustee migrants are suspicious of non-bustee dwellers.  For the bustee migrants, 
‘outsiders’ means a group of urban dwellers including the urban middle class and gov-
ernment officials (Chakraborty and Rana 1993). The notion of ‘suspicion’ refers to dis-
trust. Therefore, ‘suspicious’ in a wider sense refers to state and market institutions 
which contain elements which evoke distrust. 
Firstly, the state is primarily responsible for producing distrust because it labels bustee 
migrants criminals and holds them responsible for the city’s social hazards. This is trans-
lated into a numbers of policies which are not favourable to migrants such as evictions 
and excluding bustee dwellers from city services. 
As governments hold bustee migrants responsible for city social disorder, state policy 
is directed towards evicting bustee migrants from the city. The bustee migrants have never 
been considered legitimate urban dwellers by any government since the country’s inde-
pendence in 1971. All governments have followed the same policy of dismantling bustees 
and throwing their inhabitants out of the city. In so doing the governments have adopted 
different inhuman methods. Often everything constructed by the poor migrants in these 
bustees gets destroyed and in some cases there is even loss of life. Example 6.4  illustrates 






In February 1998, the law enforcement agency evicted migrants from a bustee 
called Noan Tek, developed on the government land. A battalion of 500 police 
men along with government officials came to the bustee and started setting it on 
fire. The police incited more panic by beating everyone coming out of the bustee. 
The bustee migrants were helpless and distraught. They tried to save themselves 
as best they could. As the attack took place early in the morning, most of the 
young men had left for work and only the women and children were in the bus-
tee. They could not save any of their property. 
Many non-bustee people joined the law enforcement authorities in their assault. The 
occasion offered them the opportunity to loot the bustee. This ill treatment of the bustee 
migrants by the authorities was a clear indication of the negative attitude towards bustee 
migrants who have no legal right to stay in the city. The whole process of eviction not 
only damaged bustee migrants’ material resources, it also affected human and social capi-
tal resources. When people are forced to move from one location to another, it does not 
only mean they lose a dwelling but the also lose their networks which are of essential 
importance. State promoted violence makes the bustee migrants distrust the state. In 
such situations, the only option open to the bustee migrants is to make use of the mastaan 
structure in order to find new shelter and employment. 
 Moreover, the exclusion of the bustees from city facilities also generates distrust of the  
state. It only requires the perpetuation of this sense of distrust towards the administrative 
organs in order to prove the usefulness of the structure developed by a group of domi-
neering people. Therefore, the mastaan structure not only provides the services deemed 
essential for bustee migrants but also enhances the process of distrust. For example, when 
the bustee migrants fail to gain access to city services, they feel themselves excluded, and 
consider the state agencies hostile to their interests. The mastaans deliberately manipulate 
this distrust in their own interests. Thus, the mastaan groups provision of illegal services 
on the one hand maintains distrust of the state and wider society and on the other proves 






In the Agargaon bustee most of the houses have illegal access to electricity. A 
gang of bustee leaders arrange this by giving a huge amount of money to the em-
ployees of the power board. The money was collected from the bustee migrants. As 
the electricity supplier the gang members charge more than four times the official 
rate. In BBBI, the rate is as much as ten times higher. This is, therefore, a good 
source of income for the mastaans. When the power development employees dis-
connect the line and demand money for its replacement, the mastaans act as in-
termediaries and organise payment. 
 
The market is a second source which produces distrust. In uncertain economic con-
texts, (see chapter two) where the reluctance for impersonal and extensive forms of co-
operation is high, actors often end up distrusting each other. This distrust affects labour 
participation and self-employed labour mobilisation.  
i) Distrust constrains labourers from accessing the labour market directly. The sense of 
distrust limits access to the bustee. The bustee is a temporary residence both in terms of 
the bustee’s sustainability as a whole and for individual migrant households. Employers 
thus need guarantees before offering employment. This encourages third party interven-
tion or a form of referral system. The function and operation of this system ensures the 
maintenance of distrust on the one hand and produces reliance on the mastaan structure 
on the other. Market oriented distrust compels the migrant labour force to access infor-
mation and seek protection from intermediaries. Such protection makes the mastaan 
structure appear  trustworthy and dependable. 
ii) Due to market distrust, the success of the labourer depends on kin. For example, the 
kin-based businesses run by the bustee migrants are found to be more successful in Agar-
gaon bustee where most of the migrants are either from Comilla or Mymensingh district.. 
People who have strong networks developed on the basis of kin, can set up and run their 
business without financial capital (Opel 1999). Such kin-based enterprises, however,  
cannot run without physical protection and the provision of illegal services. For example, 
the enterprises developed in Agargaon bustee, receive illegal electricity supply from the 




teed by the mastaan structure. As mentioned in chapter two, even beggars cannot beg 
without police harassment. All of this implies that the form of market participation de-
mand the intervention of a third party like the mastaan structure. 
Therefore, distrust created by the state and market force the bustee migrants to develop 
more solidarity and create a trustworthy environment These objectives are in part ful-
filled through the vertical integration of bustee migrants within the mastaan structure. 
3.1.2 Value introjection through the imposition of sanction 
Value introjection emerges from actors’ internalised norms which enhance their collec-
tive action. Effective sanctions also influence actors’ collective behaviour,  as discussed in 
chapter four. Moreover, the trustworthiness of an environment to a great extent depends 
on the ability to impose social sanctions. Social sanctions diminish opportunism and so 
lead to the development of goodwill, reciprocity and reputation on which wider trust 
takes shape (Nadvi 1999). I will now describe  how the imposition of sanctions is inter-
nalised by bustee migrants. 
Social sanctions are  imposed in the bustee context through the samaj. The same process 
is found in rural context (Rahman 1998). As in the rural areas, the samaj in the bustee en-
forces a moral code of behaviour on its members through the imposition of sanctions. But 
the composition of the samaj and the methods of imposing sanctions are very different in 
the two contexts. In the bustee samaj, mastaans are mainly responsible for enforcing the 
code of behaviour and presiding over the shalish  (normally known in the rural context as 
a village court). Ultimately, mastaans can enforce codes of behaviour through violence. 
The authority of the mastaans and its acceptance as legitimate by the bustee migrants is 
unquestionable since the bustee itself is established, maintained and controlled by the 
mastaan structure. Thereafter they establish their right to impose sanction through the 
shalish. Their power is accepted because the bustee cannot be controlled like the rural sa-
maj. Three reasons explain the authority of the mastaans. One reason is that the mastaans 
establish customary rights to take possesion primarily on government land.  The estab-
lishment of the bustee itself means that they enjoy the right to control it. The second rea-
son is that formal rights in the bustee context are absent. The bustee samaj is accorded that 




bustee. The third reason is the mastaans’ possession of social capital resources. Subordina-
tion allows other actors access to and use of their  social capital resouses. 
The authority to impose sanction is acceptable to the migrants as they are culturally 
accustomed to the rural culture of takdir (fortune). In the bustee context this takdir is di-
rectly linked with mastaans tadbir (negotiation for favour). When the bustee migrants 
move to the town in order to look for new opportunities (takdir) as mentioned in chapter 
five, the bustee  migrants desperately seeks tadbir. In the bustee context the mastaan struc-
ture owns such resources (public bads) which others can also use. In order to construct 
takdir (opportunity), migrants adopt the strategic option of inclusion. Therefore,  the im-
position of sanction introjects a value of obligatory trustworthiness between the mastaan 
structure and the bustee migrants.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter shows two interrelated points associated with the process of settling down in 
the bustee. Firstly it shows that in order to settle down in the town, bustee migrants need to ex-
tend their networks from kin to non-kin actors. In rural society kin-networks extend through 
fictive relations while in the town they extend through friends and associations. This funda-
mental difference influences the bustee migrants’ closures of networks and structure of relation-
ships. 
Developing new structural relationships, bustee migrants remake and extend their social 
capital resources. Two structural sources with simplex and muliplex relationships produce two 
levels of social capital resources. Mastaans produce social capital resources in two dimensions 
since they can manipulate the sources of motivational inputs of social capital. Manipulating the 
distrust produced by the state and market along with their power to impose sanctions, the 
mastaan structure translate their social capital resources into  ‘public goods’. Although, due to 
their involement with criminal activities, this source of social capital is often termed as ‘public 
bads’ it is essential for the bustee migrants to stay in town. The following chapter will show 






STAYING IN TOWN: MOBILISING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
RESOURCES 
1. Introduction 
As shown in the previous ethnography chapters, bustee migrants make a continuous 
effort to develop different types of closures of networks in order to develop social capital 
resources which are functional in the bustee settings. To make a living in the urban set-
ting, the migrants, who are often unskilled, illiterate, and have no capital in cash or kind, 
make continuous efforts to increase their stock of social capital resources.  These in turn 
form the basis on which other migrants come to and make a living in town. The quality 
and quantity of social capital resources differs according to the ability of bustee migrants. 
As shown in chapters five and six, there are two processes that enhance the stock of 
social capital resources. The first is kin-based and is produced through migration. The 
migration process itself creates an opportunity to construct social capital. The migration 
process extends social capital resources in two ways. In the first place this occurs by 
meeting family obligations and bringing non-lineage kin into closures of networks. To 
meet family obligations, bustee migrants bring their family members and kin to the bustee. 
Non-lineage kin are brought into the closures of networks through fictive kin relations. 
For example, as mentioned in chapter two and chapter five, paying guest arrangements 
in the bustee context are a source of widening closures of networks. Both these make so-
cial capital more active and functional in the bustee context. The second kind of social 
capital resource is non-kin based and is produced through associational engagements. 
Two levels of social capital are generated through associational engagement. Firstly, 
simplex relationships through closures of networks, linking friends and colleagues are 
produced. Secondly, associational engagements involve multiplex relationships, linking 
different coalitions and associations with wider urban networks like the mastaan struc-
ture.  
In this chapter, I consider how the migrants’ survival and creation of livelihoods in the 




through the combinations of two options: ‘continuum of exchange’ and ‘enforced trust’. 
The former operates more at the community level while the latter functions in wider ur-
ban spheres including the market. In the following sections I discuss each of these in 
turn.  
2. Survival Option: ‘Continuum of Exchange’  
As mentioned above, migration itself develops social capital resources in the bustee con-
text by cementing kin-based closures of networks. These kin-based networks produce a 
‘continuum of exchange’ such as generally functions in the rural context. ‘Continuum of 
exchange’ refers to the social insurance system developed on the basis of the ‘moral 
economy’. The moral economy refers to a  system which is embedded in the social and 
moral fabric of the community which enshrines rights to make a claim on others and 
obliges a transfer of basic necessities in situations of hardship (Scott 1976). However, the 
continuum of exchange emphasises the “degree of tolerance for material imbalance indi-
cated by the time allowed to reciprocate” (Sahlins, in Adams 1993:44).  Adams (1993) 
shows further how non-market transfers are associated with four categories of transfers, 
namely ritual homage and alms, gifts, exchange and credit. According to Moser (1997:4)  
“the system is sustained largely by the long-term self-interest of households in search of 
mutual insurance against livelihoods insecurity. The social capital, which meets family 
obligation and facilitates reciprocal benefit sharing, is developed on the basis of strong 
ties of family, kin group and neighborhoods”. Bustee migrants also make use of this stock 
of social capital resources and this contributes to livelihoods in different ways. I will pre-
sent here two types of benefit that bustee people generate through this system of social 
insurance which  though weak, still exists in the bustee context. 
 
2.1. Obligatory Benefit 
Although people mobilise social capital resources in coming to town, arrival in the bustee  
also represents a significant devaluation in the stock of social capital at both household 
and community levels. There exist obligatory repayment sytem, although  both the pro-
cesses of making and breaking social capital resources in bustee context. Firstly, it is a fact  
that the stock of social capital gets reduced to a great extent in the bustee. As mentioned 




in the bustee context means the moral institutions founded on the identities of kinship, 
decent and family obligations back in the villages are no longer applicable. The effects of 
this are seen in household relationships and structure. Bustee households have been 
found to be fragile, marked by a high rate of divorce, re-partnering and serial monoga-
my. This situation is aggravated by very early marriage, especially for girls, which then 
breaks down, often leading to at least a period as a female headed household. However 
as migrants of BBB2 are the first generation migrants, still they have closures of networks 
with their rural households. These are sustained by various forms of exchange between 
rural and bustee households, such as visits, gifts and remittances. In these ways bustee 
migrants seek to ‘store’, or preserve, their existing social capital resources. For their part, 
Bustee  households honour their kin obligations by extending help to their rural kin. This 
takes many forms, such as training in rickshaw pulling, helping them get to know the 
roads and  so on.   But the critical thing is that without a reference it is almost impossible 
to enter the bustees. This applies equally to newcomers from the rural areas and to bustees 
dwellers themselves, for not only entry to the bustee, but also gaining access to basic 
needs like housing rely in the bustee on a system of personal references.  
It is important to understand this reference system and how it relates to kin obliga-
tions. Whatever the aspirations of new migrants, they require the development and use 
of networks with different actors living in the bustee. For example, new migrants who 
wish to buy a piece of land to construct a house will need to contact those with land for 
sale, while people wanting to rent a house will need to contact those with land to let. But 
this process is not as simple as it seems in the bustee. For those contacts can only be made 
through the mediation of diverse linkages of bustee social networks.  
Entry to the bustee depends mainly upon the migrant household’s relationship with 
two sets of actors; the so-called bustee owners and the landlords. The bustee owners are 
the people who initiated the establishment of the bustee on government land. Having es-
tablished the bustee,  they establish their customary right to construct houses within it 
and to sell land to others. They are the dominant group in the bustee community and 
normally belong to the mastaan structure. As the actors belonging to the mastaan structure 
are characterised by rent-seeking behaviour, they receive protection money in order to 
protect, operate, manage and control the bustee community. Therefore, mastaans become, 




Apart from overarching ownership claims which are mainly associated with the mastaan 
structure, many bustee dwellers also rent out small houses which they have constructed 
on land bought from the customary owners. Thus, both these landlords and the mastaans 
are gatekeepers for entry to the bustee, and both rely on a strong referral system to protect 
their interests. By making trust and personal networks essential to life in the bustee, this 
referral system sustains the multi-actor system of mutual trust. The main actors appear 
here as intermediaries, ‘ghost’ third parties in a whole range of dyadic transactions and 
inter-personal relationships.   
The role of intermediary can also be taken on by established bustee inhabitants who 
have multi period transactions.  Referees are important because they act as a guarantor to 
landlords,  both of new  migrants’ ability to pay and their general reliability. However, 
the majority of bustee migrants are migrating for the first time from the rural areas and 
are not acquainted with the actors belonging to the mastaan structure. Therefore, at first 
these new migrants can only get assistance from kin in finding shelter. This means that in 
most cases new migrants take shelter with relatives or friends for the first few days be-
fore it is possible to make a more permanent arrangement elsewhere (see chapters two 
and five). 
Landlords with houses to rent in particular recommendations made by people in the 
mastaan structure, such as labour sardars or patrons. Thus, in most cases a kin member is 
not able to act directly as a referee for the new migrants. Instead, the kin ‘cash in’ their 
own reputation and relationship with one of the leaders belonging to the mastaan struc-
ture. This at once introduces them both to the landlords and to the mastaans. 
To sum up, it can be said that the rural people make a claim on their kin to get help to 
establish themselves in the bustee.  Such help is founded in traditionally based relation-
ships of obligation, and in turn always results in association with wider networks in the 
bustee.   
 
2.2  Mutual Benefit Sharing 
While as mentioned above, the move to the bustee represents a threat to the stock of 




bustee which serve to increase the stock of social capital. Paradoxically, this positive out-
come is often the result of what are basically negative characteristics of bustee life. Firstly, 
there is the bustee faction which itself has contradictory implications for the bustee con-
text. There is no doubt that factions break wider bustee solidarity due to their conflictual 
character and are deeply implicated in the culture of violence. However, internally the 
factions also create trust and a level of solidarity among their members. As mentioned in 
chapter two, the bustee angsho is basically an outcome of regionalism which is mobilized 
into factionalism, with the shared regional background symbolising internal unity.  
Fragile household structures similarly have these two contradictory aspects. Firstly, as 
mentioned earlier, when households break up this fragments the social capital and so 
reduces the new household’s capacity to store or reproduce social capital resources. But 
at the same time a form of social capital resources is being reproduced even within such a 
negative ‘making and breaking’ situation of marriage, separating and re-partnering. For 
example, in the bustee context a new, if fragmentary, form of social structure emerges. 
Some claim that this even amounts to matri-focal or matriarchal forms (Islam and Zeitlyn 
1987). While this may be putting it too strongly, it is clear that this new form of social 
structure creates more space for women-centred options.  There are several reasons that 
contribute to this. First of all, when women are separated or divorced, they establish 
women headed households resettling close to their natal houses. This simple process 
leads to more women-centred arrangements. For example, it is but not unusual in the 
bustee context for two or more sisters to stay together after separation or divorce. Alterna-
tively, when an older sister gets divorced she brings her unmarried sister to the bustee 
and sets up a new household. Similarly, a number of arrangements are related to the fe-
male-worker-based factories like garments. Garment workers stay with women headed 
households as paying guests, or in women’s dormitories. All such examples show that a 
different if not alternative form of mini- community  exists in the bustee context which 
either reproduces or can store social capital resources. Indeed, in the bustee context, 
communities are formed in various ways. As mentioned above, regionalism, the break-
down of patriarchal arrangements, cultural closeness, occupations and so on can all cre-
ate communities and facilitate reciprocity. In the next section, citing various examples, I 
will look at the community level of  social capital resources which generates benefit 




Reduction of transactions costs 
  As mentioned in the previous chapter, bustee migrants are engaged in two different 
types of bustee association : simplex and multiplex , which generate multiple benefits. 
This will be looked at in the following section.  Here I will look at, very personalised rela-
tionships that are embedded within the extended kin (lineage and non-lineage such as 
fictive kin) relationships that generate benefits. In particular I focus on the free access to 
employment information.  
A significant proportion of bustee labourers get access to information on employment 
or  employment itself through personalised relationships based in kinship links (both lin-
eage and non- lineage). The case of garment workers is an ideal example in this regard. 
The workers develop personal networks among themselves for sharing information relat-
ing to employment access. Most of the garment industries are big employers but the pro-
duction structure is quite simple. Therefore, a simple system of job advertisement has 
emerged, which is dominated by personal recommendation (example 7.1). Thus, job-
seekers develop their information collecting networks based on indigenous methods 
such as maintaining contacts with relatives, friends, neighbours and other labourers. 
Such personalised networks develop mainly either through working together or living in 
the same place. In the bustee, migrants prefer to live in a cluster, mostly based on the 
origin of the place of migration, which in turns develops a regional feeling and may be-
come a faction within the bustee community. 
 
Example 7.1 
A garment factory which we visited early in December 1996 has 300 casual la-
bourers including helpers, operators, a cutting master and so on. According to the 
accountant of the factory 280 workers out of 300 had left over a period of one year. 
Information of vacancies was posted every day with the gate man and all the workers 
were informed accordingly. At the end of the day the general manager had kept all 
the workers informed regarding vacancies.  So, job seekers always kept contact with 
people in the factory. In this way 280 casual workers were replaced over a period of 





As mentioned in chapter two, workers in the informal sector find it easy to take the 
option of exiting a job. It is often more profitable to leave a job if they are ensured of al-
ternative entry elsewhere. In this sense, getting access to information and entry to em-
ployment results in higher profit. Therefore, one of the strategies followed by the bustee 
migrants is to frequently change their jobs in order to maximise their income levels. At 
the same time, factories like those producing garments are also seeking to maximise their 
profits. This means that the labour turnover rate in the garments industry is extremely 
high, as example 7.1 indicates. 
The turnover rate and the production level of the factory are balanced by the demand 
and supply of the labour force in the labour market. There are two reasons for factories’ 
preference for a continuous new labour force in the garments factories. Firstly, continual 
replacement of workers prevents the labourers from getting organised in a trade union 
which could empower them to bargain for benefits, perhaps hampering the production 
system or threatening the factory owner’s profits. Secondly, the salary system provides 
profit if the labourers leave the factory. The salary system allows no payment if a full 
month’s work is not completed. Common payment practice in the garment industry is to 
pay at the end of the following month, which means that the factory can always hold one 
month’s salary as security. Therefore, if a worker leaves the factory, the factory does not 
have to pay one month’s salary. If 280 workers leave, the factory saves a huge amount of 
money. On the other hand, the labourers keep moving continuously or changing their job 
frequently as they always get higher wages on the strength of their work experience in 
the old factory. So, getting a higher salaried job at the cost of one month’s salary is more 
beneficial for them as they get access to employment through the reciprocal information 
system which cost nothing in monetary terms. 
Minimising Costs   
There are number of ways that bustee migrants minimise their costs in the bustee con-
text. Due to the closeness of neighbourhoods, they share many things in common among 
them selves. As mentioned in the chapter two, physical conditions are extremely poor 
and dwellings are barely separated from each other.  By force of circumstance there are 
therefore high levels of cooperation in many neighbourhoods. For example, in BBB2 a 




internal roads and drainage are often managed at neighbourhood level so reducing indi-
vidual costs.  
Shared cooperation.  
A further important form of co-operation is found over child-care. Child-care is ex-
tremely problematic in the bustee context for a number of reasons. Firstly, as the house-
holds tend to be nuclear, there is no one in the household apart from the parents who can 
take care of the children.  This problem is even more acute in the case of women headed 
households. In the prevailing cash economy culture, it is difficult to survive. This means 
that everybody has to work for cash leaving no one at home to take care of the children. 
The only remaining option is mutual help among the neighbourhoods. Whoever stays at 
home during the working day take care of the children of neighbours.  
Reciprocal labour exchange.   
Certain forms of traditional labour exchange exist in the bustee context. As mentioned 
in chapter two, bustee houses are extremely fragile and of poor construction making them 
vulnerable to wind and rain. The bustee migrants need to repair their houses throughout 
the year. It is common to get help with this from neighbours. Another form of reciprocal 
benefit is the ‘bodli’ (replacement) system.  This applies to those with regular jobs, such as 
non-residential maids who do not stay in the employer’s house.  If for any reason the 
maid is unable to come to work, she risks losing her job. Thus in order to ensure the job 
security, their friends, kin or anybody will go to work there as ‘bodli’ in their place until 
the original labourer gets back. 
 To sum up, it can be said that bustee economy which is characterised by cash ex-
change contains a further ‘continuum of exchange’ which bustee migrants make use of to 
maximise benefit and manage insecurity.  It is also found that although both households 
and communities have problems, they can store social capital resources and use it to 
manage insecurity.  
 
3. Survival Option: Enforced Trust 
To adapt to the shift in form of integration from ‘reciprocity’ to ‘exchange’ 




networks with the mastaan structure.  As mentioned in chapter two the bustee economy is 
characterised by cash and this is the dominant medium of transactions there. By contrast, 
rural exchange takes place to a significant extent in kind, as well as cash. In the bustee all 
forms of credit transactions (see chapter two) are maintained through cash. This change 
in the form of the economy with which they must deal creates tension between  bustee 
migrants’ networks and economic activities, their obligations and expectations. To be 
functional and active in the urban economy which is full of risks combined with manipu-
lation, corruption and exploitation, bustee migrants enter into new forms of trust labelled 
‘enforced trust’ developed by the mastaan structure.  Survival of the bustee migrants de-
pends on inclusion within these enforced trust relations which reduce risk and insecurity 
and produce security and opportunity.  
      Security refers to the systems operated, such as the referral or guarantee system 
which satisfy both parties involved and build trust between them through the mediation 
of a third party. The mastaan structure also offers the opportunity to achieve economic 
success. For example, as mentioned in chapter two, the mastaan structure helps to maxim-
ize profit by preventing the entry of potential competitors. In this section I will present 
how sellers of labour and sellers of goods manage their risks using the closures of net-
works of the mastaan structure. 
3.1. Associational Benefit for  Sellers of Goods 
Bustee migrants make use of the closures of networks by getting involved with differ-
ent associations which are directly or indirectly operated and controlled by the mastaan 
structure. Many such associations directly produce opportunities for the parties who are 
involved. The  ROSCA and ASCA,  are such  associations which create multi-party bene-
fits. A combination of wider network and mutual trust turns social resources into social 
capital which in turn creates new opportunities for economic ventures. Involvement in 
associational activities further creates an opportunity for them to transform and accumu-
late financial capital and thereafter  plays four roles.   
Firstly, it provides security for the financial capital or assets. By getting involved with 
a rickshaw garage through a ROSCA or ASCA, a single rickshaw owner can protect his 
rickshaw from the gang of rickshaw thieves which is run and managed by the rickshaw gar-




Secondly, it itself performs as financial capital. Self-employed labourers like street 
vendors and hawkers often do not require financial capital to start such a venture. They 
get their goods on credit from the shops where they are mainly associated with ROSCA 
and ASCA.  
Example 7.2 
Sharif, aged 38 has been working with a wholesale vegetable shop as a van driver 
for seven years. Malek, aged 16, one if his sons, wishes to start hawking vegetables in 
the nearby non-bustee residences. The wholesale shop owner extended his hand to him 
as he has the same sort of business with other clients. They came to an agreement that 
Malek will be allowed to take vegetables on credit at market prices and pay back at 
night before the shop closes. Malek devised his own plan to manage the business. He 
takes a small amount of vegetables and tries to sell it before late morning and give the 
money back to the shop owner. He then takes a  second lot in the afternoon and pays 
that  back before the shop  closes. After six months the shop keeper offered Malek the 
use of one his three vans for hawking vegetables. Malek accepted. Later, he joined the 
ROSCA, putting in Tk. 10 per day  as subscription. 
 
Thirdly, the ROSCAs can create a means of earning. The ROSCA which is organised 
by the rickshaw garage, for example, offers a rickshaw instead of cash to the winner of a 
rotating draw.  
Example 7.3. 
Abdus Samad, aged 35, has been living in different bustees in Dhaka for 10 
years. He has been living in BeriBadh for two years. After his arrival in BeriBadh 
he participated in a ROSCA organised by his garage owner. In its lottery he  won 
Tk. 3500  and bought a rickshaw from the garage. Being the owner of a rickshaw, 
now, he also needs to hire a licence and pay protection money to the garage owner. 
Fourthly, the ROSCA acts as a catalyst to transform resources into capital. The capital 
accumulation system in the bustee context is accelerated by social capital. Furthermore, 
social capital is the means of entering the system of operation. Therefore, associations 
like ROSCA and ACSA play an important role in making social capital which produces 





 Example 7.4 
Ahad Mia is a shopkeeper with an estimated capital of Tk. 20,000 including the 
loan amounting to Tk. 4,000 taken by his wife as a member of ASD. He started a 
ROSCA by mobilizing 50 members (divided into two groups) from his friends and 
neighbours including three members of his family. Every member has to deposit 
Tk. 10.00 at the end of the day to him and at the end of each month they organise a 
draw. Ahad Mia does not receive any service charge.   
 
 
The contributions to their members mean that ROSCAs and ASCAs are frequently cit-
ed as examples of reciprocal associational cooperation and coordination.  Thus Putman 
(1993) for example, interprets them within his rosy view of social capital, without consid-
ering their internal structure and the motivations of the different actors involved.  It is, 
however, important to consider these, to look, for example, into the questions of where 
the ROSCA and ASCA are organised and by whom  and with what motives. My findings 
lead me to argue that ROSCA and ASCA are highly hierarchical and profit-making or-
ganisations for the organisers.  They do produce mutual trust but not necessarily ‘norms 
of reciprocity’; rather such arrangements secure a high profit flow for the organisers and 
maintain the bustee migrants’ distrust of the wider market. For example, by organising 
and managing ROSCA in the bustee economy, a shopkeeper such as Ahad Mia can make 
a number of benefits which are as follows: 
 as a member he gets a sum of money from the rotating draw  
 every evening he gets an amount on deposit from all the members that he uses as his 
required daily capital up to the date of draw 
 he uses the money as security for reen and baki enabling him to charge either higher 
price or interest on loans 
 apart from this, he gets honour and makes obligatory relations with the ROSCA par-
ticipants which put him in a powerful position in the bustee community. 
It has been found that the social capital resources, a product of such associational ac-
tivities, contain both vertical and horizontal relationships which separate the two groups 




that the bustee migrants have the same stock of social capital, as mentioned before, or 
gain an equal share of the benefits.  The organisers by dint of having initiated the activi-
ties earn the right to enjoy a monopoly control over them, backed up if necessary by 
physical violence, criminal activities and so forth. Therefore, the trust associated with 
ROSCA and ASCA is enforced, but produces comparative benefits to its members which 
leads bustee migrants to make of this resources. But, it also provides opportunities for the 




3.2 Generating Benefit from Enforced Trust 
In this section I will present how bustee migrants generate benefits through their en-
gagement with enforced trust. To illustrate this, I will take the case of a rickshaw garage. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a variety of associations have emerged centering 
on rickshaw transport, comprising the full range of actors, from garage owners to pullers. 
In addition to this, however, the garage pulls together all the actors and develops wider 
networks among the associations. Thus, as a part of mastaan structure, the owner of a 
rickshaw garage can offer a number of benefits to those who are associated with his gar-
age. The associations may start with entry as a rickshaw puller which also requires refer-
ral. But getting associated with rickshaw garage may lead on into a number of further as-
sociations like rickshaw pullers association, ROSCAs and so on.  
This associational engagement, with its multiplex relationship embedded within the 
mastaan structure as mentioned in the previous chapter, generates multiple benefits. As 
seen earlier, a member can get a rickshaw through a ROSCA. But ownership is not enough 
to develop into a rickshaw based enterpreneur, further capital is needed to operate it. 
First, rickshaws need a licence but these are no longer issued by the city corporation. 
Many rickshaw owners do not have the legal licence without which rickshaws are not al-
lowed to ply on the street, while at the same time there are many licence owners who do 
not have rickshaws. So, this issue is resolved by the garage owner arranging a rotation of 
existing licenses. Therefore, garage owners often have to take the role of co-ordinator by 
arranging an operating formula between these two groups. All the actors associated with 
rickshaw have to be in touch with the garage since it keeps the whole system functioning 
by negotiating, mediating and bargaining with the other actors.   
Secondly, a rickshaw needs services to keep running, a space to keep it at night and to 
repair it. One of the main purposes of the rickshaw garage is to rent out space for other 
rickshaw owners. Aiming to make it into a monopoly the owners seek to bring together 
and supply all the services necessary for  the rickshaw owners.  
Thirdly, as rickshaws are frequently stolen in Dhaka, all rickshaws develop a protection 
mechanism through rickshaw garages. The garage uses their wider networks with the law 
enforcing authority and the mastaan networks and issues a plate which it fixes to the rick-




on the rickshaw number plate ensures protection from theft. It works well mainly because, 
rickshaw garages engage in theft to force small owners to be dependent on them. 
The owner of a rickshaw garage provides multiple benefits to its members but the ser-
vices is not free; the clients have to pay for all services used by them. The price of viola-
tions of trust by the clients is huge and includes physical violence or being forced to 
leave the area.  
 
3.3 Associational Engagement as a Source of Information Exchange 
As we have seen, decision making for migration is highly correlated with the em-
ployment information on the urban labour market (see chapter 5). Before arrival, the 
main source of information for the bustee migrants was mostly their kin networks. The 
kin networks arrange the first job after arrival. As mentioned in the previous chapter, af-
ter arrival to the bustee the migrants get involved with a numbers of associations to de-
velop their closures of network in the urban context, linking together their friends and 
colleagues.  They also get access to the different types of associations which  may provide 
a number of benefits. One benefit is employment information which is the  most im-
portant for the  sellers of labour. Here, I will mostly present the information that is circu-
lated through enforced trust oriented associations rather that that which is circulated 
through simplex networks.   
First of all, I want to discuss the major sources of information on the urban labour 
market as used by the bustee migrants. Matrix 6.1 presented below shows that different 
categories of labour sellers have different sources of information. This is due to differ-




Matrix 7.1. Sources of information Access 
Category Main Sources of information 
Wage labourers Labour sardar 
Self-employed Trade union, garage based associa-
tions 
Employees in establishment Bustee netha, Work-based association 
Personalised networks like friends 
and colleagues 
Domestic Personalised networks like friends 
and bustee netha 
 
Recruitment in the labour market is very informal but is strongly associated with the 
guarantee arrangement. For the employers this fills the gap of longer term acquaintance 
with the worker. For the workers it offers a guarantee that they will receive payment.  
The reference system is embedded with the trust system which operates in the bustee con-
text, facilitated by the mastaan structure, as explained in the previous chapter. 
The informal labour market makes use of this trustworthy environment for recruiting 
its required labour.  Thus, the information regarding employment vacancy is circulated 
through the channels that the closures of networks has developed. Thus, most of the bus-
tee migrants can make use of their own closures of networks developed through their 
own associations. As matrix 7.1 shows the labour sardar is the main source of employ-
ment information; only the bustee migrants who are associated with such labour gangs 
can gain access to the information. This constraint reflects the surplus of labour relative 
to jobs available. In such a context, a ‘multi-purpose’ kin-based information system is not 
always sufficient. This then pushes the labourers to get more direct access to a wider in-
formation system to minimise the danger of not getting a job. To get access to such a sys-
tem, most of the wage labourers go through intermediaries like the labour sardar or con-
tractors. These intermediaries earn income by supplying the information.  Access to the 
information is therefore restricted, since the sardar is paid on daily basis for the infor-




labourers in establishments all work in an organised manner under a sardar whose main 
responsibility is to arrange employment for the labourers under him. 
Amongst the self-employed transport workers, information is circulated and con-
trolled by the garage based association. For example, the rickshaw somity  may provide 
employment information to their members. Similarly, a scooter driver gets access to em-
ployment information through the trade union. But they have to repay the trade union. 
For example, scooter associations collect toll money from every scooter stand in the city. 
The members of the trade union have to give their extra time to collect such toll money 
and pay back the trade union leaders.  
If  the labourers wish to get jobs in establishments or work as domestic workers, they 
need to get information through the bustee coalitions associated with mastaan structure 
and personalised networks. In order to avoid repetition, here, only the coalition-based 
association will be discussed. Many establishments like brickfields and restaurants  re-
cruit their labour through bustee coalitions, like angsho netha (faction leader) and bustee 
netha (leader). Through the association either of the labourers themselves or their house-
hold members or friends with bustee coalitions like factions, labourers get access to the 
information and get references for jobs. Domestic workers in many cases depend on the 
bustee netha, when their own personalised networks do not work.  
Because the informal labour market is operated through a system of references, la-
bourers have little choice to use sources other than associational opportunities. As the 
labourers are unskilled and  need to get various types of activities in order to maximise 
their cash, they want to link with different types of associations or make the closures of 
networks wider through linking with associations which produce multiplex relationships 




3.4 Apprenticeships: Outputs and Inputs of Associational Benefit 
As mentioned in chapter two, wage labourers are highly insecure compared to the 
other three categories of worker, as their income depends on the daily job availability in 
the market. One of the strategies adopted to escape this insecurity is to get access to jobs 
in the other categories where income flow is comparatively stable. Employment in estab-
lishments and/or self-employment is mostly conditioned by certain types of skill but is 
ranked in higher in the labour market. Therefore, to earn more the labourers need to de-
velop their skills and the only possible arrangement is apprenticeship. 
A family who can afford to send their children as apprentices, will want to do so for 
number of reasons. Firstly, apprenticeship ensures employment since after completion 
appointees will get a reference.  Secondly, it will ensure higher and more regular income. 
Thirdly, it will offer higher levels of networks. But, the question of how to get access to 
such opportunities depends on the stock of social capital resouces developed through 
closures of networks. Apprenticeships are also structured by the referral system. Appren-
ticeships are offered by three different types of establishment:  
 Many employers, particularly those who have factories with modern technology, 
depend on skilled and experienced labour. Due to the low supply of skilled labour 
in the labour market, small-scale industries or factories arrange for unskilled la-
bourers get on-the-job training.  
 House repairers also have a provision for on-the-job training.  
 Construction sectors are highly dependent on the arrangement of apprenticeships 
for children because child labour reduces costs.  
 Transport sectors normally offer apprenticeships. A low wage arrangement and the 
long time needed for acquiring skills generally discourages the main male income 
earner from getting involved with such a system  so  it absorbs a wide range of 
child labour.  
The apprenticeship system is again embedded in the reference sytem which limits ac-
cess to the prevailing opportunities. Other limits of access are age and gender.  Firstly, 




sensitive, to get access to the system of operation most of the apprentices start their ca-
reer from their childhood in establishments like factories. As well as imparting skills the 
apprenticeship, this process also provides an opportunity for them to get access to the 
employment market which in turn helps them get a comparatively regular and higher 
income flow to the household in the near future. Generally, though, this apprenticeship-
based production organisation is often criticised for its use of cheap child labourers, yet it 
does  guarantee employment after successful completion of the apprenticeship. So, bustee 
migrants prefer to send their children for training under such apprenticeship arrange-
ment. This is illustrated in example 7.5. 
 Example 7.5 
Kashem, aged 37, has six household members including himself. Since he and 
his wife are assured of the income required for their minimum needs, they decided 
to prepare their son  to become a skilled labourer.  Thus, their 13 year old son was 
sent to a leather factory to get on-the-job training.  After four years of apprentice-
ship in the factory, he got employment there.  
 
 
The apprenticeship arrangement is also gender-sensitive. As the female labour force is 
mainly segmented into the ‘feminine’ establishment like garments factories and women 
parlours, it is generally female children who get training in such establishments. Though 
entry into these sections is not age-sensitive, ranging between 12 and 35 years,  it is high-
ly skewed to both the poles of the limit. This skewed age distribution is influenced by 
marriage of the female labour force.  Most of the adolescent girls start their career as 
helpers in the garment factory but after marriage they stop working in the factory and 
take household activities as their main occupation either because they are forced to do so 
by the husband’s family because of purdah, or out of choice. However since marital in-
stability is common in the bustee context and the age for starting apprenticeship is relaxed 
in garments factories, many women who experience divorce also take apprenticeships or 
work in establishments like a garment factory. Garment factories offer apprenticeships 
for unskilled workers who are known as helpers. Most adolescent girls start their work-
ing life as apprenticees, learning about the technology from senior workers. This process 




However, apprenticeship provides both forward and backward networks linkages in the 
urban labour market. To get access to an apprenticeship, people need to be in touch with 
the range of existing networks - both kin-based and non-kin-based and apprenticeship 
itself makes the network of the apprentices much wider linking it to different actors and 
organisations functioning  in the urban setting. If we take the case of construction ap-
prentices, we can see the network map where one network leads to another and so on,  
making  the networks wider and  linking  them  with others.  
Example 7.6 
Rafiq , aged 24,  has been living in  the Southern part of BBB2 which is dominated 
by the Barisal faction for six  years. He started his career as a construction worker 
as a helper after his arrival from his home in Barisal. His brother-in-law who has 
been living in the same place for five years introduced him to a mason. Rafiq has 
quickly become a mason and started working independently with other helpers as-
sociated with contractors to whom he was introduced by the contractors with 
whom he was associated during his apprenticeship. 
Example 7.6 shows that Rafiq gained access to the apprenticeship through his regional 
group organised in the bustee under a faction. Through access to the apprenticeship, he 
came across new networks existing in the market. This network helps Rafiq to get access 
to employment as a skilled labourer. He paid for his apprenticeship with four years’ la-
bour. Not only did he gain the skill as a construction worker, but he also acquired the 
knowledge of the labour market as he developed a wider network within it. Therefore, it 
seems that apprenticeship helps develop a vertically integrated structure of relationship - 
a resourceful social network. This vertically integrated structure includes different stages 
of relations developed at different steps. The structure starts from the faction where he 
lives and ends with the owner of the enterprise. Thus, on the one hand the financial in-
vestment in terms of labour cost makes someone skillful, while on the other, it brings him 
or her to the wider network through different actors associated with mastaan structure. 
To sum up, it can be said that the interlocking system of market operation limits access to 
employment, while it offers a recruitment and information circulation system, having 
links with the trustworthy closures of networks like mastaan structure. The vertically in-




Therefore, to make a living in the urban settings the bustee migrants take the strategic 
option of the upward structure of  network. 
 
4. Conclusion 
As they settle down in town bustee migrants need to make use of the social capital re-
sources which they achieve through engagement in different associations. As shown in 
the previous chapters, the bustee migrants continuously struggle to produce effective so-
cial capital resources to establish some measure of security in a context where no formal 
institutions are operative. Their living and livelihoods options depend only on informal 
rights. The social capital resources that the bustee migrants produce are co-opted by the 
dominant actors in the urban political economy, the mastaan structure. But when the 
stock of social capital resources produced within the kin sphere is not sufficient to estab-
lish and sustain livelihoods, the only option left is to enter the networks of ‘enforced 
trust’ which support and are supported by the mastaan structure.  In the absence of any 
alternative the bustee migrants resort to the resources of the mastaan structure, they have 
no choice. 
Although the mastaan structure may offer advantages in the short-term, in the long run it 
creates a vicious spiral of exploitation. The inclusion of the excluded does not necessarily 
take place on positive terms. Through their participation in different associations and or-
ganisations, the bustee migrants are marginalised, manipulated, exploited and co-opted.  
Their cultivation of associations reflects as such an adjustment to pervasive mistrust.  The 
underlying logic of these relationships represents a process of adverse incorporation, 
within which poor bustee migrants can get an opportunity to pursue their livelihoods, but 
that opportunity itself reproduces the very structures of exploitation that undermine 







    I have mentioned in the introduction that my research process was rather uncon-
ventional. There are two aspects to this. First, as mentioned earlier, the research focus 
emerged during fieldwork, naturally and in a reflective way. It was in fact the bustee mi-
grants themselves who identified both the main strategy that they adopt and the critical 
actors that influence and affect their lives. These then became the main focus of my the-
sis. The overall concern of the thesis is to understand the practical responses of bustee mi-
grants to urban social transformation.  In particular, the thesis explores the significance of 
the role of mastaans in influencing the survival strategies of the bustee migrants.  The 
phrase ‘line lagao’  (to make connections or contacts) offered the starting point for analys-
ing these survival strategies.  Since bustee migrants have few, if any, formal rights and 
since neither state nor market institutions offer them access to employment, welfare or 
other urban services, the strategy of ‘line lagao’ highlights the importance of making and 
maintaining relationships with key actors who can provide the services needed.  By look-
ing at the strategy of ‘line lagao’, the thesis places epistemological emphasis on ‘what bus-
tee migrants do’ rather than on ‘how they are constrained’.  
    The second unconventional aspect of this research is that the theoretical framework 
was selected after completion of my fieldwork and the Urban Livelihoods Study of 
which it was a part. The data came first, and reflecting on its significance led me finally 
to select the concept of social capital to assist me in interpreting it. There are two ration-
ales for this.  Firstly, the centrality of the notion of ‘line lagao’ in my field data led me to 
seek a theoretical tool which would be equipped to analyse how relationships constitute 
an important resource to create opportunities and manage risk and insecurity. Secondly, 
my initial contact with the bustee and the employment to which I return in Bangladesh is 
as a development worker.  This exposes me to development discourse, in which the con-
cept of social capital and its notions of networks, trust and norms are currently much dis-
cussed.  I was therefore interested to test out these ideas in the context of my own field 




offer a brief summary of the main points of the thesis. In the second I will reflect on these 
to suggest some  implications that they may have for policy.   
 
2. Summary and Arguments 
    As stated in chapter one, the urbanisation process entails social transformation in 
that a large rural population shifts into cities.  However, cities are rarely, if ever, capable 
of supplying adequate services.  In such a contradictory situation, a continuous flow of 
migration further increases the urban population. Bustee migrants constitute one contrib-
utor to the increase in the urban population in Bangladesh. The bustee migrants are man-
aging their life in the urban settings by making use of social capital resources. In analyz-
ing the creation and use of social capital resources in the bustee context, the thesis makes 
its main points at two levels, theoretical and empirical. Although in practice these are in-
ter-related, for the sake of clarity I present these separately here. In the sections below I 
therefore begin with three theoretical issues and follow these with four further empirical 
points.  
2.1. Theory Focused Arguments 
    As I sought to apply the theory of social capital to my research data it became obvi-
ous that the concept is highly contested, comprising a wide range of ideas, views and 
perceptions. One of the main reasons is that conceptually and analytically social capital is 
derived through both sociological and economic traditions. There are three major argu-
ments that need to be highlighted here. 
Argument one: social capital is a value neutral resource with multi-dimensional 
features  
           This thesis argues both theoretically (chapter 4) and empirically (chapters 5 and 6) that 
social capital should be conceptualised as a resource which can be produced and stored. 
Chapter five shows that migration process itself creates social capital and helps to increase 
it.  As a resource social capital can, like ‘endowments’, be constructed and increased 
through deliberate action. It can also appreciate, as, for example, when people collect 
information and advice that reduce transaction costs.  Similarly, networks of friendship 




be  converted to secure economic or other forms of advantage. Moreover, social capital has 
‘public goods’ characteristics which facilitates peoples’ access to other resources. For 
example, as chapters six and seven show, the mastaans construct social capital primarily for 
their own monopoly benefit but it also provides the means to mediate benefits to others.   
          The significance of such benefits to the urban poor raises a question about the value 
judgements commonly made in relation to social capital.  (Putzel (1998), for example, terms 
this the ‘dark side’ of social capital, while Wood (1998) describes it as ‘adverse 
incorporation’ and Portes (1999) refers to it as the ‘public bads’ of social capital resources. 
When the same resources produce benefits for both the mastaans and for the urban poor this 
calls for a differentiated analysis. The resources themselves are constant but used very 
differently by different actors with different backgrounds and purposes. Rather than 
designating the resource itself as ‘bad’ when used by criminals and ‘good’ when mediating 
benefits for the poor, it is clear that social capital itself is value neutral like any other 
resource. The uses – good or bad - depend on the users not on the resources. 
 
       Argument two: the quality and quantity of the elements that constitute the social 
capital affect the level of benefits it produces.  This composition can also be reorganised.   
The capacity of social capital resources to mediate benefits depends on the quality and 
quality of the elements that compose it. An example of this is the difference between ties 
which constitute simple connections and closures which are connections that ensure 
rights of claim. There is thus a qualitative difference both in the relationships that make 
up the social capital and the broader benefits (such as trust) that it sustains. The high lev-
el of benefits mediated through the social capital of the mastaan structure is due to its 
multiplex character.  
Argument three: more research on social capital is needed to explore its use in de-
velopment contexts.     
   While social capital is now a fashionable term in development studies Sthere re-
mains the limitation that the term was originally developed on the basis of observations 
in developed countries. Foundations have been provided by Putnam’s work on Italy and 
followed up in the USA (Putnam 1993b, 1995, 1996) and Coleman’s (1988, 1994) reflec-




oped countries whether from an economic or sociological perspective.  The lack of dis-
cussion of social capital is particularly evident in the urban sector, and particularly in 
Latin America (see chapter four).  Some studies are now being undertaken to fill this gap, 
for example Narayan and Pritchett (1999) in Africa, Holland (1998) In Albania, Beall 
(1997) in India. The importance that this research has shown of social capital to the liveli-
hoods of the poor indicates, however, suggests that much more research on social capital 
is justified, and particularly the contradictory role played by actors such as the mastaans 
in facilitating this.  
 
2.2. Empirical  Findings Based Arguments 
    The following arguments have been put forward on the basis of the observations 
made in the Dhaka bustee. As mentioned earlier, the bustee dwellers consider social rela-
tionships to be their main resources. These arguments focus on how these resources are 
produced and used. 
Argument one : Bustee migrations play a dual role of reducing and constructing so-
cial capital resources 
   The migration process itself creates greater opportunities for the bustee migrants to 
develop social capital by widening their closure of networks and increasing their stock of 
social capital in the bustee (see chapter five). There is a continuous process of remaking 
household level social capital resources through chain migration (Tilly 1997), a form of 
migration whereby bustee migrants support and help other family members living in the 
rural areas. Household level social capital resources increase when new members from 
rural families join the original migrants in the bustee.  Furthermore, the migration process 
itself widens the closure of networks from the lineage kin to non-lineage networks.  This 
occurs primarily through the creation of fictive relations. Secondly, the migration process 
also reduces the social capital resources owned by the migrant household in the rural 
home. As mentioned in chapter two, a ‘structural hole’ is created when migrants move 
from villages to the bustee in that two important levels of social organization prevalent in 
the rural context (gusti and lineage based neighborhoods) do not exist or are not as strong 
in the urban bustee context.  This has a number of consequences for those living in the 




eage based networks assume responsibility in rural contexts are effectively absent in the 
bustee context. This suggests that the migration process reduces social capital both at 
household and community levels on one hand, and constructs new forms of social capital 
resources on the other. 
Argument two : The mastaan structure enjoys the right to construct informal rights 
   The mastaan structure enjoys the right to construct informal rights on the basis of the 
linking role it plays in both social and economic spheres. First of all, the mastaan structure 
connects two social levels situated at the two poles of the bustee social organisation. These 
levels are the bustee shamaj and the household members (khana sadasha).  Mastaans take 
advantage of the  ‘structural hole’ which exists in the bustee  social organisation to carve 
out a niche for themselves(see chapter two).  This confers on them significant power and 
the right to use or threaten violence in order to maintain their position. Thus the bustee 
social organisation assumes a different shape from the rural one in that it is based on 
non-lineage actors and networks.  Violence or the threat of violence becomes the ordi-
nary means for maintaining social control and order. In the rural area by contrast, the 
main means of control is family and kin- based pressure. The thesis also shows how this 
shift in the pattern of social organisation implies a concomitant shift in how trust is con-
structed.  While respect, honour and prestige play a fundamental role in the construction 
of trust in the rural areas, trust is often enforced in bustee contexts.   
In the absence of lineage based sanctions and an imposed code of behaviour, bustee 
migrants become relatively individualistic and opportunistic. This has the consequence 
of further reducing social capital resources at the level of the household. As mentioned in 
chapter two, serial monogamy has become a normal part of the bustee culture and this 
reflects a process of making and breaking family relations and bonds.  
Just as mastaans help organise the life of the bustee socially, they also act as intermedi-
aries between the more formal institutions and bustee dwellers. As shown in chapters one 
and two, the informal market, where migrants are involved in two main activities (the 
selling of labour and goods), is characterized by a cash economy. The urban cash econo-
my in turn implies two main processes: a) exchange through cash and b) transactions.   
The urban cash economy is an economy with a high level of risk in that it implies a 




change from an economy based on ‘reciprocity’ to one based on ‘exchange’ demands new 
closures of networks since the ‘moral economy’ (a system that enshrines the rights to 
make a claim on others and obliges a transfer of basic necessities) (Scott 1977) is absent 
(see chapter two). The lack of formal rights in terms of law, legislation or regulation in-
vites greater levels of manipulation, corruption and exploitation. This again creates space 
for intermediaries like mastaans to operate.  
Mastaans therefore operate both as organisers of the social life of bustees and as brokers 
between formal institutions and people. To the extent that they provide services (always 
against payment), they induce a certain level of predictability in the bustee. This predicta-
bility is important for poor bustee dwellers seeking to create strategies for survival in the 
city. Predictability is important in the search for the reduction of risk and uncertainty in 
the hazardous lives of bustee migrants. 
 
Argument three: Co-option of the social capital resources produced by bustee mi-
grants 
In the urban context where lineage based organisations are not functionally effective, 
bustee migrants organise themselves in different forms of association and networks (see 
chapter six).  In this way, they transform simple ties of ‘knowing me, knowing you’ to 
efficient closures of networks.  As mentioned in chapter six, the importance of building 
closures of networks among friends and colleagues is that it enables the construction of 
trust.  Bustee migrants therefore develop associations in order to make the environment 
where they conduct their transactions as predictable and trustworthy as possible.  Such 
associations are predominantly in the structure of simplex relationships but may be char-
acterised by overlapping membership (for example one can be a  member of both a rick-
shaw association and a ROSCA).  Again, it is mastaans who use their positional advantage 
to control and mobilise the different bustee coalitions and associations and in this way, 
they effectively control the urban political culture.  To do this, they call upon their own 
closures of networks with other urban actors often from outside the bustee.  The effective 
mobilization of networks and associations produces new social capital resources with a 
public goods character.  In other words, it opens up multiple options which may help 




through associational engagement, the actual structure of association is not controlled by 
them, but by the mastaans.  In this sense, associations become entities of a ‘public goods’ 
nature (see chapter six).  
 
Argument four: The response of the bustee migrants is a strategic one 
          To make a living in the urban setting, bustee migrants make use of the social capital 
resources available to them. They invest time and energy in developing social capital re-
sources which will ensure a ‘continuum of exchange’.  This continuity signifies a form of 
insurance system. In the bustee, it is not possible to build such a strategy without resort-
ing to resources, relationships and connections managed and controlled by the mastaan 
structure.  
In a context where both state and markets operate imperfectly and do not offer effec-
tive formal rights, opportunities for intermediaries and brokers who can provide services 
abound.  In the bustee, it is mastaans who assume the role of intermediaries or brokers.  
‘Mastaanocracy’ therefore offers access to services and a set of informal rights to poor ur-
ban dwellers.  Through these informal rights, these dwellers manage risk, uncertainty 
and insecurity. This is the main insight summarised in the phrase ‘line lagao’ 
 
3. Policy Implications 
    In the previous section I have highlighted two points regarding risk management. 
Firstly, bustee migrants are capable of producing social capital resources and secondly 
there are constraints on storing social capital resources. The former refers to strength and 
capacity and the latter refers to barriers to stock or weakness. As mentioned in the previ-
ous section, bustee migrants as actors are constructive and creative in building closure of 
networks. In order to construct a better life they migrate from the rural settings and enter 
the bustee. They take continuous initiatives in building relationships. The wider network 
building process starts with the migration process and then this is developed and ex-
tended in a calculative way. Calculative behaviour refers to the continuous struggle for 
survival.  However, the bustee migrants cannot store social capital resources due to the 




Bustee social organisation is problematic due to the fact that its intermediate levels are 
missing, creating a gap into which the mastaan structure has stepped. This ‘structural 
hole’ causes problems for the establishment of social capital resources at both household 
and community level. Similarly problematic is that while bustee migrants produce social 
capital in the non-kin sphere, the mastaan structure is in a better position to control these. 
The activities of the bustee migrants themselves therefore help to reinforce the position of 
the mastaan structure as multiplex-relationship-oriented closures of networks.  
The above suggests that the appropriate policy option would be mobilisation of the 
capacity of the bustee migrants and the removal of the barriers to storing social capital 
resources.  However, it is important to consider what strategy could achieve this. In con-
sidering this I draw on Hirschman’s (1970) framework of exit, voice, and loyalty. This 
framework is commonly used as a negotiation model by NGOs.  But in the bustee context 
the option of ‘voice’ or direct confrontation is to be questioned. This is because the means 
of controlling the bustee is violence or the threat of violence. It needs to be acknowledged 
that the voice raising option, may propel the bustee migrants towards exit. But according 
to the Hirschman, the exit option is unproductive or less productive because it reduces or 
destroys the  negotiating position. 
The first option that needs to be considered is mobilisation and exit. In the bustee con-
text, the option of partial exit would be the better strategy for the bustee migrants’ mobili-
sation. The partial exit refers to increasing bustee migrants’ strategic options for survival, 
through risk diversification, by building up alternative bases of social capital, while still 
retaining their engagement with the mastaan structure. This builds on the existing strate-
gies of bustee migrants. While they cannot avoid involvement with the mastaan structure, 
they also extend their own contacts and closures of networks across the bustee boundary 
either through personalised or associational networks or both. Although they accept the 
legitimacy of the mastaan structure and show loyalty to it through the system of enforced 
trust, bustee migrants also belong to a mutual trust system where there exists a  ‘continu-
um of exchange’ as mentioned in chapter seven. Thus, the ‘strategic option’ does not in-
dicate that bustee migrants are only adversely incorporated within the enforced trust, but 
also that they are operating with a sense of  ‘parallel rationality’ (see Wood, 1994) in 




the mastaan structure.  The existence of parallel rationality in the bustee context indicates 
the possibility  of ‘partial exit’.   
Use of such ‘partial exit’ is important because bustee migrants’ survive fully in the in-
formal sphere. In this sense migration to the bustee from rural settings challenges mod-
ernization assumptions that urbanisation represents social progress. In Weberian thought 
progress towards modernity will involve a move towards increasingly rational bureau-
cracy and governance through formal, impersonal institutions.  In this thesis, however, 
we have seen that when rural people migrate to the bustee they may exit from the rela-
tively secure formal and informal institutional rights prevailing in the rural contexts. 
They do not, however, subsequently enjoy the secure rights of modern citizenship when 
they settle in the bustee context. Rather they have to accept the informal rights operated 
through enforced trust which are created by the mastaan structure. The acceptance of 
such informal rights means getting benefit through subordination and loyalty where the 
option of voice is omitted, leaving partial exit as the only option. 
    By making use of partial exit options and their parallel rationality for institution 
building, bustee migrants may make use of the benefit of informal rights which derive 
from their loyalty to the mastaan structure.  The value of thinking in terms of parallel ra-
tionalities lies in the importance of the multiplex relationships of the mastaan structure 
which provides multiple benefits in the urban economy. It is unlikely that the traditional 
model of mobilisation through raising voice which is generally used in the mobilisation 
of the rural poor, would be effective in  challenging the mastaan structure  in the bustee 
context.   
    The second point is to consider the appropriate policy option for removing the ‘bar-
rier’ to the bustee migrants’ ability to store social capital resources i.e. possible replace-
ments of the mastaan structure. Since it is deeply rooted in wider economic and political 
culture, only a long term strategy can overcome it. Before indicating a policy option in 
this regard, we need to look back again to why this mastaan structure is so powerful. It is 
powerful from two perspectives: their ability  to use the threat of violence, and most im-
portantly, their acceptance as legitimate by the bustee migrants. The root causes of such 




produce ‘informal rights. Without creating an alternative to these, no strategy can be ef-
fective. 
In this situation a dual policy option may be considered. Firstly, we need the alloca-
tion of formal rights of citizenship to the bustee dwellers. This would weaken the mas-
taans’ capacity to impose and produce informal rights. The means to achieve formal 
rights is ‘voice’. Raising voice may be complemented by advocacy  with policy makers. 
    Secondly, the gap in intermediary social structure needs to be addressed. At pre-
sent, the mastaan structure, due to its multiplex relationships and closures of networks, 
enjoys monopoly rights to control the bustees.  In order to deal with the mastaans’ ‘en-
forced trust’ an alternative institution with multiplex relational characteristics should be 
produced. In this relation, NGO organised federal coalitions can be cited as an example 
which could work. As mentioned above, the created institutions must have the ability of 
multiplexity which means the ability to provide a wide range of required services. There-
fore, strong institution building activities may not be sufficient if the bustee migrants re-
main fully dependent on the mastaans for access to all required necessities.   
    To sum up, it can be said that a two-pronged policy option should be considered. At 
the micro level, policy should be directed towards mobilisation on the basis of a ‘partial 
exit option’ to build alternative institutions with the capacity to produce, increase and 
store social capital resources. At the macro level, policy should be directed towards rais-







KEY INFORMANT HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
 Household (HH)  No :  01 
 Category : Declining  
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Harun Howlader 
 Demographic Feature : 










Hamid Howlader Household 
Head 
Male 35 Married Rickshaw Pull-
er 
- 
Piara Begum Wife Female 28 Married Earth Cutter - 
Fatima Daughter Female 11 Unmarried - II 
Rosina Daughter Female 09 Unmarried - - 
Roma Daughter Female 07 Unmarried - - 
Soma Daughter Female 04 Unmarried - - 
 
 Income Sources : Rickshaw Puller+Earth Cutter 
 District  of  origin of HHH : Faridpur  
 Length of migration to Dhaka city :  15 Yrs 
 Household structure : Nuclear 
 Housing  : Rented 






 Household  (HHH) No : 02 
 Category : Declining 
 Name of Household Head : Nila Begum 
 Demographic Feature : 
 




Sex Age Marital Status Occupation Edu-
cation 
Nazma Begum Household Head Female 30 Separated Maid Serv-
ant 
- 
Mamun Son Son 05 Unmarried - - 
 
 Income Sources  : Maid 
 District  of origin of  HHH  : Manikgonj 
 Length of migration to Dhaka city  : 15 Yrs 
 Household structure   : Nuclear 
 Housing   : Own 




















 Household (HH) No    :  03 
 Catagory    :Coping 
 Name of Household Head (HHH)  : Sofiq Islam 












Rafiqul Islam HHH Male 21 Married Rickshaw pull-
er 
- 
Sebina Akter Wife Female 15 Married House Wife - 
Md. Alamin Brother Male 14 Unmarried Skilled Labour - 
Halima Daughter Femalr 1 Unmarried - - 
 
 Income Sources   : Rickshaw  pulling,  Salary 
 District of origin of  HHH  : Bhola (Barishal) 
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city : 2 Yrs 
 Household Structure   : Joint 
 Housing   : Won 




 Household  (HH)  No :  04 
 Category  : Declining 
 Name of Household Head  (HHH)  : Nurani Begum 
















30 Divorce Earth Cutter - 
Rina Daughter Fe-
male 
12 Unmarried Earth Cutter - 
Rabiul Mollah Son Male 06 Unmarried - 1 
 
 Income Sources : Earth Cutter 
 District  of origin of  HHH : Manikgonj 
 Length of migration to Dhaka city : 20 Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Rented 







 Household (HH) No : 05 
 Catagory : Declining 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Badol Mia 













Badsha Mia Household 
Head 
Male 45 Married Rickshaw Puller - 
Joitun Bibi Wife Female 35 Married House 
wife,Artisin 
- 
Liton Mia Son Male 14 Unmarried Hawker IV 
Abdul Malik Son Male 12 Unmarried Hawker III 
Laiju Begum Daughter Female 07 Unmarried Hawker I 
 
 Income Sources : Rickshaw Pulling, Howker, Artisan 
 District  of origin of  HHH : Barisal 
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city : 05  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Rented 





 Household (HH) No : 06 
 Category : Declining 
 Name of Household Head  (HHH) : Munni Begum 












Monowara Begum Household 
Head 
Female 30 Divorce Maid Servant V 
Jorna Daughter Female 12 Unmarried Garments Work-
er 
II 
Sahin Son Male 10 Unmarried - I 
 Income Sources : Maid , Garments 
 District of origin of (HHH) : Barisal 
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city : 05  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Own 








 Household (HH) No : 07 
 Category : Improving 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Abdul Ahad 












Abdul Wohab Household 
Head 
Male 45 Married Shop Keeper - 
Miful Begum Wife Female 40 Married Shop Keeper - 
MosleUddin Son Male 21 Married Rickshaw Puller - 
Bibi Fatima Daughter Female 16 Married House wife - 
Yanoor Bibi Daughter Female 11 Unmarried - - 
Noor Islam Paying Gust Male 17 Unmarried Rickshaw Puller - 
Bushir Paying Guist Male 21 Unmarried Rickshaw Puller - 
 
 Income Sources : Shop, Rickshaw pulling, maid House 
 District of origin of  HHH : Faridpur 
 Length of migration to Dhaka city : 10  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Joint 
 Housing : Own 
 Somity Member : NGO (ASD) 
 
 
 Household (HH) No : 08 
 Category : Improving 
 Name of Household Head  (HHH) : Monira Akter 











Mina Akter Household 
Head 
Female 40 Married Drug Seller - 
Jabbar Ragol Husband Male 50 Married Drug Seller - 
Amjad Son Male 08 Unmarried Student II 
Hummai Daughter Female 06 Unmarried - - 
 Income Sources : Drug Selling 
 District  of origin of (HHH) : Manikgonj 
 Length of migration to Dhaka city : 15  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Own 








 Household (HH) No : 09 
 Category : Coping 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Nazrul Islam 












Md. Nizam Household 
Head 
Male 38 Married Begging - 
Kayli Wife Female 50 Married Begging - 
Imran Son Male 03 Unmarried - - 
 Income Sources : Begging 
 District of origin of HHH : Bhola 
 Length of migration to Dhaka City : 04  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Rented 





 Household (HH) No : 10 
 Category : Coping 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Jan-E- Alam 













Jahangir Alam Household 
Head 
Male 25 Married Rickshaw owner 
& Pulling 
- 
Barium Wife Female 16 Married House wife - 
Rachel Son Male 01 Unmarried - - 
 
 Income Sources : Rickshaw, Rickshaw pulling 
 District  of origin of  HHH : Barisal 
 Length of migration to Dhaka city : 05  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Own 









 Household No (HH) : 11 
 Category : Coping 
 Name of Household Head  (HHH) : Mr. Shahansha 












Mr. Shaha Alam Household 
Head 
Male 22 Married Rickshaw Pull-
ing 
II 
Perveen Wife Female 18 Married Maid Servant - 
Monoara Daughter Female 06 Unmarried - - 
 
 Income Sources :  Rickshaw pulling, Maid servant 
 District  of origin of  HHH : Bhola 
 Length of migration to Dhaka city : 05  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Joint 
 Housing : Rented 








 Household (HH) No : 12 
 Category : Coping 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Abdul Odud 











Abdul Hamid Household 
Head 
Male 45 Married Boat Man IV 
Fulmoti Begum Wife Female 25 Married - - 
Luggita Wife Female 27 Married - - 
Asma Daughter Female 12 Unmarried - III 
Robin Son Male 10 Unmarried - - 
Nazma Daughter Female 06 Unmarried - - 
Farid Hossian Son Male 01 Unmarried - - 
 Income Sources : Boat, House 
 District of origin of HHH : Faridpur 
 Length of migration to Dhaka city : 15  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Joint 
 Housing : Own 









 Household (HH) No : 13 
 Category : Coping 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Basu Mia 










Md. Nosu Household Head Male 35 Married Rickshaw Pulling - 
Nurjahan Wife Fe-
male 
25 Married House wife - 
Kaber Son Male 10 Unmar-
ried 
Student III 




 Income Sources : Rickshaw pulling 
 District of origin of  HHH : Bhola 
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city : 03  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing   : Rented 








 Household (HH) No   : 14 
 Category   : Improving 
 Name of Household Head (HHH)  : Shahid Mia 











Salauddin Mia Household 
Head 
Male 47 Married Skilled la-
bour 
- 
Rahima Khatun Wife Female 30 Married House wife - 
md. ali hossain Son Male 04 Unmarried - - 
Sufia Khatun Daughter Femalr 2.5 Unmarried - - 
 Income Sources : Salary, House 
 District of origin of  HHH : Dhaka 
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city : 40 Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Own 







 Household (HH) No : 15 
 Category : Improving 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Monir Ali 
 Demographic Feature : 
 















Male 40 Married Service 
(Chairman) 
II 
Motijan Bibi Wife Female 35 Married House wife - 
Shafi Bibi Wife Female 22 Married Mail - 
Nunurnnahar Daughter Female 12 Unmarried - III 
Shirina Begum Grand Daugh-
ter 
Female  Unmarried - - 
Nirole Son Male 08 Unmarried - II 
Bashir Son Male 05 Unmarried   
 Income Sources   : Salary, Business (Duck Farm) Maid, House 
 District of origin of  HHH   : Bhola  
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city  : 20 Yrs 
 Household Structure   : Joint 
 Housing   : Own 





 Household (HH) No : 16 
 Category : Improving 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Md. Falu 
 Demographic Feature : 










Md. Faraque Household 
Head 
Male 30 Married Richsaw 
garage 
III 
Rena Wife Female 25 Married House wife - 
Farzana Daughter Female 08 Unmarried Student I 
Liza Daughter Female 05 Unmarried - III 
 
 Income Sources : Ricshaw garage, House, cattle farm, Scooter 
 District of origin of  HHH : Bhola 
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city : 15 Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Own 









 Household (HH) No : 17 
 Category : Coping 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Md. Israfil Hossian 











Md. Abdus Samad HHH Male 35 Married Rickshaw puller - 
Parul Wife Female 18 Married Maid - 
 
 Income Sources : Rickshaw pulling, Maid 
 District of origin of  HHH : Rangpur 
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city : 02  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Rented 






 Household (HH) No : 18 
 Category : Coping 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Abdur Rahim 
 Demographic Feature : 
















Anjuman Begum Wife Fe-
male 
35 Married Wagelabour - 
Mohammad Hossain Son Male 11 Unmarried Brick Break-
ing 
- 
Bibi Siysha Daughter Femalr 8 Unmarried - - 
Abul Hashem Son Male 7 Unmarried - - 
Zahura Begum Daughter Fe-
male 
 Unmarried - - 
 Income Sources : Maker, Wage 
 District of origin of  HHH : Faridpur 
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city : 15  Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Own 







 Household (HH) No : 19 
 Category : Coping 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Jainal Haq 













Fazlul Haq HHH Male 35 Married Rickshaw 
puller 
- 
Jarina Begum Wife Female 25 Married House 
Wife 
- 
Fahi Mia Son Male 7 Unmarried - - 
Fatima Begum Daughter Femalr 2.5 Unmarried - - 
 Income Sources : Rickshaw  pulling 
 District of origin of  HHH : Bhola (Barishal) 
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city : 4 Yrs 
 Household Structure : Nuclear 
 Housing : Rented 





 Household (HH) No : 20 
 Catagory : Coping 
 Name of Household Head (HHH) : Kuddus 
 Demographic Feature : 










Kalam HHH Male 25 Married Rickshaw 
puller 
- 
Shabana Azmir Wife Female 16 Married House Wife - 
Hazera Mother in law Female 45 Widow Maid Serv-
ant 
- 
Halima Daughter Femalr 1 Unmarried - - 
 Income Sources : Rickshaw  pulling, Maid 
 District of origin of  HHH : Bhola (Barishal) 
 Length of migration  to Dhaka city : 4 Yrs 
 Household Structure : Joint 
 Housing : Won 
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Addabagider Dal Cliques 
Amader lok One of us 
Astana Abode of a Muslim saint 
Baki A loan in kind normally taken from shops without interest 
Bari Homesteads 




Busteer aagsho Part of Bustee 




Cheris Slums (in Madras, India) 
Chowls Slums (in Bombay, India) 
Chouki Wooden bedstead 
Chula Stove 
Contractor Who provide work to labourer on behalf of employer 
Dal Faction 
Dalbal Gang 
Dhar A loan in the form of cash taken  from relatives, friends, acquuaint-
ances without interest 





Hawlat A small loan in the form of cash taken from relatives, friends ac-
quaintces without interest 




Jamat-E-Islami A Muslim fundamentalist political parties 
Kartras Slum (in Dhelhi, India) 
Khana Household 
Khana Prodhan Household head 
Khana Shadasha Household member 
Kutcha Semi-permanent, non cemented (of building) 
Kaj Work 
Khoraki Partial payment of daily labourer for daily consumption 
Kolis Labourers 
Line lagao Make a connection 
Lungui A dress of Bangladeshi men 
Mastaan Strongman/Muscleman 
Mastani A package of activities performed by mastaan like collection of    
protection money 
Mastanocracy Urban political economic culture where informal rights are preva-
lent 
Madracha Religious school 
Manikgor Peer group 
Matubbar Village leader 
Mauza Land adminstrative unit 
Mess Boarding house/dormitory 
Minti Porter 
Mishuk Three-wheeled auto-rickshaw 
Mohajan Owner of rickshaw 
Muribbi Homestead leader 
Netha Leader 
Pal Gang 
Paler goda Gang leader 
Panca Mental 
Para Part of village, neighborhood 
Pathi-mastaan Trainee muscleman 
Pauna Unpaid money of labour cost 
Peer Muslim saint 
Pitha Cake 
Proshika One of the largest NGO in Bangladesh 




Shalish Local informal judiciary system  
Sardar Traditional Labour leader 
Samaj Society 
Sharee A dress of Bangladeshi women 
Somity Cooperative 
Rangbaj Young muscleman 
Reen A loan taken on interest 
Rickshaw Three-wheeled cycle 
Tadbir Negotiation for fevour 
Tader lok One of them 
Taka The monetary unit of Bangladesh 
Takdir Fortune 
Tempoo Three-wheeled auto-rickshaw 
Thana Administrative unit of Bangladesh  
Upazila Sub-district 
Urus Annual gathering 
Ustad-sagred Mentor-apprenticeship 




ASCA Accumulating Savings and Credit Association 
ASD Assistance for Slum Dwellers - an NGO 
BBB Beri Badh Bustee  
BBB1 Beri Badh Bustee 1 
BBB2 Beri Badh Bustee 2 
BBB3 Beri Badh Bustee 3 
BBS Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
BIDS Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies 
BPDB Bangladesh Power Development Board 
BWDB Bangladesh Water Development Board 
CUS Centre for Urban Studies 
HHH Household Head 
IDPAA Institute for Policy Analysis and Advocacy at PROSHIKA 
      LFS Labour Force Survey 
      LSHTM London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
      NGO Non-Government Organisation 
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal 
STD Sexual Transmitted Disease 
ROSCA Rotating Credit and Savings Associations 
TK.  Taka – Bangladeshi Currency  
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal 
PROSHIKA One of the Largest NGO in Bangladesh 
QPS Quantitative Panel Survey 
UIS Urban Informal Sector 
ULS Urban Livelihoods Study 
UN United Nations 
UPDP Urban Poor Development Programme of PROSHIKA 
UPM Urban Popular Movements  
 













Abbot, J. and I. Guijt  (1997). “Creativity and Compromise.” In PLA Notes: Methodological 
Complementarity, IIED 28 : 27-32 
 
Adam, A (1993), “Food Insecurity in Mali: Exploring the Role of the Moral Economy” 
IDS Bullietin vol 24 no 4 :41-51 
 
Afsar, R. (1988). “Towards Organising the Urban Poor.” BIDS Dhaka :    (memio) 
 
Afsar, R. (1989).  Squatter Life in the Agargoan Area. Dhaka : BIDS. 
 
Afsar, R. (1995a). “Causes, Consequences and Challenges of Rural-Urban Migration in 
Bangladesh” Ph. D. Thesis, University of Adelaide, Austrlia 
 
Afsar, R. (1995b).  “Rural-Urban Migration and its Impact on Women’s Roles and States.”  
Empowerment, No   2   
 
Afsar, R. (1996). “Onus of Poverty on Women in the Poorer Settlements of Dhaka City.” 
Paper presented at the seminar on Women and Poverty organised by Women for 
Women at Academy for Planning and Development., Dhaka 
 
Ahmed, H (1997). Kathao Keu Nei, Dhaka : Kakoli Prokhasoni 
 
Ahmed, M (1999). “Mastanocracy: Reflections and Recollections” in The Daily Star, Dha-
ka, June 10.  
 
Alam, A. (1987). Bangladesh country paper. Urban Policy Issues, Regional seminar on major 
national urban policy issues, Manila, 3-7 February, Asian Development Bank. 
 
Alamgir, J (1993), “Rural urban Migration in Bangladesh: Theoretical approaches to Un-
derstanding the Internal and External Dynamices.” In Journal of Social Studies, 





Alamgir, M (1973). “Approaches Towards Research Methodology on Problems of Urban-
isation in Bangladesh. ” New Series No. 15, BIDS, Dhaka. 
 
Amin, A. (1981). “ Marginalism vs. Dynamism: A study of the informal sector in Dhaka 
city.” The Journal of Bangladesh Development Studies 9, 4 : 72 - 112. 
 
Amin, ATMN (1986). “Urban Employment and Underemployment” in Islam R and 
Muqtada M (eds) Bangladesh: Selected Issues in Employment, ILO, Asian Employ-
ment Programme, New Delhi. 
 
Amin, ATMN(1987). “Bangladesh Country Paper”, Asian Development Bank, Urban Poli-
cy Issues, Regional Seminar on Major national urban policy issues, Manila 
 
Amin, ATMN (1991). “Role of Informal sector in alleviating Urban Poverty” paper Pre-
sented in a saminar on urbanisation and urban poor, BIDS, Dhaka 
 
 Amin, S. et al   (1997). “ Transition of Adulthood for Working Girlss: the Case of 
Bangl;adesh Garment Workers” Paper Presented at Population  Council  Work-
shop on “Adolesence and Marriage among Female Garment Workers of Dhaka”, 
Dhaka: BIDS 
 
Appaduai, A.  (1988). ‘Putting Hierarchy in Place’ Cultural Anthropology 1(3):36-49 
 
Arefeen, H.K. (1994).  “Urban Social Structure in Bangladesh: A review of research.” In 
N. Islam, ed., Urban Research in Bangladesh. Dhaka : CUS. 
 
Arifeen S.E. and AQM, Mahbub, eds. (1993) A Survey of Slums in Dhaka Metropolitan Area 
1991.  ICDDR,B Urban FP/MCH Working Paper No. 11. Dhaka 
 
Arnes, J. and V. Beurden. (1977). Jhagrapur: Poor Peasants and Women in A Village in Bang-
ladesh. Amsterdam : Third World Publication. 
 
Arrow, K. J (1999). “Observation on Social Capital” in Social Capital : A Multifaceted   Per-
spective (eds)  Dasgupta , P and I. Serageldin, Washington, D.C : The World Bank 
 
Baker W.E. (1981), "The Social Structure of Security Market." American Journal of Sociology  





Baker W. E.  (1990).  "Market networks and corporate behavior."  American Journal of Soci-
ology 96 : 589 - 625. 
 
Balu, P. M. (1994). Exchange and Power in Life. New York: John Wiley&Sons. 
 
Banck G.A. (1980): “Survival strategies of low-income urban households in Brazil.” Urban 
Anthropology 9 : 227-242. 
 
Banfield, E. C. (1967). The Moral Basis of a Backward Society.  New York : The Free  Press. 
 
Bartles-Smith, D. and D.Gerrard (1976). Urban Ghetto.  London : Lutterworth  Press. 
 
Bearak,  B (2000). “In  a Dhaka Slum, The Grisly Fate of Handcuff Babul: Where Poorest 
of Poor Live, Criminals are Source of Both Crime and Punishment” in The New 
York Times, April  
Beall, J. (1997). “Social Capital in Waste - A Solid Investment?” Journal of International 
 Development 9, 7 :951-961 
 
Beneria, L. and S. Feldman eds. (1992). Unequal Burden: Economic Crises, Persistent Poverty, 
and Women’s Work.  Boulder, Colorado : Westview. 
 
Bennett, V. (1992). “The Evolution of Urban Popular Movements in Mexico Between 1968 
and 1988” in The Making of Social Movements in latin America: Identity, Startegy and 
Democracy, (eds) Escobar, A and Sonia, E.A., Westview Press, USA   
 
Berman, S. (1997) “Civil Society and the Collapse of of the Weimar Public” in World Poli-
tics 49: 401-429 
 
Bertocci, P. (1970).  Elusive Villages : Social Structure and Community Organisation in Rural 
Pakistan.  Unpublished PhD Thesis, Michigan State University. 
 
 
Birkbeck C. (1978). “Self-employed proletarians in an informal factory : the case of 
 Cali’s Garbage Dump.”  World Development 6, 9/10 : 1173-1185. 
 
Bhorer Kagoj (1996:) The Daily Bhorer Kagoj, 09  September, Dhaka 
 
 
Blok, A (1974), The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860-1960,  London : William Clows  





Bogdan, R and Taylor, S (1975), Introduction to Qualitative Research Method,  Chiches-
ter:John Wiley and Sons 
 




Booth, D. (1994). “Rethinking Social Development:an : an overview” in Rethinking Social 
Development:theory,research and practice, Booth, D. (ed), Essex, UK: Longman 
Group Ltd. 
 
Bose, A. (1965). “Internal Migration in India, Pakistan and Ceylone.”  In United Nations, 
ed., The Proceedings of the World Population Conference Volume 4.  New York : Unit-
ed Nations. 
 
Bourdieu, P  (1989), Outline of A Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press  
Bourdieu, P  (1993), Sociology in Question, London : Sage Publication  
 
Breman J. (1976). "A Dualistic Labour System? A Critique of the Informal Sector Con-
cept."   Economic and Political Weekly. Nov. 27:1979-1976, Dec 4:1905-1908, and Dec. 
11:1939-1976 . 
 
Bromley, R. and C. Gerry (1979).  Casual Work And Poverty in Third World Cities. John    
Chicester  : Willey and Sons. 
 
Burt, R. S. (1992).  Structural Holes, The Social Capital Structure of Compettion,  Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
 
Cain, M. (1978).  "The Household Life Cycle and Economic Mobility in Rural Bangladesh” 
Population and  Development Review 4 : 421- 438. 
 
Chakraborty, S and G. Rana  (1993). “Violence in the Urban Slums: A Case study of Delhi” 
in Social Action, ISI, April-June, vol 43, no 2 : 152-163. 
 
Chant, S. (1991). Women and Survival in Mexican Cities: Perspectives on Gender, Labour Mar-
kets and Low-Income Households.  Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
  
 
Canel, E. (1992). “Democratization and Decline of Urban Social Movements in Uruguay: 




ca: Identity, Startegy and Democracy, (eds) Escobar, A and Sonia, E.A.,  Westview 
Press, USA 
 
Cardoso, R.C. L. (1992). “Popular Movements in the Context of the Consolidation of De-
mocracy in Brazil” in The Making of Social Movements in latin America: Identity, 
Startegy and Democracy, (eds) Escobar, A and Sonia, E.A.,  Westview Press, USA 
 
Chen, M.A. (1986). A Quiet Revolution, Dhaka: BRAC  
 
 
Coleman, J. (1988). "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." American Journal of 
Sociology  94,  Supplement S95 - S121. 
 
Coleman, J. (1994a). Foundation of Social Theory.   Cambridge: The Belknup Press of     `    
Harvard University Press. 
 
 
Coleman, J. S. (1994). “Sustem of Trust and Their Dynamic Properties.” In  Founda-
tion of Social Theory.: Harvard University Press 
 
Coleman,  J. (1994b). "A Rational Choice Perspective on Economic Sociology." In  




Cottle, T. J (1972), The Abandoners: Protriats of Loss, Separation and Neglete,  Boston: Little 
Brown 
 
CUS (1983).  Slums in Dhaka City - A Socio-economic Survey for Feasibility of Slum Clearance 
and Urban Renewal Programme in Dhaka City. CUS :  University of Dhaka. 
 
CUS (1988). Bustees and Squatters in Dhaka City. Dhaka : Department of Geography, Univer-
sity of Dhaka. 
 
CUS (1989). The Urban Poor in Bangladesh Volume 1 : Comprehensive Summary Report.  Dhaka : 
Department  of Geography, University of Dhaka. 
 
CUS (1990.)  The Urban Poor in Bangladesh.  Dhaka : Department  of Geography, University 
of Dhaka. 
 
Datta, A.K. (1991). “ontrol, Conflict and Alliance: An Analysis of Land and Labour Rela-
tions in Two Bangladesh Villages.” Ph.D. Thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The 





Davis, P. (1997). ”The Concept of Social Exclusion as an Approach to Poverty in Banlgadesh 
: New Problematic or Eurocentric Imposition? “MA Thesis  in Development Stud-
ies, Unversity of Bath . 
 
Davis, R. and P. Harding (1991). Bangladesh Poverty Strategy: Literature Review of Urban 
 Slum Dwellers, Swansea : Centre for Development Studies 
 
Devine, J .(2000). “One Foot in Each Boat: The Macro Politices and Micro Sociology of 




D’Rozario, B (1998). “Factors Influencing the Growth of Sustainable People’s organisations 
at Grassroots Level: The case of Caritas and sangathan in bangladesh, Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Bath. 
 
Durkhem, E. (1984). The Division of labour in Society, New York :Free Press 
 
 
Elster, J. (1989).  Nuts and Bults for the Social Sciences : A Case Study in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence.  Cambridge  : 
 
Escobar, A and Sonia, E.A., (1992). “Conclusion: theoretical and Political Horizons of 
Changes in Contemporary Latin American  Social Movements” in The Making of 
Social Movements in latin America: Identity, Startegy and Democracy, (eds) Escobar, A 
and Sonia, E.A.,  Westview Press, USA  
 
Evans, A. (1989). Women: Rural Development: Gender Issues in Rural Household Economics.  
IDS Discussion Paper No. 254.   Sussex : Institute of Development Studies. 
 
Fafchamps, M.  (1992).  “Solidarity Networks in Pre-Industrial Societies: Rational Peas-
ants with A Moral Economy.” Economic Development and Cultural Change  : 
147-174 
 
Fei, J. C. H. and G. Ranis (1961).  "A Theory of Economic Development." American Eco-
nomic Review , 11(4) : 533-565. 
 
Feld, S. L (1981). “The Focused Organisation of Social Ties” in American Journal of Soci-
ology, vol 86 no 5 pp 1014-1035 
 






Frank, A. G. (1971). Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Harmondsworth : 
Penguin. 
 
Francis, F (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, London: Hamish  
Hamilton 
 
Francis, F (1999). The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the reconstitution of Social Order, 
Profile Books 
 
Gallagher, B. (1992). The Rickshaws of Bangladesh.  Dhaka : University Press Limited.  
 
Geertz C (1963), Peddlers and Princes, Chicago : Chicago University, Chicago Press 
 
Gambetta, D. (1968), “Mafia: The Price of Distrust” in Gambetta, D (ed) 
                        Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations,  Basil Blackwell Ltd. UK 
 
Gambetta, D. (1968). “Can We Trust Trust?” in D. Gambetta,(ed.), Making and  Breaking 
Coopertive Relations.  UK : Blackwell, Ltd 
 
Gambetta, D. (1993). The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection. Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 
 
Germani, G (1964), “Migratin and Acculturation” in M, Hauser(ed) Handbook for Social 
science Researchin Urban Areas UNESCO, Parismpp  :159-178 
 
Granovetter,  M. (1973). "The Strength of Weak Ties."  American Journal of Sociology 
                78 : 130-80 
   
Granovetter, M. S. (1977). Getting a Job, London :Harvard University Press,  
 
 
Granovetter, M. (1985).  "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embed-
dedness."  American Journal of Sociology 91, 3 :  481 - 510. 
 
Giddens, A (1984), The Constitutions of Society, Cambridge:Polity Press  
 





Gluckman, M (1967). The Judicial Process among the Barotes of Northern Rhodesia, 2nd ed. 
Manchachester: Manchachter  University Press 
 
GOB (1988).  Bangladesh Household Expenditure Survey 1985-86. Dhaka: Bangladesh Bureau  
of Statistics. 
 
GOB (1994). Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh 1994. Dhaka:  Bangladesh Bureau  of Statis-
tics. 
 
Gudeman, S (1990), Conversation in Columbia: the domistic economy in life and text, Cam-
bridge : CUP. 
Hammersley, M  (1992).What’s Wrong with Ethnography? London: Routledge 
 
Hammersley, M and Atkinson, P (1995) Ethnography: Principles in Practice (2nd edit.); 
Routledge: London: New york 
 
 
Harriss, J. and De P. Renzio (1997).  "Missing Link or Analytically Missing? The  Concept 
of Social Capital." Journal of International Development  9:919-937 
 
Harriss, J. (1982). “Character of An Urban Economy : Small Scale Production and Labour 
Markets in Coimbatore.” Economic and Political Weekly June 5 : 945-954, and 12 : 
993-1001.  
Harriss, J. (1986). Vulnerable Workers in the Urban Labour Markets of South and South-East 
Asia.  Reports in Development Studies. No. 32.  Norwich : School of Development 
Studies, University of East Anglia. 
 
Hart, K. (1988). "Kinship, Contact, and Trust : The Economic Organization of Migrants  in 
An African City Slum."  In D. Gambetta (ed),  Making and Breaking Cooperative Re-
lations.  UK : Blackwell, Ltd. 
 
Hartmann, B  and B,  James (1983), A Quite Violence: View From a Bangladesh Village, Lon-
don: Zed Press 
 
Hauser, P.M. (1985), “Introduction and Overviews”, in Urbanisation and Migration in 
ASEAN Development, P.M. Hauser, D.B Suits and N, Ogawa (eds), Tokyo: Na-
tional Institute of Research Advancement 
 
Hirschman, A.O. (!970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to decline in Firms, Organisations, 





Hirschman, A (1982).  ‘’Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive or 
Feeble?” Journal of Economic Literature 20,  4 : 1463 - 84. 
 
Hoselitz, B. F.  (1957).”Generative and Paraistic Cities” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 3 : 278-94 
 
Hossain, M. (1989). Nature and Impact of the Green Revolution in Bangladesh”, Research  Re-
port No. 67. Washington DC : International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
 
Holland, J. (1998). “Does Social Capital Matter? IDS Bulletin vol. 29, No. 3: 65-71 
 
Hulme, D. (1998).  “Protecting and Strenthening Social Capital in Order to Produce De-
sirable Development Outcomes”.London : DFID 
 
Hulme, D (1994), “Social Development Research and the Third Sector: NGOs as Users 
and Subjects of Social Enquary” in Rethinking Social Development:theory,research 
and practice, Booth, D. (ed), Essex, UK: Longman Group Ltd. 
 
Huq, S. (1992).  Bubupura busteer khamatha  katamo  Dhaka : Proshika (mimeo). 
 
 
Huq, S. and A. Sabri (1992). Busteete Panisarbarah babostha: Mohakhali busteer  chalchit-
ro  Dhaka : Proshika (mimeo). 
 
Huq-Hussain, S. (1996). Female Migrant’s Adaptation in Dhaka - A Case of the Process of Ur-
ban Socio-Economic Change. Dhaka : Urban Studies Programme (USP), University 
of Dhaka. 
 
ILO (1972).  Employment, Incomes and Equality : A Strategy for Increasing Productive Em-
ployment in Kenya.  Geneva : International Labour Office. 
 
ILO (1973).  Strategies for Employment Promotio :An Evaluation of Four Inter-Ggency Em-
ployment Missions.  Geneva : International Labour Office. 
 






ILO (1972).  Employment Incomes and Equality: A strategy for Increasing Productive Employ-
ment in Kenya. Geneva : International Labour Office. 
 
Islam R. and M. Muqtada, eds. (1986). Bangladesh Selected Issues in Employment and Develop-
ment. New Delhi: International Labour Organisation, Asian Employment Pro-
gramme (ARTEP). 
 
Islam, F. and S. Zeitlyn (1987).  “Ethnographic Profiles of Dhaka Bustee.” Oriental Geogra-
pher 31, 1 : 42. 
 
Islam, N. (1994). “Review of Research on Urban Poverty and the Urban Poor in Bangla-
desh.” In N. Islam, ed., Urban Research in Bangladesh. 
 
Islam, N. (1996). “Migrants in Dhaka Metropolitan Area.” In N. Islam, ed., Dhaka: From 
City to Megacity.  Dhaka : Urban Studies Programme (USP), University of Dhaka. 
 
Islam, N. (1997). “Urban Poverty, Government Policy and Its Implications for NGOs in 
Bangladesh.” Paper presented at the Workshop on Experience Sharing of NGOs 
Working with the Urban Poor and Identifying Major Issues to be Addressed, 
Dhaka. 
 
Jansan, E. G. (1987).  Rural Bangladesh: Competition for Scarce Resources.  Dhaka : University 
Press, Ltd. 
 
Jencks, C. and P.E. Peterson, eds.(1991).  The Urban Underclass.  Washington DC :   
 The Brookings Institution. 
 
Jesmin, S. (1998). Marital Instability and Its Effect on Women and Children. ULS monograph, 
IDPAA.   Dhaka : Proshika. 
 
Kabir, M. A. (1998). Ill-Health as A Barrier to Strategies for Improvement: A study on the Eco-
nomic Behavour of Slum Dwellers. ULS Monograph, IDPAA. Dhaka : Proshika. 
 
Kabeer N. (1989). Monitoring poverty as if gender mattered: a methodology for rural Bangladesh.  
IDS Discussion Paper No. 255.  Sussex : Institute of Development Studies. 
 






Keefer, P. and k. Stephen (1997). “Does Social Capital have an Economic Payoff? A           
cross-Country Investigation?”The quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2):1251-88     
 
Khan M I A (1998). “Livelihoods of New Bustee Migrants”, Research Monograph, 
(Mimeo), Proshika, Dhaka. 
 
Kochnaek, S.A. (1993). Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh. Dhaka : UPL. 
 
Krishna, A (1999). “Creating and Harsessing Social Capital” in Social Capital: A Multifac-
eted Perspective (eds) Dasgupta P and I. Seraggeldin, Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank 
 
Laskar, S.I. (1983). Urbanisation in Bangladesh 1901-1981. Research Report No. 34, Dhaka : 
BIDS. 
 
Law, J (1986), “Introduction :monsters, machines and socio-technical relations” in A Soci-
ology of Monster: esseys on Power, technology and Domination (ed) J. Law, London: 
Routedge 
 
Levi, M. (1996). "Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s Making 
Democracy Work."  Politics and Society  24,  1 (March)  :  45-55 
 
Lewis, O  (1959).  Five Families: Mexican Studies in the Culture if Poverty, New York, Basic 
Books,  
 
Lewis, O  (1967). La Vida: A uerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty . New york: Ran-
dam House. 
 
Lewis D. J (1989)  “Technology and Transaction: A Study of the Interaction Between New 
Technology and Agrarian Structure in Bangladeh”, Ph. D. thesis, University 
Of Bath.  
 
Lewis D. J., and J.A. McGregor (1992). Vulnerability and Impoverishment in Northern Al-
bania.  CDS Occasional Paper and Report to ODA. UK : ODA. 
 
Lewis D. J., et. al, (1993).  “Going It Alone: Female Headed Households, Rights and Re-
sources in Rural Bangladesh.” Occasional Paper No. 01/93. UK : Centre for Devel-





Lewis, D. (1996a). Corruption in Bangladesh : Discourse, Judgements and Moralities.  Occasional 
Paper No. 05/96. UK : Centre for Development Studies, University of Bath. 
 
Lewis D. J (1996b) Trading the Silver Seed: Local Knowledge and Market Moralities in 
Aquacultural Development, UPL, Dhaka 
 
Lloyd, P. (1979). Slums of Hope: Shanty Town of the Third World. Manchester : Manchester 
University Press. 
 
Lin, N., W.M.Ense and J.C. Vagghn (1981). “Social Resources and Strength of Ties: Struc-
tural Factor in occupational Attainments, in American Sociological Review, 
46:393-405   
 
Lipton, M (1977). Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study of Urban Bias in World Development, 
Brookfield USA, Hongkong, Singapore, Sydney : Athenaeum Press. 
 
Lipton, M and S. Maxwell (1992).  The New Poverty Agenda: An Overview. Institute of De-
velopment Studies Discussion Paper 3.6.  Sussex, England : Institute of Develop-
ment Studies, University of Sussex.  
 
Logan, K. (1981).  “Getting by with Less: Economic Strategies of Lower Income Households 
in Guadalajara.” Urban Anthropologist 10, 3: 231-46. 
 
Long, N. (1992). "From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained: the Case for an Actor-
oriented Sociology of Development. " in N. Long and A. Long, eds., Battlefield of 
Knowledge.  London :  Routledge.  
 
Long, N. and A, Long (1992).  Battlefield of Knowledge, London :Routledge 
 
Loury, G, C  (1977) “A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences” in Women, Minorities 
and  Employments Discrimination (ed) P A Wallace, Lexington AM La Mond, : 153-
186. LexingtonMA:Health. 
Mead, Margaret (1977), Letters From the Field, New York:Harper Colophon Books 
 
McGregor,J.A (1991),  “Poverty and Patronage: A Study of Credit, Development and 





McGregor,J.A (1998), “A poverty of Agency: Resource Management Among the Poor in 
Bangladesh”, Paper presented presented to the 5th ENBS Workshop held in the 
University of Bath. 
Majumder, P.P., S. Mahmud and R. Afsar (1995). The Squatters of Dhaka City - Dynamics in 
the Life of Agargaon Squatters. University Press Ltd. 
 
Mannan, R. and F. Akhter (1991). “Employment and Earnings of Informal Sector Mi-
grant” Paper in a seminar on urbanisation and urban poor at BIDS, Dhaka 
 
Matin, I. (1997). “The Renegotiation of Joint Liability : Notes from Madhupur.” In G. 
Wood and I. Sharif, eds., Who Needs Credit ?  Dhaka : The University Press Lim-
ited. 
 
Mauss, M. (1954).  Archaic Society. London : Cohen and West. 
 
Mazumdar, D. (1976). ‘The urban informal sector." World Development  4, 8 : 655-679. 
 
 
Miah,  M. , K. E. Weber and N. Islam (1988).   Upgrading A Bustee Settlement in Dhaka. Bang-
kok, Thailand : Division of Human Settlements Development, Asian Institute of 
Technology. 
 
Mitchell J. C. (1973). “Networks, Norms and Onstitutions.” In J. Boissevain and  J. C. 
Mitchell, eds., Network Analysis Studies in Human Interaction. The Hague : Maiton 
and Co. 
 
Mohan, R. (1984), “The Economic Determinants of Urbanisation: The Regional Patern of 
Urbanisation in India Explained”, Discussion Paper DRD -78, Washington, D.C. 
World Bank 
 
Mohammad, (1981). “Mastaans “ in Weekly Bichitra, Dhaka: No 34, 6 February  
 
Mohit, M.A. and C. L. Choguill (1987). Small and Medium-Sized Towns in the Development 
Policy of Bangladesh. Paper presented at the Development Studies Association An-
nual Conference, University of Manchster, 16-18 September. 
 
Moser, C (1995): “Confronting Crisis: Household Responses to poverty and Vulnerability. 






Moser, C.  (1996).  Confronting Crisis : A Comparative Study of Household Responses to Pov-
erty and Vulnerability in Four Poor Urban Communities. Environmentally Sustaina-
ble development studies and monographs series NO. 8.  Washington DC : The 
World Bank. 
 
Moser, C.  (1998). "The Asset Vulnerability Framework : Reassessing Urban Poverty 
 Reduction Strategies.". World Developement 26, 1 :1-29 
 
Moser,  C. and J. Holland (1995) “A participatory Study of  Urban Poverty and  
Violence in Jamica: Summary Findings” Urban Development Division, Washing-
ton DC : The World Bank  
 
Maxwell, S and M.  Smith (1992) “ Household Food Security: A Conceptual Review” in 
Household Food Security: Concepts, Indicators, Measurements (eds) S. Maxwell and t 
frankenberrger, IFAD and UNICEF, Rome and New york 
 
Nadvi, K (1999). “Knowing Me, Knowing You: Social Networks in the Surgical Instru-
ment  Cluster of Sialkot, Pakistan.”   IDS Discussion Paper 364. Brighton : Institute 
of Development Studies, University of Sussex. 
  
Nadvi, K (1999).   “Shifting of Ties: Social Networks in the Surgical Instrumental Cluster 
of Sialkot, Pakistan,” In  Development and Change vol 30 (1999), 141-175. 
Narayan, D. and Pritchett, L. (1999). “ Cents and Solideraty:Household Income and Social 
Capital in Rural Tanzania” Economic Development and Cultural Change 47 (4): 871-989. 
 
Norris, W. P. (1988). "Household Survival in the Face of Poverty in Salvador, Brazil: to-
wards An Integrated Model of Household Activities." Urban Anthropology 17, 4 : 299 
- 321. 
 
North, D. (1990).  Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press  
 
Opel, E, A. (1998). Livelihoods of the Vulnerable.  Bangladesh : IDPAA, Proshika. 
 
Peattie, L. R.(1974).  The Informal Sector : A Few Facts from Bogota, Some Comments and A 
List of Issues.   : Department of Labour Studies and Planning, MIT. 
 
Perlmanan, J.E. (1976), The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro, 





Peterson, J. E., Thomas K. and Jeffrey, P.T.T.  (1991). “Urban Economics and National de-
velopment,” Washington, D.C: USAID, Office of Housing and Urban Programs. 
 
Portes, A. (1998 ), “Social capital:Its Origin and Applications in Modern Sociology” in in 
Annual Reviews of Sociology,  1998, 24:1-24  
 
Polanyi, K. (1944).  The Great Transformation : The Political Economic Origins of Our time.  
USA :  Beacon Press. 
 
Polanyi, K. (1992). “The Economy as Instituted Process.” In M. Granoverr and R. Swed-
berg, eds.,  The Sociology of Economic Life. London : Westview Press. 
 
Pryer, J. , E. Clay and B.  Harriss (1991).  Nutritionally Vulnerable Households in the Urban 
Slum Economy: A Case Study from Bangladesh. Paper presented to the British Sociolog-
ical Association National Conference (Processed). 
 
Pryer , J. (1990).  Socio-economic and Environmental Aspects of Undernutrition and Ill-Health in 
An Urban Slum in Bangladesh. Unpublished PhD Thesis, London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine. 
 
Pryer,  J. (1993). “Nutritionally Vulnerable Households in the Urban Slum Economy: a Case 
Study from Khulna, Bangladesh.” In L.M. Schell, M. Smith and A. Bilsborogh, eds, 
Urban Ecology and Health in the Third World.  Cambridge : Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic and Tradition in Modern Italy, Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Puntam, R. (1993b). “ The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life.” 
 The American Prospect 13:35-42 
 
Puntam, R. (1995). “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” Journal of 
 Democracy 6 (1) :  65 - 78. 
 
Puntam, R. (1996).  “The Strange Disappearance of Civic America.” The Arerican  Pro-
spects, 24:34-48 
 
Putzel, J. (1997). "Accounting for the ‘Dark Side’ of Social Capital: Reading Robert Put-





Rahman, H. Z. and M. Hossain, eds. (1995). Rethinking Rural Poverty: Bangladesh as case 
study.   : The University Press Limited. 
 
Rahman, P.M.M (1994).  Poverty Issues in Rural Bangladesh, Dhaka : University Press Lim-
ited. 
 
Rahman, M. (1998).  “Social Capital, Accumulation of Resources and Poverty:  An 
 Analytical Framework of Study Social Oragnisation of Economy  (Embed-
dedness)  with Reference to Bangladesh”.  Paper presented in   ENBS work-
shop, 16-18 April,  Bath, UK. 
 
Rahman, M.  (1998).”NET- society: Mark Granovetter on Network, Embededness and  
 Trust” in  Sociologi, No 4 :87-113 
 
Rahman, A (1998), “ Rhetoric and Reality of Micro- Credit for Women:  Anthropologi-
cal Study of Grameen Bank Lending in Rural Bangladesh” Ph.D.  Thesis, University  of 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada. 
 
Rakodi, C. (199). “A Capital Assets Frameworks for Analysing Household Livelihood 
Strategis: Implications for Policies” in Development Policy Review, vol. 17: 315-342. 
 
Roberts, B. (1978),  Cities of Peasants.  London :  Edward Arnold. 
 
Roberts, B. (1995),  The Making of Citizens : Cities of Peasants Revisited.  London :  Edward 
Arnold.  
  
Rutherford, S. (1997). “Informal Financial Services in Dhaka’s slums.” In G. Wood and I. 
Sharif, eds., Who Needs Credit?   Dhaka : The University Press Limited. 
 
Salaff, J.W. and W. Siu-lun (1998). “Network Capital: Emigration from Hong  Kong.” 
British Journal of Sociology  49,  3 :385-373. 
Salway, S., A, Rahman and S. Rahman  (1998). “Urban Livelihoods study: Preliminary 
Findings From the quantitative Panel Surveys” Prosshika, Dhaka 
 
Schiff,  M. (1992). “Social Capital, Labor Mobility and Welfare.”Ration, Soc 4 : 157-75. 
 
Schneider, C. (1992). “Radical Opposition Parties and Squrters Movements in Pinochet’s 
Chile,  in The Making of Social Movements in latin America: Identity, Startegy and 
Democracy, (eds) Escobar, A and Sonia, E.A.,  Westview Press, USA 
Scott, J. C. (1976).  The Moral Economy of the Peasant, - Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast 





Scott, J.  C. (1985).  Weapons of the Weak.  London : Yale University Press. 
 
Sen, A. (1982).  Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford : Ox-
ford University Press.  
 
Sen, N.D. (1998). “Shafollo Baktimanuske Gile Falee, Kintho Amartho Chiro Amlan 
Thakuk: Amartho Shamprokke Ja  Monea Alo, in Weekly Desh, Calcutta, In-
dia:1:57-65 
 
Shahabuddin,  M (1998) “Urban Poverty Reduction Strategy and Major  Policy Advocacy 
Process: The Proshika Experience”, paper presented at DSA conference 1998, Un-
versity of Bradford, UK 
 
Shakur, M. T. (1987).  “Urbanisation and Housing in Bangladesh.” The Journal of Himanchal 
Pradesh Institute of Public Administration 1 : 27 - 37. 
 
Shakur, M. T. (1988). “Implications for Policy Formulation towards Sheltering the Home-
less, A Case Study of Squatters in Dhaka, Bangladesh.” Habitat International 12, 2 :  
53 - 66. 
 
 Shakur, T. , M. Madden, M. (nt.dt.) A. Rita.  Resettlement Camps: An Answer to Spontane-
ous Settlements: a socio-economic profile of squatter settlements in Dhaka. 
 
 
Siddiqui, K. , S.R. Quadir, S. Alamgir and S. Huq (1990).  Social Formation in Dhaka City. 
Dhaka : UPL. 
 
Stack, C  (1974). All Our Kin,  New York, Harper &Row 
 
Stanley,  K  (1988). “Urbanisation in the Third World”, The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, June 
05. 
 
Stockman, F.N., R. Zeigler, R. and J. Scott  (1985).  Networks of Corporate Power. Cambridge 
: Policy Press. 
 





Sterling, C.(1990). The Mafia: The Long Reach of the International Sicilian Mafia, Hamish 
Hamilton, 
 
Swift, J.  (1989), “Why are poor people vulnerable to famine?” IDS Bulletien vol 20 n0 2:8-
15 
 
Task Force (1992).  Report of the Task Forces on Bangladesh Development Strategies for the 1990s : 
Volume Three, Developing the Infrastructure, Dhaka : Government of Bangladesh. 
 
The Daily Star (1996). “ A Day in the Life of Sadarghat”, The Daily Star, July 26. 
 
The Daily Star (1999). “Democracy or Mastanocracy: Do we have a choice? The Daily Star, 
June 10. 
 
Tilly, C (2000). “Social Movements as Political Struggle” in Encyclopedia of American So-
cialMovments,://www.sociology.columbia.edu/faculty/tilly/pub/ 
             tilly_soc.htm1 
 
ULS (1995). Workshop on PRA, ULS, IDPAA.   Dhaka : PROSHIKA. 
 
UNDP (1993). HABITAT and the Government of Bangladesh. Bangladesh Urban and Shelter Sec-
tor Review (draft). 
 
Van Schendel (1986). “ Self-Rescue and Survival: The Rural Poor in Bangladesh” papre 
presented ASA, Australia 
 
Warten, E. (1995), “Conceptualising Urban Poverty” in Envoronment and Urbanisation, 
Vol. 7, No. 1. :11-36 
 
Waldinger, R  (1995). “The ‘Other Side of Embeddedness: A Case Study of the Interplay 
Between Economy and Ethnicity”, Ethnicity Racial Studies 18: 555-80.  
 
Walston, J  (1988), The Mafia and Clientalism: Roads to Rome in post-war Calabria,  London 
and New York : Routledge. 
 
Williamson O, E, (1981) “The Economics of Organisation: The Transaction Cost Ap-





White S.C. (1992) Arguing with the Crocodile: Gender and Class in bangladesh, London: Zed 
Books,  
Wood, G.D (1994). Bangladesh: Whose Ideas, Whose Ineterests? Dhaka: UPL 
 
Wood, G. D. (1998). “Investing in Network: Livelihoods and Social Capital in Dhaka 
 Slums”.  Paper presentaed  in the ULS workshop, Dhaka, Bangladesh 14 - 16 
 January held at IDPAA, Prshika.  
 
Wood,  G. D. and I, Sharif (1997), “Who Needs Credit? Poverty and Finance in  Bangla-
desh”, UPL, Dhaka 
 
Wood, G. D. (1999). “ Adverse Incorporation:The Dark Side of Social Capital” Notes 
for IFIPA meeting, IFIPA, University of Bath. 
 
 
World Bank (1992), Bangladesh:  Selected Issues in External Competitiveness and   
 Economic Effiency, Washigton, D.C. The World Bank. 
 
Wrong,  D (1961). “The Oversocialized  Conception of Man in Modern Sociology, in  
 American Sociological Review, 26: 183-193 
 
Zucker L. G. (1986).  “The Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economice Struc-
ture, 1840-1920.” In B. State and L. L. Cumnings, eds.,  Research in Organisa-
tional Behaviour.  Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
